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INTRODUCTION 
Recent debate about the propriety of relying on legislative his-
tory1 in interpreting statutes has tended to focus on the landscape 
as a whole. Federal judges, writing both in opinions2 and in schol-
1. I use the term legislative history to refer to assorted materials generated within 
Congress as part of the process of statutory enactment. These materials principally include 
committee reports, floor statements, and committee hearings. My primary focus is on com-
mittee reports. See infra note 298. 
2. For disagreement at the Supreme Court level, see, for example, Conroy v. Aniskoff, 
113 S. Ct. 1562, 1566 n.12, 1567-72 (1993) (Stevens, J., writing for the Court, debating with 
Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2109 
n.8, 2111 (1992) (Souter, J., writing for the Court, debating with Scalia, J., concurring); Wis-
consin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610-12 n.4, 616-23 (1991) (White, J., writing 
for the Court, debating with Scalia, J., concurring); and Public Citizen v. United States Dept. 
of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470-73 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See also Thunder Basin 
Coal Co. v. Reich, 114 S. Ct. 771, 782 (1994) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., joining some parts of 
majority opinion but not Part 111-B) (rejecting the Court's use of legislative history as a tool 
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arly journals,3 have expressed spirited disagreement over whether 
to consult legislative history at all. Legal academics, in espousing 
divergent theories of statutory interpretation, have frequently illus-
trated and supported their theories by drawing on or referring to 
the broad corpus of legislative history.4 
An alternative approach is to begin by examining a particular 
context in an effort to arrive at more general insights or conclu-
sions. This article focuses on a certain type of legislative history, 
examining both when it should be relied on and how refusals to rely 
on it may entail substantial costs to the legislative process: At the 
same time, analysis of this particular type of history offers insights 
about the broader issue of whether - and when - it is appropriate 
for courts to credit legislative history. The article addresses that 
broader issue as well. 
This article also departs from more traditional analysis by exam-
ining legislative history from a Congress-centered viewpoint. Much 
of the scholarly literature considers statutory interpretation from a 
judge-centered perspective, regarding statutes as one among the 
for interpreting a Mine Safety and Health Act provision); Darby v. Cisneros, 113 S. Ct. 2539, 
2540 n.* (1993) (Rehnquist, CJ., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., joining majority opinion except for 
Part III) (implicitly rejecting the Court's use of legislative history in Part III as a tool for 
interpreting an Administrative Procedure Act provision); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 
1163, 1166 n.1 (1993) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., joining majority opinion except for Part IV-A) 
(implicitly rejecting the Court's use of legislative history in Part IV-A as a tool for interpret-
ing a RICO provision). 
For similar concerns expressed by lower court judges, see, for example, In re Sinclair, 870 
F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.); ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1583 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., dissenting in part), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Wallace v. Christen-
sen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559-60 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
3. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 
S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POLY. 61 (1994); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About 
the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DuKE LJ. 371; Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's 
Observations, 1987 DuKE LJ. 380; Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legis-
lative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Tenn, 68 lowA L. REv. 195 (1983). 
4.· See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 313-54 (1986) (describing a chain-novel 
approach that entails interpreting statutes by continuing to develop the statutory scheme 
begun by Congress); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. 
REv. 20 (1987) (defending the "nautical" approach in which interpretation of statutes is an 
ongoing process that requires Congress as "shipbuilder" and courts as "subsequent naviga-
tors" each to play roles); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987) (advocating a dynamic approach, interpreting statutes in light of 
their current social, political, and legal context); see also Richard A. Posner, Statutory Inter-
pretation - in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 800 (1983) (arguing 
that statutes be interpreted by "imaginatively reconstructing" the thoughts or perspectives of 
the enacting legislators). 
There are, however, examples of more targeted analysis by legal scholars. See, e.g., T. 
Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A Comment on Plain 
Meaning, West Virginia Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due Process of Statutory Interpretation, 
45 V AND. L. REv. 687 (1992); William D. Popkin, Foreword: Non-Judicial Statutory Interpre-
tation, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 301 (1990). 
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various sources of law to be iiiterpreted and applied to particular 
controversies.5 While such consideration is surely. important, it 
does not reflect an adequate appreciation for the structure and op-
eration of Congress's lawmaking enterprise. This article regards 
the legislative process as a distinctively complex participatory re-
gime that requires, and rewards, an interpretive method different 
from that applied to judge-made law. 
The category of legislative history I will examine involves a 
rather extended dialogue between Congress and the federal courts, 
particularly the Supreme Court.6 Federal legislation often includes 
language that is inconclusive on some important matter of public 
policy. The Supreme Court may resolve the uncertainty through an 
interpretation of the statutory language in the circumstance of a 
specific case. Congress, in tum, may emit either of two kinds of 
signals regarding its view of the Court's interpretation. On the one 
hand, Congress may, if it approves, incorporate the Court's conclu-
sion into statutory text.7 Or Congress may, if it disapproves, ex-
5. This is true whether the scholar's view of legislative history as a source of possible 
meaning is inclined to be sympathetic or hostile. Compare DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 313-54 
with Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 533, 544-52 (1983). 
6. I devote most of my attention to congressional commentary on decisions by the 
Supreme Court, but I also address congressional review of decisions by lower federal courts. 
Relevant distinctions between the two are discussed infra at notes 325-26 and accompanying 
text and infra at notes 330-31 and accompanying text. Dialogue over statutory interpretation 
between Congress and federal agencies is not within the scope of this article; reasons for the 
exclusion are discussed infra at notes 202 and 217. 
7. See, e.g., Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 235, 96 Stat. 2294, 2322 
(adding a private right of action, endorsing the holding in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982)); Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments 
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(a), 92 Stat. 189, 190 (amending the ADEA to include the 
right to a jury trial, endorsing the holding in Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 {1978)). 
Often, the textual endorsement is accomplished in a less direct manner by building upon the 
Court's prior interpretation when amending related textual provisions. See, e.g., Labor-Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 9(c)(3), 61 Stat. 136, 144, and Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 702, 73 Stat. 519, 
542 {first adding and then modifying 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3), which confirms the permanent 
replacement doctrine set forth in NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 
(1938)). 
Congress also has endorsed Supreme Court conclusions in text by rejecting efforts to 
overturn the holding and then agreeing to adopt a "lesser" textual amendment that recog-
nizes the holding as authoritative. See, e.g., Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 
100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28, 31-32 (1988); S. REP. No. 64, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1987) 
(rejecting in committee an amendment aimed at overriding School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 
273 {1987), which had held that individuals with contagious diseases may be considered hand-
icapped under § 504 of Rehabilitation Act); 134 CoNG. REc. 2924 (1988) (statement of Rep. 
Coelho) (approving a minor amendment that recognizes § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as 
covering persons with contagious diseases); 134 CoNG. REc. 383-84 (1988) (statements of 
Sens. Humphrey & Harkin). 
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pressly override the Court's decision and modify the statutory 
language in question. s 
On the other hand, Congress often sends signals that, while 
clearly set forth in the legislative history accompanying a subse-
quent enactment,9 do not find their way into the statutory text. 
Thus, Congress regularly reauthorizes, updates, or modifies statu-
tory schemes and - as part of its process - endorses through leg-
islative history judicial interpretations of inconclusive provisions in 
those schemes without altering the language of the actual provi-
sions.10 Similarly, are numerous instances, though doubtless 
fewer in number, in which Congress - while reenacting or modify-
ing a statute - has in legislative history expressed disapproval for a 
court's holding or reasoning without a complete textual analogue 
for that disapproval.11 These expressions of approval or disap-
8. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 
(1988) (overriding McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987)); Uniformed Services For-
mer Spouses' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, § 1002, 96 Stat. 718, 730-35 {1982) ( overrid-
ing McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 {1981)); Endangered Species Act Amendments of 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, § 7, 92 Stat. 3751, 3752-60 (overriding TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 
(1978)). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Deci-
sions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 424-41 (1991). 
9. My focus here is on legislative history accompanying a statutory enactment, as op• 
posed to legislative history "in the air." The reasons for this distinction are set forth infra at 
text accompanying notes 171-73. I also refer here to "Congress" speaking through legislative 
history. I recognize, of course, that the attribution of any such legislative history to Congress 
as an institution is a central aspect of the issue I am exploring. But my references are made 
for convenience - to avoid cumbersome and lengthy language - at least until I have ad-
dressed the issue of collective intent. 
10. For.examples of endorsement of Supreme Court decisions, see S. REP. No. 580, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.109,118 (accompanying Communi-
cations Act Amendments of 1978 and approving United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 
392 U.S. 157 (1968), and United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972)); H.R. 
CoNF. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 {1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 342 
(accompanying Securities Act Amendments of 1975 and approving Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 
427 (1953)); H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1971), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2156-57 (accompanying Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 
and approving Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971)); S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 
1st Sess. 14-15 (1971) (same). 
For examples of endorsement of lower court decisions, see S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 
2d Sess. 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913 (accompanying Civil Rights At-
torney's Fees Award Act of 1976 and approving three district court decisions); H.R. REP. No. 
253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 74, pt. 3, at 19 {1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 
2856, 3042 (accompanying Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 and 
approving a district court decision); H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1983), re-
printed in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274, 2283 (accompanying Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 
1984 and approving two appellate court decisions). 
11. With respect to disapproval of decisions by the Supreme Court, the issue often arises 
when Congress has codified its disapproval but the scope of the disapproval. is expressed 
more expansively in the legislative history than in the actual text. In recent years, the Court 
has had to decide whether Congress's overriding of an earlier decision should be limited to 
the specific language of the textual modifications, or whether it should have more far-reach-
ing consequences as suggested by the legislative history accompanying the text. Compare, 
e.g., H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
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proval in the legislative history, referred to herein as congressional 
reviews of, or commentaries on, judicial decisions, provide the focus 
for my analysis. 
There is a conventional wisdom regarding the import of subse-
quent enactments - without regard to the presence or absence of 
legislative history - for intervening judicial decisions that have 
construed the now-reenacted text. Traditionally, courts consider 
the reenactment to constitute a ratification of any settled judicial 
interpretation;12 it assuredly does not constitute a disapproval of 
prevailing case law.13 Indeed, given ample evidence that Congress 
today is more than willing to override Supreme Court decisions by 
enacting new or modified statutory language,14 one might question 
528, 529 (accompanying Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978 and 
disapproving reasoning and holding of United Airlines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 {1977)) with 
Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 {1989) {disregarding legislative his-
tory and following in part the holding of McMann); S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 10, at 1, 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5908-09 (disapproving decision in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. 
Co. v. Wilderness Socy., 421 U.S. 240 (1975)) with West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 
U.S. 83, 97-101 (1991) (refusing to read Senate report as a reversal of Alyeska in all respects); 
H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 
4750-51 (accompanying Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 and disapproving reasoning 
and holding of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)) with Newport News 
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678-85 (1983) (construing Congress's 
rejection of Gilbert in broad terms); S. REP. No. 388, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1986) (ac-
companying Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986 and disapproving decision in Atas-
cadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)) with Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 
228-30 (1989) (construing disapproval in narrow terms). 
With respect to lower court decisions, the issue frequently arises when Congress, through 
legislative history, recognizes a conflict in the circuits and expresses a preference for one line 
of cases while disapproving another. Compare, e.g., S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 504, 509-10 (accompanying Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act Amendments of 1978 and disapproving numerous lower court decisions) 
with Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 758 (1979) (declining to follow reasoning of 
the Senate report); H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 9 (1985), reprinted in 
1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 137 (accompanying Equal Access to Justice Act of 1985 and disap-
proving lower court decisions) with Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566-68 (1988) (de-
clining to follow reasoning of the House report); H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 911 
(1985) (accompanying Tax Reform Act of 1986 and disapproving a tax court decision) with 
Landreth v. Commissioner, 845 F.2d 828, 832-33 (9th Cir.) (declining to follow reasoning of 
House report), vacated on re/lg., 859 F.2d 643, 648 (9th Cir. 1988) (following reasoning of 
House report). 
12. See, e.g., Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978); Snyder v. Harris, 394 
U.S. 332, 338-39 (1969). See generally 2B SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CoNSTRucnoN § 49.09 
(Norman J. Singer ed., 5th ed. 1992) (citing cases). Recently, however, the Supreme Court 
has raised doubts about this conventional wisdom. See Central Bank of Denver v. First Inter-
state Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1452 (1994) (Kennedy, J.) (declining, over Stevens's dissent, to 
credit a consistent lower court interpretation recognizing aider and abettor liability under 
§ lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, despite express approval of the 
lower court case law in a recent committee report accompanying modifications to the 1934 
Act); see also 114 S. Ct. at 1458 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
13. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988). 
14. Compare Eskridge, supra note 8, at 335-36 (noting that since 1975 an average of 
about a dozen Supreme Court decisions have been overridden in each Congress) with Note, 
Congressional Reversal of Supreme Court Decisions, 1945-1957, 71 HARV, L. REV. 1324, 
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how much weight, if any, should be given to an expression of disap-
proval from Congress other than an override contained in precise 
statutory text. 
Although the traditional doctrine of ratification has much to 
recommend it, the issue of subsequent legislative signals requires 
further analysis. In particular, legislative history endorsing specific 
judicial decisions should be independently evaluated and not auto-
matically credited. By the same token, recognition of Congress's 
increasing willingness in recent years to override judicial interpreta-
tions by changing statutory language also does not present an ade-
quate picture. The override text itself may leave certain 
interpretive matters unresolved - matters that are referred to in 
the legislative history.15 Moreover, at least when lower court deci-
sions are involved, Congress could not possibly modify or reject in 
text each statutory interpretation decision with which it has serious 
concerns and still have time to transact any other legislative 
business.16 
There are two principal aspects of my thesis. First, it is desirable 
to consider seriously these legislative signals of approval and disap-
proval, because a blanket rejection, or even systematic hostility, im-
poses significant opportunity costs on Congress. If the judiciary 
refuses to consider these signals, Congress will have to expend extra 
resources to achieve the same ends. That expense will diminish the 
institution's ability to enact other laws and in some cases will alter 
the character of the other laws that it is able to enact. The conse-
quent diminution or depletion of Congress's legislative authority is 
1324-26 & nn.5-10 (1958) (reporting fewer than two overrides per Congress during a twelve-
year period). See also Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congres-
sional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMPLE L. REv. 425, 439-52 (1992) 
(examining overrides between 1968 and 1988). But cf. Beth Henschen, Statutory Interpreta-
tions of the Supreme Court: Congressional Response, 11 AM. PoL. Q. 441 (1983). According 
to Henschen, "Congress rarely responds to the statutory decisions of the Court in at least two 
substantive areas." Id. at 453. She notes that of222 cases in which the Supreme Court inter-
preted labor and antitrust statutes between 1950 and 1972, Congress considered bills reacting 
to only 27 (12 % ); 176 bills were introduced to respond to these 27 decisions, and only nine of 
the decisions were successfully modified by enactment of a bill into law. Id. 
15. See supra note 11. 
16. Courts of appeals decide over 20,000 cases each year; in recent years, nearly 7000 of 
these decisions have been published and reported on an annual basis. See DIRECTOR OF THE 
AoMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. Crs. ANN. REP. tbl. S-3 (1990, 1991, 1992, 1993). Over 7000 district 
court decisions also are reported each year. See Search of Westlaw, DCI'R database (March 
3, 1994) (search for decisions containing is and date equals 1991, 1992, and 1993 found 7159 
decisions in 1991, 7329 decisions in 1992, and 7387 decisions in 1993). A substantial portion 
of these federal court decisions construe federal statutes. Even assuming that most statutory 
interpretation cases involve matters of low visibility, there may be scores if not hundreds of 
cases during each Congress about which substantial disagreement exists and comes to the 
attention of congressional members or committees. 
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unhealthy from a democratic perspective and reflects an unwar-
ranted disrespect for Congress's chosen means of conducting its leg-
islative business. 
Second, it is possible to credit these signals in a manner that is 
limited to appropriate circumstances. Legislative history expressing 
approval or disapproval of judicial decisions is susceptible to ma-
nipulation and abuse. Accordingly, its interpreters need specific 
criteria that can separate the wheat - expression that can be fairly 
imputed to Congress - from the chaff - expression that reflects, 
at most, the commitment of individual members or their staff. 
Part I sets forth an example of the extended dialogue between 
Congress and the Supreme Court. It illuminates the problem of as-
sessing legislative signals in a given context and introduces the issue 
of opportunity costs for Congress. The example chosen involves 
signals of disapproval rather than approval, because crediting such 
signals is more difficult to defend under the traditional analysis. 
Part II expands the discussion of opportunity costs by consider-
ing the legislative process from Congress's perspective. It describes 
Congress as a complex bureaucratic institution, seeking to manage 
limited resources while meeting public expectations for an ex-
panded legislative presence. In this setting, it examines why - and 
how - Congress has chosen to rely on"Iegislative history as an inte-
gral part of the lawmaking enterprise, as well as why judicial failure 
to recognize or credit legislative history can impede the operations 
of Congress. 
Part III clears away obstacles presented by three interrelated 
arguments that are current in the field of statutory interpretation: 
(i) the argument by textualists that courts should give legislative his-
tory virtually no weight at all;17 (ii) the argument that even if legis-
lative history may be credited in some instances, subsequent 
legislative history, commenting on earlier-enacted textual provi-
sions, should never be given any weight;18 and (iii) the argument 
that legislative inaction - Congress's failure to alter or modify a 
particular statutory provision - should carry no weight notwith-
standing later signals in the legislative history.19 Part III concludes 
that while each of these arguments counsels in favor of a careful 
approach, the legislative signals with which this article is concerned 
remain appropriate matters for judicial consideration. 
17. See infra text accompanying notes 166-239. 
18. See infra text accompanying notes 240-59. 
19. See infra text accompanying notes 260-69. 
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Part IV seeks to develop a taxonomy that can assist courts in 
evaluating congressional commentary on judicial decisions. It con-
tends that in reviewing the expression of approval or disapproval in 
legislative history, a court should ask whether this expression would 
have been (i) understood, (ii) noticed, and (iii) accepted by a rea-
sonable member of the House or Senate. It then suggests why ex-
pressions of approval should be presumed valid, whereas 
expressions of disapproval should not, noting that either presump-
tion can be overcome based on the three considerations just identi-
fied. Part IV further suggests that approvals or disapprovals that 
are politically controversial should be approached with special care. 
It concludes by applying these proposed variables to particular de-
cided cases. 
I. THE CosT TO CONGRESS OF IGNORING OR DEVALUING 
LEGISLATIVE SIGNALS 
A. The Often-Inconclusive Quality of Text 
It is not surprising that the language of federal statutes is at 
times inconclusive on important public policy issues. A text will 
often be ambiguous or incomplete just because language itself is 
frequently imprecise, no matter how explicitly spoken or carefully 
drafted. Words are "inexact symbols"20 of meaning and often can-
not be fully or properly understood without reference to the con-
text or community in which they were created.21 
Thus, for instance, whether a party's position in court is "sub-
stantially justified"22 or a business transaction is entered into "for 
profit"23 or a plant closing was "reasonably foreseeable"24 are not 
matters that can be resolved solely by reference to common sense 
or ordinary meaning. Similarly, when a statutory scheme expressly 
covers some victims while ignoring others,25 or when a statute im-
poses a severe penalty with no reference to ordinary mitigating cir-
20. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLUM. L. REv. 
527, 528 (1947). 
21. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT CoMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND 
THE PRAcnCE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1988); Frederick Schauer, 
Statutory Construction and the Coordination Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 
231, 251 & n.82. 
22. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1988); see Pierce v. Underwood, 
487 U.S. 552 (1988). 
23. I.R.C. § 165(c)(2) (1988); see Miller v. Commissioner, 836 F.2d 1274 (10th Cir. 1988). 
24. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2102(b)(2)(A) 
(1988). 
25. Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1988); Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 
(1988); see Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970). 
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cumstances,26 a prudent interpreter may need to look beyond the 
mere textual gaps. 
In addition to the inherent imprecisions of language, there are 
at least two political explanations for a legislative text that is ambig-
uous or incomplete. One is lack of foresight: Congress as an insti-
tution may fail to anticipate new developments, whether factual or 
legal, or even new variations on current developments.27 The sec-
ond is lack of will: Congress may recognize a potentially divisive 
issue but decide to finesse the issue with ambiguous or incomplete 
language.28 
Given that text is at times inconclusive, the courts must decide 
what sources they will consult in an effort to find meaning in the 
text and resolve individual cases. Legislative history is certainly 
one potential source of meaning; what follows is a particular exam-
ple in which the Supreme Court declined to credit that source and 
Congress paid a price. 
26. 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1982) (recodified at 46 U.S.C. § 10313 (1988)) (providing recovery of 
double wages for discharged seamen for every day that their wages have been withheld 
"without sufficient cause"); see Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564 (1982). 
27. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing before S11b-
comm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Stat. Interp. Hrg.] (statement of Chair-
man Kastenmeier); id. at 16-17 (statement of Chief Judge Patricia M. Wald); id. at 88 (state-
ment of Prof. William N. Eskridge, Jr.); see also Bradford L. Ferguson et al., Re-examining 
the Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing Realities of the Pro-
cess, 67 TAXES 804, 806 (1989). 
28. See Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 187 (1986); 
Mikva, supra note 3, at 380-81; Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 88 (statement of Prof. 
Eskridge). 
What I refer to as "lack of will" may reflect sensitivity to the procedural difficulties of 
effecting change even when the change itself would command the requisite majority or 
supermajority support. Alternatively, the lack of will may reflect sensitivity to the s11bstantive 
difficulties of being unable to command majority support for the proposed change. This dis-
tinction is explored further infra at text accompanying notes 335-40. 
In attributing inconclusive statutory text to either a lack of foresight or a lack of will, I do 
not distinguish between text that is inconclusive due to ambiguity and text that is inconclu-
sive due to incompleteness. Each may reflect a failure of foresight or a failure of will. See 
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1495-96 (1994) (describing the language on 
retroactivity in the 1991 Civil Rights Act as indicative of ambiguity and lack of will); Green v. 
Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509-11 (1989) (describing the use of the word defend-
ant in Federal Rule of Evidence 609 as indicative of ambiguity and lack of foresight); 
Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 397-400 (1970) (describing the federal maritime 
statutes as indicative of incompleteness and lack of foresight); Mikva, supra note 3, at 380-81 
(discussing 1977 strip mining legislation as an example of incompleteness and lack of will). I 
will discuss the distinction between lack of foresight and lack of will at a later point. See infra 
notes 332-34 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Meaning of Subterfuge Under the ADEA 
. 1. The 1967 Statute 
11 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)29 was en-
acted in 1967; the statute prohibits age-based discrimination against 
older individuals in the terms or conditions of employment.30 As 
originally enacted, the ADEA applied to individuals between the 
ages of forty and sixty-five.31 Mandatory retirement was therefore 
lawful at age sixty-five and above. The ADEA also permitted ·any 
bona fide employee benefit plan "which is not a subterfuge to 
evade the purposes of this Act, except that no such employee bene-
fit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual."32 
In the Act's first decade, controversy arose over whether private 
pension plans that required retirement prior to age sixty-five vio-
lated the ADEA.33 A large percentage of the workers covered by 
private plans were subject to mandatory retirement prior to age 
sixty-five.34 The Supreme Court, in United Airlines v. McMann, 35 
concluded that such plans were 
2. The McMann Decision 
The Court in McMann referred to the ADEA's primary purpose 
as preventing age discrimination in the hiring and discharge of 
workers but not in their retirement. Chief Justice Burger, writing 
for the majority, reasoned that while the language of section 4(f)(2) 
did not immunize age-based discharges - that is, termination with-
out compensation - it did protect retirements that were 
part of a bona fide pension plan. Thus, the Court concluded, 
mandatory retirement provisions of bona fide employee pension 
plans were lawful whether adopted before or after enactment of the 
ADEA.36 
29. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81Stat.602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 {1988 & 
Supp. V 1993)). 
30. 29 U.S.C. § 623{a) (1988). 
31. Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 12, 81 Stat. 602, 607 (1967). 
32. Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 4(f){2), 81 Stat. 602, 603 {1967). 
33. Compare Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F:2d 901 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding such plans lawful 
under§ 4(f)(2)) and Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting, 500 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1974) (same) with 
McMann v. United Airlines, 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that § 4(f)(2) does not 
accommodate plans that include mandatory retirement prior to age 65). 
34. See S. REP. No. 493, supra note 11, at 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 512 (re-
porting that a 1974 Labor Department study concluded that 41 % of workers covered by 
private pension plans were subject to mandatory retirement). 
35. 434 U.S. 192 (1977). 
36. 434 U.S. at 198-202. As part of its analysis, the Court rejected McMann's argument 
that § 4(f)(2) immunized "lesser benefits," including involuntary retirement, for older work-
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In addition, Chief Justice Burger separately concluded that the 
particular plan before the Court, which had been established in 
1941, could not possibly be a "subterfuge to evade the purposes of 
this Act" under section 4(f)(2). Relying on the dictionary definition 
of subterfuge as "a scheme, plan, stratagem or artifice of evasion," 
the Court reasoned that a plan adopted prior to 1967 logically could 
not have been motivated by an intent to evade the purposes of the 
1967 Act.37 In reaching this conclusion, the Court credited the dic-
tionary more than the legislative history, which explained that the 
exception applied to "new and existing employee benefit plans, and 
to both the establishment and maintenance of such plans."38 
3. The 1978 Statute 
When McMann was decided in mid-December of 1977, Con-
gress was already well advanced in the process of enacting amend-
ments to the ADEA.39 Congress enacted the modifying legislation 
ers covered under a pension plan only when those lesser benefits were offered as a way of 
making it economically feasible for an employer to hire older employees. Relying exten-
sively on the Act's legislative history, the Court concluded that Congress in 1967 meant to 
protect all bona fide pension plans under § 4(f)(2), including plans that permit involuntary 
separation. 434 U.S. at 198-99. 
37. 434 U.S. at 203. 
38. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967) (emphasis added); S. REP. No. 723, 
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967) (emphasis added). The majority sought to limit the import of 
these statements by stressing the next sentence in each committee report: "This exception 
serves to emphasize the primary purpose of the bill - hiring of older workers - by permit-
ting employment without necessarily including such workers in employee benefit plans." 
H.R. REP. No. 805, supra, at 4; S. REP. No. 723, supra, at 4. It then asserted that a preexist· 
ing bona fide plan used as a reason for refusing to hire older applicants might well be an 
unlawful subterfuge. See 434 U.S. at 203 n.9. But this response undermines the Court's con-
clusion that any preexisting plan cannot logically be a subterfuge and suggests that the 
Court's mandatory retirement analysis is the key to its decision. 
In any event, the "pre-Act v. post-Act" analysis of subterfuge may fairly be characterized 
as a secondary holding in McMann. It is principally contained in one paragraph at the con-
clusion of the majority opinion, whereas analysis of§ 4(f)(2) and mandatory retirement runs 
for several pages. Justices Marshall and Brennan, in dissent, focused almost exclusively on 
the mandatory retirement issue, 434 U.S. at 208-19, although in passing they also rejected the 
Court's subterfuge analysis, 434 U.S. at 219 n.13. Justice White concurred in the judgment 
but explicitly disagreed with the majority's analysis on subterfuge while endorsing the major-
ity's treatment of the mandatory retirement issue. 434 U.S. at 204-08. Justice Stewart, in a 
brief opinion concurring in the judgment, agreed with the Court's analysis of subterfuge and 
found it unnecessary to address the issue of mandatory retirement to which the Court de-
voted most of its attention. 434 U.S. at 204. 
39. See H.R. 5383, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 1784, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The 
House version was introduced on Mar. 22, 1977, 123 CONG. REc. 8497 (1977), and a report 
was submitted by the House Education and Labor Committee on July 25, 1977, H.R. REP. 
No. 527, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1977). The bill was considered and passed by the full 
House on Sept. 23, 1977. 123 CoNG. REc. 30,573 (1977). The Senate version was introduced 
on June 29, 1977, 123 CoNG. REc. 21,530 (1977), and a report was submitted by the Senate 
Human Resources Committee on Oct.12, 1977, S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
The bill was considered and passed by the full Senate on Oct. 19, 1977. 123 CoNo. REC. 
34,324 (1977). 
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primarily to reduce the incidence of mandatory retirement.40 To 
that end, it raised the upper age limit from sixty-five to seventy for 
individuals employed in the private sector or with state or local gov-
ernments,41 and it clarified the section 4(f)(2) exemption fQr em-
ployee benefit plans to prohibit early mandatory retirement.42 
With respect to section 4(f)(2), both the House and Senate had 
added language prior to the Supreme Court decision in McMann. 
The new language specified that employee benefit plans would not 
qualify for the exemption if they required or permitted the involun-
tary retirement of any individual because of age.43 The drafters of 
this legislation were responding to the split in the circuit courts and 
were endorsing in text the result reached by the Fourth Circuit in its 
McMann opinion,44 namely that section 4(f)(2) should not be con-
strued to permit mandatory retirement within the protected age 
group.45 
Several months after the Supreme Court decision, a conference 
committee resolved the differences between the House and Senate 
versions of the proposed ADEA amendments. The language 
amending section 4(f)(2) was virtually identical in the two versions 
and was unchanged by the conferees.46 The Joint Explanatory 
40. See H.R. REP. No. 527, supra note 39, pt. 1, at 1; S. REP. No. 493, supra note 39, at 1. 
41. See Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat.189, 189 (1978) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)). 
The 1978 amendments also removed any upper age limit for most federal employees, thereby 
abolishing mandatory retirement altogether for these individuals. See Pub. L. No. 95-256, 
§ 3(a), 92 Stat. 189, 189 (1978) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 63l(b)). 
42. See Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189, 189 (1978) (amending 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(f)(2)). In addition, the amendments included provisions clarifying the right to a jury 
trial, the timing for filing of charges, and certain minor procedural issues, and also raised the 
ceiling for authorized federal funding to enforce the Act. See Pub. L. No. 95-256, §§ 4-7, 92 
Stat. 189, 190-93 (1978). 
43. The relevant language of § 4(f)(2) thus reads as follows, with the 1978 addition in 
italics: 
(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer ... 
(2) to observe the terms of ... any bona fide employee benefit plan ... which is not a 
subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such employee benefit 
plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual, and no such ... employee benefit plan 
shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by section 
631(a) of this title [ages 40-70] because of the age of such individual 
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 189, 189 
(1978). 
44. McMann v. United Airlines, 542 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1976), revd., 434 U.S. 192 (1977). 
45. See H.R. REP. No. 527, supra note 39, pt. 1, at 5-8; S. REP. No. 493, supra note 39, at 
10; see also 123 CONG. REc. 34,295-96 (1977) (statement of Sen. Williams). 
46. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 950, supra note 11, at 7-8, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
528-29. Senate and House Rules confined the conferees to the areas of disagreement be-
tween the Senate and House versions of the bill. See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE Rule 
27.2 (1977); RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Rule 28.3 (1978). If conferees vio-
lated this rule, the conference report was subject to a point of order. STANDING RuLES OF 
THE SENATE Rule 27.2 (1977). There are several methods by which conferees may defeat 
points of order asserting violations of the rule on scope, but these methods are often time-
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Statement of the Conferees, however, did include an explicit refer-
ence to the Supreme Court's intervening holding: 
The conferees agree that the purpose of the amendment to section 
4(f)(2) is to make absolutely clear one of the original purposes of this 
provision, namely, that the exception does not authorize an employer 
to require or permit involuntary retirement of an employee within the 
protected age group on account of age. 
In McMann>·v. United Airlines, 98 S. Ct. 244 (1977), the Supreme 
Court held to the contrary, reversing a decision reached by the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, 542 F.2d 217 (1976). The conferees specifi-
cally disagree with the Supreme Court's holding and reasoning in that 
case. Plan provisions in effect prior to the date of enactment are not 
exempt under section 4(/)(2) by virtue of the fact that they antedate the 
act or these amendments. 41 
The conference report was approved by overwhelming margins in 
both Houses,48 and the ADEA amendments became law on April 
6, 1978. . 
4. The Betts Decision 
Eleven years later, the Supreme Court revisited the "subter-
fuge" issue in Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts. 49 The 
case involved a public employee who became disabled at age sixty-
one after seven years .on the job. The state's disability retirement 
scheme, which required that retirees receive at least thirty percent 
of their final average salary, was available only to individuals who 
became disabled prior to reaching age sixty.so Betts brought suit 
under the ADEA, leading the Supreme Court to reconsider the 
scope of the section 4(f)(2) exemption. 
With respect to the meaning of subterfuge, Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the Court, reaffirmed the McMann Court's conclusion 
that an employee benefit plan adopted prior to the ADEA's enact-
consuming and burdensome for each chamber as a whole. See generally CHARLES TrnFER, 
CoNGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 811-33 (1989). The same rules confining the 
scope of action by conferees remain in effect today. See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE 
Rule 28 (1990); RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Rule 28.3 (1991). 
47. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 950, supra note 11, at 8, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 529 
(emphasis added). 
48. See 124 CONG. REc. 7889 (1978) (reporting a House vote of 391-6); id. at 8220 (1978) 
(reporting a Senate vote of 62-10). 
49. 492 U.S. 158 (1989). 
50. 492 U.S. at 163. The "normal" retirement scheme, based on age plus years of service, 
did not include the 30% guarantee. As a relatively short-term employee, Mrs. Betts was 
entitled to roughly $160 per month of age-and-service retirement payments. Had she been 
permitted to take disability retirement, she would have received over twice that amount, 
some $355 per month. 492 U.S. at 163. 
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ment in 1967 could :p.ot be a subteifuge.51 While acknowledging 
that the 1978 ADEA amendments had overruled the result in 
McMann, Justice Kennedy emphasized that Congress had done so 
by barring early mandatory retirement and had not altered or rede-
fined the term subterfuge. The conference report's explicit dis-
approval of McMann's subterfuge analysis was deemed 
inconsequential because Congress had failed to amend the subter-
fuge text. 52 
5. The 1990 Statute 
Within weeks of the Betts decision, bills were introduced in both 
chambers to overturn the Court's holding and analysis on the mean-
ing of subterfuge.53 In the fall of 1990, Congress enacted the Older 
Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA).54 The principal pur-
pose and effect of the legislation was to override the Court's deci-
51. 492 U.S. at 166-68. 
52. 492 U.S. at 168. The Betts Court's reaffirmation of McMann on this issue did not, 
however, fully resolve the case. Whereas the Ohio state employees' retirement system had 
been in place since 1933 and the age-sixty ceiling for disability retirement was unchanged 
since 1959, the 30% guarantee for disability retirees was added in 1976. This post-1967 modi-
fication could logically qualify as a subterfuge under the Court's approach. The Court, there-
fore, proceeded to define subterfuge for purposes of employee benefit plans adopted or 
modified after enactment of the ADEA. 
Even here, the Betts Court rejected the declared intentions of the principal authors of the 
1978 amendments. The agency charged with interpreting the ADEA had co11cluded at an 
early stage that age-based distinctions in employee benefits were a subterfuge unless eco-
nomically justified by the increased cost of providing the benefits in question for older work-
ers. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.120(a) (1970) (Dept. of Labor guidance). This initial executive 
branch interpretation was expressly endorsed by the bill's managers and principal sponsors in 
legislative history accompanying the 1978 amendments. For example, Senator Javits stated: 
(
A] retirement, pension or insurance plan will be considered in compliance with 
§ 4(f)(2)] where the actual amount of payment made, or cost incurred in behalf of an 
older worker is equal to that made or incurred in behalf of a younger worker, even 
though the older worker may thereby receive a lesser amount of pension or retirement 
benefits, or insurance coverage. · 
124 CONG. REc. 8218-19 (1978); see also id. at 8219 (statement of Sen. Williams); id. at 7881 
(statement of Rep. Hawkins); id. at 7888 (statement of Rep. Waxman). The agency, relying 
on this legislative history, reaffirmed its original guidance as a regulation in 1979. See 29 
C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(l) (1979), recodified at 29 C.F.R. § 1625.lO(a)(l) (1993). 
Nonetheless, the Betts Court declined to rely on either the 1978 legislative history or the 
two decades of consistent agency interpretation. It concluded instead that an age-based dis-
tinction in benefits is a subterfuge only if it is actually used as a method of discriminating in 
non-fringe-benefit aspects of the employment relationship - notably, constructive discharge 
or failure to hire. 492 U.S. at 175-80. Thus, age-based distinctions in employee benefits were 
given extremely broad protections whether implemented before or after the enactment of the 
ADEA in 1967. 
53. Betts was decided on June 23, 1989. In the Senate, S. 1511 was introduced August 3, 
1989. 135 CONG. REc. 18,394 (1989). In the House, H.R. 3200 was introduced August 4, 
1989. Id. at 19,330. 
54. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 
623, 626, 629, 630 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
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sion in Betts.55 Of particular relevance here, the new law modified 
section 4(f)(2) to expunge the word subterfuge from the ADEA. It 
then added a new section 4(k) that expressly required an employee 
benefit plan to comply with the ADEA regardless of the date of the 
plan's adoption.56 
6. The Institutional Costs to Congress 
How should one evaluate this extended dialogue between the 
Supreme Court and Congress? One can argue that the 1990 statute, 
with its elimination of the term subterfuge and its addition of new 
section 4(k), fully vindicated the Court's approach in McMann and 
Betts. Congress in 1978 had overridden one aspect of the McMann 
decision in text, but it had failed to provide a textual foundation for 
the conferees' disapproval of the Court's treatment of the subter· 
fuge issue. The Betts Court's focus on the 1978 statutory language 
to the exclusion of legislative history was, therefore, "respectful" of 
the democratic process, if that respect requires the Court to address 
only the text considered and voted on by Congress.57 Moreover, as 
a practical matter, the Betts Court forced Congress to take the time 
to clarify the language of the ADEA exception for employee bene· 
fit plans. One consequence of such judicial "tough love" is that we 
now have a less inconclusive, more carefully worded statute. 
This argument, however, overlooks important costs to Congress. 
The initiation, negotiation, and enactment of a statute is a mul· 
tidimensional process that requires committing considerable institu· 
55. See Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 101, 104 Stat. 978, 978 (1990); 136 CoNo. REC. H8616 
(daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Clay); id. at Sl3,603 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990) 
(statement of Sen. Pryor). Title I of the OWBPA dealt exclusively with the Betts decision. 
See Pub. L. No. 101-433, §§ 101-05, 104 Stat. 978, 978-83 (1990). Title II addressed the dis-
crete issue of when individuals may waive their rights or claims under the ADEA. See Pub. 
L. No. 101-433, §§ 201-02, 104 Stat. 978, 983-84 (1990). 
56. See Pub. L. No. 101-433, § 103, 104 Stat. 978, 978-81 (1990) (amending § 4(f) and 
adding § 4(k)). These changes fully addressed the issue of whether an employee benefit plan 
may be exempt by virtue of its pre-ADEA adoption. 
In modifying § 4(f)(2), Congress also expressly codified the "economic purpose" justifica-
tion for age-based distinctions in employee benefits that had been promulgated by the De-
partment of Labor (DOL) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
prior to McMann and had been endorsed by the chief sponsors of the 1978 amendments. See 
supra note 52. Thus, with respect to the meaning of the employee benefit plan exception as 
applied to plans adopted or modified after enactment of the ADEA, Congress once again 
repudiated the McMann Court's reasoning - the Court there having rejected a "business 
purpose" analysis, see supra note 36 - as that reasoning had been expanded upon by the 
Betts Court. 
57. See infra notes 179-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of textualist arguments 
based on legislative supremacy. But cf. Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: 
The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 266 (1992) (discuss-
ing whether the Court's textualist analysis in a comparable setting was "democracy-forcing" 
or "anti-democratic"). 
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tional resources, navigating politically sensitive internal procedures, 
and anticipating substantial societal consequences. The complexity 
of the process precludes the more straightforward interpretive in-
ferences that may be appropriate when construing certain other 
legal texts.58 Unlike appellate court decisions, which are generally 
drafted by a single author and presumably subject to careful review 
by a few colleagues, legislation is a product of negotiation and com-
promise among multiple participants over an extended period of 
time. Accordingly, to treat inconclusive statutory text as though it 
were the consciously streamlined product of one legislator's pen 
risks undervaluing what the legislative process has to offer in ex-
plaining that text. Further, to assert that Congress can simply "do it 
better next time" discounts how resource-intensive that next time is 
likely to be. 
The OWBPA itself exemplifies the considerable investment of 
legislative resources often required to overturn a judicial decision.59 
In the Senate, where the battle began and ended, a broad coalition 
of Democrats, together with a handful of moderate Republicans, 
supported the bill.60 Opposition came from the Bush administra-
58. Cf. McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Inter-
pretation, 80 GEO. LJ. 705, 710-11 (1992) (concluding that interpretive problems are more 
complex for legislation than for contracts, as the former typically involves bargaining among 
more parties "having a wider diversity of purposes"). 
59. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, 1020 CONG., !ST 
SESs., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OLDER WORKERS BENEFIT PROTECTION Acr (S. 
Comm. Print 33, 1991) (two volumes containing 1266 pages of hearings, committee reports, 
and floor debates) [hereinafter LEGIS. HIST.]. Although some of the controversy was unre-
lated to the Betts decision, see supra note 55, most of the attention focused on the Court's 
interpretation of subterfuge and its refusal to follow the 1978 legislative history and consistent 
agency interpretations. · 
60. The bill, S. 1511, was introduced by Senator Pryor (D-Ark.), chairman of the Special 
Committee on Aging, and cosponsored by Senators Jeffords (R-Vt.), Metzenbaum (D-Oh.), 
Kennedy (D-Mass.), DeConcini (D-Ariz.), and Bumpers (D-Ark.). 135 CONG. REc. 18,408-
10 (1989), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 59, at 909-15. A joint hearing was held 
before the Special Committee on Aging and the Subcommittee on Labor of the Committee 
on Labor and Human Resources, chaired by Senator Metzenbaum. The bill was reported by 
the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, chaired by Senator Kennedy. Ultimately, 
the key Senate sponsors who negotiated a compromise with Senator Hatch were Senators 
Pryor, Metzenbaum, Jeffords, and Heinz (R-Pa.). Pryor and Heinz were respectively the 
chair and ranking minority member for the Aging Committee, While Metzenbaum and 
Jeffords were the chair and ranking minority member for the Labor Subcommittee. 
In the House, leadership also was shared between the chair of the Select Committee on 
Aging, Representative Roybal (D-Cal.), and the chairs of the Subcommittees on Employ-
ment Opportunities and Labor-Management Relations of the Committee on Education and 
Labor: Representatives Martinez (D-Cal.) and Clay (D-Mo.), respectively. 135 CONG. REc. 
H5334, E2880, E2906-07 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989), reprinted in 2 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 59, 
at 899-903. There was no Republican participation in the House that was comparable to that 
in the Senate. After the final compromise was negotiated in the Senate, it was approved by 
the House without change, although the House added a technical clarification as a short 
separate bill. See 2 id. at 1260-66. 
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tion61 and from Senator Hatch, who, as ranking minority member 
of the Labor and Human Resources Committee, was the key mem-
ber defending the administration's position.62 
The dynamics of this political struggle were very similar to the 
dynamics surrounding the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990, which 
also was under active considerci.tion during the second session of the 
101st Congress.63 In each instance, substantive disagreements sepa-
rated the predominantly Democratic proponents from both the 
Bush administration and Senator Hatch as the leader of the Senate 
opposition.64 In each instance, the proponents had a comfortable 
majority in both houses to override Supreme Court decisions. Yet 
in each instance, proponents strained to find the two-thirds support 
necessary to overcome a threatened presidential veto. 
The political battle over the OWBPA was resolved in late Sep-
tember 1990. After several days of floor consideration by the full 
Senate and extended negotiations involving five senators, Senator 
Hatch reached a compromise agreement with Senators Metzen-
baum and Pryor.65 Although overwhelming majorities approved 
61. Although the Justice Department had argued in support of Mrs. Betts in the Supreme 
Court in early 1989, see 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 59, at 157-67, and the EEOC testified in 
qualified support of the bill at the Senate hearings, see 1 id. at 451-58, the administration 
reversed its position in early 1990 and thereafter steadfastly threatened a veto. See Letter 
from Roger Porter, Assistant to the President for Economic and Domestic Policy, to Rep. 
Goodling {Mar. 27, 1990) (on file with author) (opposing the bill as reported out of the 
Senate committee); Letter from Secretary of the Theasury Nicholas Brady, Secretary of 
Labor Elizabeth Dole, and EEOC Chairman Evan Kemp to Sen. Dole (Sept. 18, 1990) (on 
file with author) (opposing the bill as modified on the Senate floor by Sens. Pryor and 
Metzenbaum). The administration's opposition derived primarily from concerns that both 
private and public employers would incur substantial costs in having to modify existing em-
ployee benefit plans. 
62. See, e.g., 136 CoNG. REc. S9444 (daily ed. July 10, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch) 
(expressing the concerns of the administration and the business community over the impact 
of S. 1511); "Dear Colleague" Letter from Senators Hatch and Dole (Sept. 17, 1990) (on file 
with author) (opposing Pryor bill as modified on Senate floor by Pryor and Metzenbaum). 
63. See 136 CoNG. REc. S1018 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (S. 2104 introduced); id. at S7638 
(daily ed. June 8, 1990) (report on S. 2104 submitted by Committee on Labor and Human 
Resources); id. at H364 {daily ed. Feb. 7, 1990) (H.R. 4000 introduced); id. at H6049 (daily 
ed. July 31, 1990) (report on H.R. 4000 submitted by Committee on the Judiciary). 
64. The Civil Rights Act proposed to override a number of Supreme Court decisions 
from recent terms, addressing diverse issues including but not limited to the coverage of 42 
U.S.C. § 1981, see Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 {1989), the meaning of 
disparate impact employment discrimination under Tiile VII, see Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 {1989), and whether "mixed motive" employment decisions violate TI tie 
VII, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 {1989). In addition, the 1990 Act pro-
posed, for the first time under Title VII, a right to jury trials and compensatory and punitive 
damages. The Bush administration agreed with certain discrete sections of the bill but 
strongly opposed the bill's language on Wards Cove, damages, and numerous other proce-
dural and remedial issues. 
65. For extended floor consideration, see 136 CONG. REc. S13,236-55 {daily ed. Sept. 17, 
1990), $13,286-93, S13,296-98, S13,348 {daily ed. Sept. 18, 1990), S13,405, S13,417, $13,435-36 
{daily ed. Sept. 19, 1990), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 59, at 96-188. For a descrip-
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the compromise version in both the Senate and the House, the 
Bush administration remained opposed to the bill and publicly ex-
pressed that opposition.66 President Bush eventually signed the bill 
into law only when faced with veto-proof majorities.67 
Less than one month later, the political battle over the Civil 
Rights Act of 1990 reached a very different resolution. Once again, 
Senator Hatch, working with proponents of the legislation, played a 
central role in brokering a compromise agreement.68 This time, 
however, Senator Hatch made clear that, while he found the substi-
tute version acceptable, he would not support it over the objections 
of the Bush administration.69 Despite pleas from the bill's propo-
nents,70 neither Senator Hatch nor any other prior opponents voted 
for the compromise that Hatch had helped negotiate. The Bush 
administration maintained its strong opposition,71 and Hatch de-
tion of senators' personal involvement in negotiations, see 136 CoNo. REc. S13,405 (daily ed. 
Sept. 19, 1990), reprinted in 1 LEGJS. HIST., supra note 59, at 96, and 136 CoNo. REc. Sl3,597 
(daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 59, at 53-54. For the an-
nouncement of the compromise agreement, see 136 CoNo. REc. S13,594-97 (daily ed. Sept. 
24, 1990), reprinted in 1 LEGJS. HIST., supra note 59, at 46. 
66. See 136 CoNG. REc. Sl3,611 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., 
supra note 59, at 90 (reporting a Senate vote of 94-1); 136 CoNG. REc. H8738 (daily ed. Oct. 
3, 1990), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 59, at 10-11 (reporting a House vote of 406-
17); Statement of Administration Policy (Oct. 2, 1990) (on file with author) (opposing enact-
ment of S. 1511 as passed by the Senate); 136 CoNG. REc. H8623 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990), 
reprinted in 1 LEGJS. HIST., supra note 59, at 36 (statement of Rep. Bartlett) (noting contin-
ued opposition of the administration). Senator Hatch worked closely with the administration 
during the bill's legislative journey; when he signed on to the compromise he had helped 
negotiate, he could not have been unaware of the administration's displeasure. 
67. 136 CoNG. REc. D1362 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990), reprinted in 1 LEGJS. HIST., supra 
note 59, at 10. For reference to the veto-proof majorities, see supra note 66. 
68. See 136 CoNG. REc. S15,328 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990) (remarks of Sen. Hatch) (dis-
cussing negotiations process); id. at Sl5,332 (remarks of Sen. Specter) (discussing "the so-
called Hatch-Coleman [former Secy. of Transportation William Coleman]-Specter 
compromise"). 
69. See id. at S15,333 (remarks of Sen Hatch) ("I wanted to please the President. I 
wanted to see if there was some way we could get this to a point where he could sign the bill 
.... Unfortunately, as I look at it in retrospect, I think we failed."); id. (remarks of Sen. 
Specter) (agreeing with Hatch that "he [Hatch] found this compromise acceptable and that 
he recommended it to the President even though he reserved the right to vote against it, 
oppose it if the President did not go along"). 
70. See id. at S15,333, S15,401 (statement of Sen. Specter) (urging colleagues to rely upon 
Hatch's "professional judgment" and accept compromise rather than following the Presi-
dent); id. at S15,342-43 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (arguing that the compromise cannot be 
a "quota bill" if Hatch recommended it to the President); id. at Sl5,335 (statement of Sen. 
Metzenbaum) (commenting, with respect to Hatch's political imperatives, that Hatch "has no 
choice but to oppose the bill, even though the conferees accepted his suggested changes," 
and asserting that "[w]e do not have a consensus because the White House operatives simply 
do not want a consensus"). 
71. See Letter from Attorney General Thornburgh to Sen. Dole (Oct. 12, 1990), reprinted 
in 136 CONG. REC. Sl5,328 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990) (indicating the President's intention to 
veto the compromise). 
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dined to buck the White House on major civil rights legislation 
twice in a period of less than one month. Thus, thirty-four senators, 
including Senator Hatch, opposed the compromise; this was pre-
cisely the number needed to sustain a presidential veto.12 
When President Bush subsequently vetoed the legislation,73 the 
override vote failed in the Senate by a one-vote margin of 66-34.74 
A year later, Congress did pass the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which 
President Bush signed. That bill was, in many respects, substan-
tially weaker for civil rights plaintiffs than the 1990 version that 
failed to gamer veto-proof support in the Senate by one vote.75 
II. THE ISSUE OF OPPORTUNITY COSTS 
The example just described suggests that Congress's devotion of 
considerable resources to clarifying the meaning of certain language 
under the ADEA in 1990 rendered it marginally less capable -
during the same period - of resolving the meaning of certain other 
language under Title VII and related civil rights statutes. This mar-
ginal decline in institutional capability, in tum, helped produce a 
substantially different legislative outcome in the Title VII context. 
72. The vote on the conference report was 62-34. See 136 CONG. REC. S15,407 (daily ed. 
Oct. 16, 1990). Three of the four senators who were absent - Exon, Kerry, and Hatfield -
had voted for the version of the bill that had been approved by the Senate in July, while the 
fourth, Stevens, had opposed it. See id. at S9966 (daily ed. July 18, 1990). Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to infer that sixty-five senators would have voted for the compromise civil rights 
bill negotiated in October. This was exactly the same number that had voted for the precon-
ference version in July. See id. 
73. See id. at S16,562-63 (daily ed. Oct 24, 1990) (Bush Veto Message). 
74. See id. at S16,589. The 66th vote came from Senator Boschwitz (R-Minn.) who 
switched from his prior votes in July and mid-October. 
75. There are numerous substantive differences between the 1991 bill that became law, S. 
1745, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CoNG. REc. S15,503-12 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991), and the 1990 
bill as described in H.R. CoNF REP. No. 856, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. H9552-55 
(daily ed. Oct. 12, 1990). For example: (i) the 1990 Act capped punitive damages at the 
greater of $150,000 or the total compensatory and equitable amounts awarded (§ 8), whereas 
the 1991 Act caps punitive and compensatory damages combined at $50,000 to $300,000 based 
on size of employer(§ 102); (ii) the 1990 Act required employers to demonstrate that "dispa-
rate impact" employment practices - such as tests, education requirements, or minimum 
height and weight standards - "bear a significant relationship to successful performance of 
the job" (§ 3, new definition added to § 701(o)(l)(A) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), 
whereas the 1991 Act requires only that employers demonstrate that the practice at issue "is 
job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity" (§ 105(a)); (iii) 
the 1990 Act included a provision overriding Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986}, thereby 
prohibiting a compelled waiver of attorney's fees as a condition of settlement (§ 9), whereas 
the 1991 Act is silent on this issue; (iv) the 1990 Act included a provision overriding In-
dependent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989), thereby allowing 
for an award of attorney's fees against intervening defendants under Title VII (§ 9}, whereas 
the 1991 Act is silent on this issue; (v) the 1990 Act did not address race-based scoring of 
employment tests, whereas the 1991 Act prohibits such practices (§ 106). 
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Although the evidence does not compel such a conclusion,76 it 
raises in vivid terms the reality of trade-offs and opportunity costs 
within the legislative process. 
A. Finite f.?.esources and Limited Windows of Opportunity 
There are approximately 10,000 bills introduced in each session 
of Congress, but fewer than ten percent survive the legislative pro-
cess to become law.77 While the number of public laws being en-
acted has stabilized in recent years, these laws are of unprecedented 
length and complexity, and their consideration and approval - or 
rejection - has become virtually a continuous operation.78 Under 
76. It is difficult to imagine what would qualify as conclusive proof that Senator Hatch, or 
any of the other 33 Republican senators involved, would have opted to defy the President, 
also a Republican, on the Civil Rights Act of 1990 but for the expenditure of political capital 
on the OWBPA. There were important connections between the two pieces of legislation, in 
terms of the proximity of timing on the floor and also an identity of many key actors involved 
from the Senate (including Sens. Hatch, Kennedy, Metzenbaum, and Jeffords), the adminis-
tration (Roger Porter, Assistant to the President, and Tom Scully of the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget), and interest groups on both sides (Leadership Conference on Civil Rights 
and AFL-CIO for the proponents; National Assn. of Manufacturers and Chamber of Com-
merce for the opponents). But there also were many factors endemic to each bill individually 
- for example, the costs of employee benefits for OWBPA and the political implications of a 
so-called "quota" bill for the Civil Rights Act - and the Civil Rights Act attracted far more 
public and media attention than the OWBPA. Moreover, even senators themselves cannot 
possibly be certain how they would have voted on one bill in the absence of a second bill that 
may have affected their outlook in subtle or unanticipated ways. 
77. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., CALENDARS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIVES AND HISTORY OF LEGISLATION (final ed.) 98th Cong. (10,134 bills introduced1 
623 public laws), 99th Congress (8697 bills introduced, 664 public laws), lOOth Congress (8515 
bills introduced, 713 public laws), lOlst Congress (9248 bills introduced, 650 public laws), 
102d Congress (9602 bills introduced, 590 public laws). 
78. The number of public acts passed by each Congress rose from an average of just 
under 550 during the first one-third of this century (1901-1933) to an average of 780 during 
the ensuing four decades (1933-1970); it has leveled off at 620 since 1971. See BUREAU OF 
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, pt. 2, at 1081 (1975); U.S. STATS. AT LARGE (vols. 85-106). 
Numerous commentators have observed that federal legislation in recent decades has ad-
dressed new and complex areas. See, e.g., George E. Connor & Bruce I. Oppenheimer, De-
liberation: An Untimed Value in a Timed Game, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 315, 316 
(Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 5th ed. 1993) (noting the increased role of 
federal legislation since World War II in the economy, health care, education, the environ-
ment, energy, and civil rights). One indicator of this complexity is an enormous increase in 
the sheer volume of legislative language being enacted. For the 68th Congress (1923-1925), 
the Statutes at Large includes 1357 pages for 632 public laws. For the 83d Congress (1953-
1954), the Statutes at Large includes 2850 pages - more than double the volume for 781 
public laws. For the 98th Congress (1983-1984), the Statutes at Large includes 5299 
another enormous increase in volume even though the number of public laws enacted actu-
ally declined to 623, below the number enacted 60 years earlier. See U.S. STATS. AT LARGE 
(vols. 43, 67, 68, 68A, 97, 98). 
'The increased length and complexity of the legislative work product has imposed. new 
constraints on Congress's ability to cope with competing demands. Prior to the 1960s, Con-
gress ordinarily functioned for only seven or eight months each calendar year, but since the 
1970s, Congress normally has operated eleven to twelve months a year. Today, many bills 
that would command majority support are not passed simply from lack of time to move them 
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these circumstances, the decisions about which bills are given prior-
ity are in large part a function of how Congress manages two insti-
tutional resources - time and political capital. 
Individual senators and representatives facing the press of legis-
lative business must deal with serious time constraints. Members 
must choose to expend their energies on certain legislative subjects 
instead of others.79 They also must decide to participate in certain 
legislative activities and not others.80 These time pressures assume 
added urgency because members must devote considerable atten-
tion to nonlegislative business, especially raising funds for reelec-
tion. s1 Apart from the constraints on individual members, there is 
not enough floor time for every bill that one or more members wish 
to have considered. Accordingly, the leadership in each chamber 
must decide to bring up some bills and not others.s2 
There also are inherent limits on the political capital available to 
each senator or representative. Individual members and committee 
leaders may alienate their colleagues by pressing them to vote for 
too many "controversial" bills.83 Moreover, party leadership may 
through the legislative process. See Connor & Oppenheimer, supra, at 316. Even the bills 
that do pass may receive markedly less deliberative attention from the body as a whole than 
was true on average in prior eras. See id. at 322-23 (comparing hours allotted for general 
debate in the 68th, 84th, and 96th Congresses). 
79. Members' subject-matter priorities are determined in large part by their choice of 
committee assignments. Committee choices in tum are heavily influenced by how members 
view the distinct but overlapping objectives of serving local constituents (thereby advancing 
reelection prospects), enhancing relationships with colleagues (thereby securing prestige and 
power within the chamber), and promoting ideological or public policy objectives. Different 
committees offer varying opportunities to achieve each of these goals. See RICHARD F. 
FENNO, CoNGRESSMEN IN COMMrITEES (1973); JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNA· 
TIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 41-42 (1984). 
In addition, committee choices are affected by members' prelegislative occupational inter-
ests; for example, judiciary committees attract attorneys, and commerce committees appeal 
to members with backgrounds in business. 
80. It is routine for members to have conflicts among several hearings or between com-
mittee functions and floor time. See MICHAEL J. MALBIN, UNELECrED REPRESENTATIVES 
239 (1980) (reporting that members are often unable to attend meetings at which legislative 
business is transacted); Richard L. Hall, Participation, Abdication, and Representation in 
Congressional Committees, in CoNGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 78, at 161, 166-68 (re· 
porting that scheduling conflicts are a major source of member frustration). At the end of a 
session, such conflicts may affect attendance at conferences as well. See generally TIEFER, 
supra note 46, at 823-24; LAWRENCE D. LoNGLEY. & WALTER J. 0LESZEK, BICAMERAL POLI· 
ncs: CoNFERENCE CoMMrITEES IN CONGRESS 129, 212-13 (1989). 
81. See Norman J. Ornstein et al., The U.S. Senate in an Era of Change, in CONGRESS 
RECONSIDERED, supra note 78, at 13, 20. 
82. Certain bills are assured of being scheduled, such as the appropriations measures nec-
essary for the federal government to continue operating and any revenue measures needed to 
raise the funds to be appropriated. Beyond these "imperatives," the leadership has more 
power to make discretionary scheduling decisions in the House than in the Senate. See 
T1EFER, supra note 46, at 187-88. . 
83. See generally KINGDON, supra note 79, at 194. 
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offend the rank and file by attempting - or being seen as attempt-
ing - to force too many bills to the floor that have a certain ideo-
logical flavor or come from a particular committee. 
In the case of the OWBPA and the Givil Rights Act of 1990, the 
political capital of a key minority player was implicated. Senator 
Hatch, as ranking Republican on the Committee on Labor and 
Human Resources, was looked to by his conservative colleagues for 
leadership and guidance on legislation that emanated from the 
committee. He risked losing their respect, and adherence, if he 
broke with the conservative positions taken by a Republican presi-
dent. Having done so once, and having carried most of them 
along,84 he ran an even greater in doing so a second time on 
another civil rights bill. · 
The issue of limited political capital obviously may confront a 
majority party as well. For instance, assuming the presence of· a 
Democratic majority, Democrats from the Northeast and Midwest 
may try to bring to the floor a range of bills or amendments sup-
porting ideologically liberal positions on civil rights, protection for 
la.bor unions, environmental cleanup, and other social issues. But 
conservative Democrats from the Southeast and Southwest will re-
sist having to vote on too many of these measures, which may be 
highly controversial with their supporters. The leadership has an 
incentive to regulate and limit the number of votes on these liberal 
bills, in an effort to minimize internal party dissension and avoid 
defeat before the full Senate. 
The incentive to limit votes on potentially !livisive issues is even 
stronger when one factors in the realities of time constraints on the 
floor. Given the number of bills competing as serious candidates 
for enactment, measures on which substantial consensus has been 
achieved are more likely to be brought up for a vote. This tendency 
places a premium on making bills broadly palatable.85 Minimizing 
the controversial aspects of legislation is often accomplished proce-
durally. Thus members may agree to specify a time length for de-
bate and a time certain for final vote, or they may schedule a few 
84. Compare 136 CoNG. REC. Sl3,611 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. 
HIST., supra note 59, at 90 (reporting that 41 Republicans voted for the final negotiated 
version of the OWBPA and only four Republicans failed to vote for that version) with 136 
CONG. REc. Sl3,217 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1990), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 59, at 
189 and S. 1511 (as reported by committee Apr. 15, 1990), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra 
note 59, at 394 (the latter two sources together indicating that recorded support for earlier 
versions of the bill included only four Republicans: Sens. Heinz, Jeffords, Cohen, and 
Hatfield). 
85. See C. LAWRENCE EVANS, LEADERSHIP IN CoMMrITEE 127-34 (1991); Stat. Interp. 
Hrg., supra note 27, at 112 (statement of Prof. Stephen F. Ross). 
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key votes on identified, potentially divisive issues.BG On other occa-
sions, members advance the quest for consensus substantively by 
leaving divisive issues ambiguous in text or omitting them entirely 
from the statutory language.B7 
Even at the committee stage, there can be pressure to achieve 
consensus for scheduling purposes. Because committee leaders 
know they must compete for scarce floor time, they may seek to 
move a bill quickly through markup in order to maximize the time 
available for subsequent floor consideration.BB The attempt to ac-
commodate opposing views may lead to substantive adjustments or 
compromises, but it may also produce the same kind of ambiguity 
or omission that occurs on the floor. 
Contrary to the view of some theorists, Congress's approach to 
managing its institutional resources of time and political capital is 
neither static nor mechanical. B9 Decisionmaking in the legislative 
86. See Ornstein et al., supra note 81, at 21-22 (discussing the Senate's use of unanimous 
consent agreements); Steven S. Smith, Forces of Change in Senate Party Leadership and Or-
ganization, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, supra note 78, at 259, 269-72 (reporting that unani-
mous consent agreements are more common and complex in the Senate today); Hall, supra 
note 80, at 162-63 (reporting that the number of bills considered under special rules in the 
House risen dramatically in the last 20 years); Garry Young & Joseph Cooper, Multiple 
Referral and the Transformation of House Decision Making, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED, 
supra note 78, at 211, 223 {describing the growth of restrictive rules in the House); see also 
CoNGRESSIONAL QuARTERLY's GUIDE TO CoNGRESS 427 (4th ed. 1991) [hereinafter CQ 
GUIDE] (reporting that in the 95th Congress {1977-79), 15% of the rules reported to the 
House were closed or restrictive, and by the lOlst Congress (1989-91), that number had risen 
to 55%). The Rules Committee's effort to control the number and nature of amendments 
offered followed the House decision to allow recorded votes on floor amendments, thereby 
making members accountable for these amendment votes to constituents, not just colleagues. 
Id. 
87. Anecdotal examples of this practice abound. Former Representative Mikva describes 
how Representative Udall steered major strip mining legislation through the House using 
humor to avoid resolving tensions between supporters of uniform national standards and 
defenders of state sovereignty. See Mikva, supra note 3, at 380-81. Similarly, the 1991 Civil 
Rights Act is ambiguous on the issue of retroactivity, and the floor debates are replete with 
inconsistent statements on the issue from competing groups of supporters. See Pub. L. No. 
102-166, §§ 109{c), 402, 105 Stat. 1071, 1078, 1099 {1991); 137 CoNG. REC. S15,477 (daily ed. 
Oct. 30, 1991) (presenting the administration's views on the Act's effective dates); id. at 
Sl5,483 (statement of Sen. Danforth) {presenting his views on the retroactivity of the Act); 
id. at Sl5,485 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) {presenting his views on retroactivity). 
At a more general level, text may be left inconclusive on certain matters to ensure the 
"supermajority" support for a suspension of the House rules that is needed to move the bill 
expeditiously. See Young & Cooper, supra note 86, at 224 (noting "an expanded reliance on 
suspension of rules," a device that requires that the bill be sufficiently noncontroversial to 
enjoy bipartisan committee support); Connor & Oppenheimer, supra note 78, at 323 (report-
ing that 47 bills were considered under suspension in 1923-24, 69 in 1955-56, and 397 in 1979-
80). See generally 5 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., CONGRESS AND THE NATION, 1977-
1980, at 902-03 (1981). 
88. See EVANS, supra note 85, at 48-49, 59 {discussing accelerated committee action as 
part of the reauthorization of Superfund). 
89. Public choice theory has been criticized for asserting a unidimensional and overly 
simplistic model of the legislative process. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. 
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process is best viewed as dynamic and discontinuous. In this re-
gard, political scientist John Kingdon has described Congress as an 
"organized anarchy."90 Borrowing from the "garbage can model of 
organizational choice,"91 Kingdon views the congressional "garbage 
can" as one in which three separate "streams" coexist: problems 
that come to capture the attention of the policy community working 
in and around Congress;92 proposals generated as possible solutions 
to the problems;93 and politics, which allows for openings in the leg-
islative process to enact possible solutions.94 A problem may be 
recognized and a solution may be favored by key players in the 
congressional policy community, but the solution will not become 
law unless the political process is simultaneously mastered by those 
favoring the legislative proposal. Whether proponents are able to 
master the process is unpredictable and not directly related to the 
magnitude of the problem or the objective persuasiveness of the 
solution.95 
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 58-59 (1988) (criticizing public choice 
theory for misconceiving the legislative process as static rather than dynamic); Daniel 
Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as 
Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the I980s, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 77-85 (1990) (claiming that 
voters are not narrow profit maximizers and that politicians have goals beyond self-interest). 
See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 
VA. L. REV. 423 (1988). 
90. KINGDON, supra note 79, at 89-91. These references to discontinuity and organized 
anarchy should not be equated with indeterminacy or incoherence. Although decisionmak-
ing in Congress is a complex and fractured process, there may well be rules or considerations 
that can explain and predict legislative action. See generally id.; KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMA-
TION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1992); McNollgast, supra note 58; Edward P. 
Schwartz et al., A Positive Theory of Legislative Intent, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBs., Winter 
1994, at 51. 
91. KINGDON, supra note 79, at 89 (citing Michael D. Cohen et al., A Garbage Can Model 
of Organizational Choice, AoMJN. Sci. Q., Mar. 1972, at 1). 
92. This general "policy community" includes legislators, congressional staffs, interest 
groups, academic experts, and agency personnel. See KINGDON, supra note 79, at 92. The 
community actually consists of various more specialized policy communities devoted to par-
ticular policy areas. Id. at 122-23. Problems may come to the attention of a particular com-
munity through routine review of various activities or events; alternatively, some crisis or 
disaster may serve as a triggering or focusing event. See id. at 95-101, 199. 
93. See id. at 92-93, 122-52. Although a large number of ideas are generated for consider-
ation - what Kingdon refers to as a "policy primeval soup" - the ones most likely to ripen 
into concrete, problem-solving proposals possess certain traits: they are technically feasible, 
they are acceptable in value terms to specialists in the community, and they anticipate rele-
vant budgetary and political constraints. Id. at 128, 138-46. 
94. See id. at 93, 152-72. Various elements make up the political climate, including the 
national mood, public opinion polls, interest group pressure campaigns, shifts in partisan dis-
tribution of Congress, and change in administrations. Kingdon observes that these elements 
differ in weight from one situation to another; further, because of the extrinsic variables 
involved, events in this "politics" stream occur largely independently of problems and 
proposals. 
95. See id. at 170-72. 
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The difficulty of enacting into law widely endorsed solutions to 
recognized policy problems is attributable, in part, to the proce-
dural constraints within our legislative structure that allow a deter-
mined minority to delay or obstruct legislation.96 These procedural 
hurdles can become especially formidable because, as Kingdon ob-
serves, problems not resolved in relatively short order may simply 
disappear from the legislative agenda.97 There is no irresistible mo-
mentum for any given initiative, and legislative opportunities are 
lost when Congress determines that it is counterproductive to invest 
more time on the particular problem. Congress may reach this con-
clusion because the focusing event fades from public consciousness 
or from an interested group's agenda, or because key participants 
shift their attention to another problem that has greater personal 
appeal or more chance for success, or even because a key legislator 
pushing for change has passed from the scene.98 
In short, the opportunities for Congress to act are limited in pre-
dictable ways by the finite quantity of temporal and political re-
sources and by substantial logistical and procedural constraints. 
These opportunities also are limited in unpredictable ways by the 
ebb and flow of public attention, interest group commitment, and 
intensity of member preferences. When Congress devotes more 
time to one legislative item, it sacrifices the opportunity to address 
other items on the legislative agenda. These opportunity costs are 
substantial and are often impossible to anticipate. 
B. Legislative History and Limited Windows of Opportunity 
One important way that Congress deals with its opportunity-
cost problem is through the use of legislative history. 
As has been frequently observed, Congress today is not in any 
meaningful sense a deliberative body.99 Members are not generalist 
96. See generally ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 89, at 28·40 (discussing committee 
referral and markup, floor debate and amendment, and reconciliation between two versions 
through conference). Although some of these constraints - bicameralism, for example -
are constitutionally explicit, many, including filibusters and committee structure, are not. 
97. See KINGDON, supra note 79, at 109-10, 176-78 (discussing policy windows). 
98. See id. 
99. See, e.g., HARRISON W. Fox, JR. & SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL 
STAFFS 143-45 (1977); MALBIN, supra note 80, at 240-43; Connor & Oppenheimer, supra 
note 78, at 315-16, 320-27. There are, of course, occasions when Congress does deliberate as 
a body - that is, when many members participate in discussion and debate while many more 
members listen to the exchanges. A notable recent example was the debate by both houses 
of Congress in January 1991 on U.S. participation in the Persian Gulf War. But such exam-
ples are exceptional. 
It is not clear at what point Congress ceased to be deliberative on a regular basis. Some 
observers may be looking through rose-colored glasses when they suggest that extended de· 
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legislative guardians of the common good, engaging in extempora-
neous debate on the ·floor to explore the details and ambiguities of 
statutory language or to seek broad agreement about the meaning 
and merits of that language. Rather, Congress is a bureaucratic or-
ganization with thousands of employees, and its members are man-
agers on the executive model more than deliberators on the judicial 
model.100 
Deliberation does occur, but it occurs at the committee and sub-
committee levels. There, legislation is drafted and debated, policy 
expertise is solicited or contributed through informal exchanges and 
public hearings, and compromises are reached among key commit-
tee members and nonlegislative players.101 
Beyond this committee-based policy community, most members 
decide to support or oppose a measure by relying on the expertise 
of particular colleagues who have taken leadership roles on the bill 
in question.102 This expertise is accessible to members in the form 
of legislative history - principally committee reports and to some 
extent explanatory floor statements.103 Congressional rules require 
- subject to limited exceptions - that any committee report filed 
be made available to all members before the bill is considered on 
the floor.104 Members may then examine the report directly to re-
liberative discussion on the meaning of substantive legislative language survived as the nor-
mal means of conducting business on the House or Senate floor until relatively recent times. 
See WooDROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 69 {World Publishing Co., 1956) 
{1885) (writing in 1883-1884 that "Congress in session is Congress on public exhibition, whilst 
Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at work"). 
100. See Breyer, supra note 3, at 858-59. 
101. See generally KINGDON, supra note 79, at 123; McNollgast, supra note 58, at 720-21. 
102. Prior to floor consideration, most members are not personally familiar with the de-
tails - or sometimes even with the broad outlines - of legislation in which they have not 
actively participated. See, e.g., Stat. lnterp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 111 (statement of Prof. 
Stephen F. Ross). Reliance is not strictly a matter of party loyalty. Considerations of ideol-
ogy or politics may cut across party lines. Thus, for instance, on a civil rights bill conservative 
Democrats may weigh the views of a moderate Republican more carefully than a liberal 
Democratic committee chair or floor manager. 
Of course, members also are influenced by presentations from the executive branch, in-
terest groups, and individual constituents. But the primary source of expertise is generally 
presentations from colleagues, although input from others may be coordinated with such 
presentations. 
103. Hearings rarely are available in printed form prior to floor vote, so access depends 
on obtaining copies of individual prepared statements, or viewing the proceedings on C-
Span. By contrast, committee reports and introductory floor statements are promptly acces-
sible in print, to staff as well as members. 
104. See STANDING RuLES OF THE SENATE Rule 17.5 (1992) (requiring that reports be 
available two days prior to consideration, excluding Sundays and legal holidays); RuLES OF 
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Rule 11.2(1)(6) (1992) (requiring that reports be available 
two days prior to consideration excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays). Customa-
rily, a copy of the report is placed on each member's desk prior to the start of debate. 
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ceive necessary information and assurances about a bill's content 
and projected consequences. Or they may depend on written or 
oral briefings from their own staffs, who in turn have relied heavily 
on the committee report to educate themselves.10s 
Many former and current members have confirmed the central 
importance of committee reports to their own understanding of 
statutory text. For example, Judge James L. Buckley, former U.S. 
Senator and presently on the D.C. Circuit, has commented, "[M]y 
understanding of most of the legislation I voted on [while a U.S. 
Senator] was based entirely on my reading of its language· and, 
where necessary, on explanations contained in the accompanying 
report."106 Abner Mikva, a former member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives and until recently a judge on the D.C. Circuit, de-
scribes the committee report as the "bone structure of the legisla-
tion. It is the road map that explains why things are in and things 
are out of the statute."107 Finally, Congressional Quarterly has sum-
marized Senator Arlen Specter's views in this way: "[M]embers of 
Congress are more likely to read a committee report than the bill 
itself. The prose of a report is easier to understand, and, because a 
bill usually amends an existing statute, it is impossible to follow 
without referring to the U.S. Code."10s 
The detailed information and commentary included in commit-
tee reports invariably covers more ground than the text itself. 1\vo 
key substantive sections of most reports - not always titled the 
same way - are "Background and Need" and "Committee Views." 
The former explains the problems that gave rise to the bill and the 
bill's broad response. The latter is a more detailed commentary on 
legal issues arising under each section or title of the bill.109 This 
approach represents a "middle ground" response to the intractable 
dilemma of drafting legislative rules. 
105. See Stat. lnterp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 111 (statement of Prof. Stephen F. Ross). My 
experience in seven years as subcommittee staff counsel is similar to that described by Ross. 
Staff for legislators off-committee who sought written information asked primarily if not ex-
clusively for the report and almost never for the text of the reported bill. My own inquiries, 
directed to staff from other committees, were similarly focused on the report. Occasionally, 
briefing documents prepared by staff from the Democratic or Republican leadership also 
play a role in educating staff and members. But these too are generally drafted on the basis 
of committee report language and often with substantial input from staff on the committee 
that reported the bill in question. 
106. Stat. lnterp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 21 (statement of James L. Buckley). 
107. Mikva, supra note 28, at 184. 
108. Joan Biskupic, Scalia Takes a Narrow View in Seeking Congress' Will, 48 CoNo. Q., 
913, 917 (1990) (relating Sen. Specter's view). 
109. Apart from these and other substantive sections, reports also include many formal 
or recitative provisions. See generally TIEFER, supra note 46, at 183-86. 
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One horn of the dilemma is that statutory language must be spe-
cific enough to give notice to affected parties, as well as to guide 
agencies charged with implementing and enforcing the text and 
courts charged with reviewing alleged noncompliance. If such pre-
dictability and notice were the sole justifications for having legisla-
tive rules, then it would be easier to make such rules categorical 
and unequivocal. But there is another horn to the dilemma. 
In the real world, categorical rules end up covering more or less 
than their authors sought to address - and sometimes more or less 
than makes sense. After all, statutes ordinarily must be applied to 
unanticipated circumstances affecting unidentifiable entities in the 
indefinite future. If legislative rules are too specific or exhaustive, 
they will unduly constrain agencies, courts, and private parties in 
their ability to adapt to situations that were unforeseen and even 
unforeseeable at the time a statute was enacted. 
The problem of an unduly confining text is particularly vexing in 
an era when Congress must respond to more complex and techni-
cally sophisticated problems through the legislative process.110 The 
solution chosen by Congress has generally been a text that is 
rougher and more approximate than what is optimal from the 
standpoint of predictability. It contains some details, but it is ac-
companied by committee reports that amplify the need for the leg-
islation and include examples or additional instructions for applying 
the text to specific settings. By allowing for some flexibility in stat-
utory language, Congress minimizes the risk of erroneous or absurd 
applications of an overly detailed text.111 This flexibility also allows 
agencies the scope to perform their delegated interpretive 
function.112 
Apart from improving the particular legislative product, Con-
gress's use of legislative history enhances its overall product by di-
minishing burdens on the congressional calendar. Detail or 
guidance included in committee reports generally addresses matters 
that are subsidiary to what is contained in the text. This kind of 
explanatory material is meant to be illustrative and not to resolve 
110. See supra note 78. 
111. This approach has long been justified as essential in areas of tax legislation. See 
Ferguson et al., supra note 27, at 806-07. The approach has far broader application in the 
modern era of statutory rulemaking, when Congress regulates environmental emissions into 
the air and water, the use of communications technology, and innumerable other subjects 
that defy definitive textual renditions. 
112. See Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is not the Primary Official with the Responsibil-
ity to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 Cm.-KENT L. 
REV. 321, 335-38 (1990). 
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ambiguities that have consciously been included or retained by the, 
authors. The alternative of adding these details to text increases 
the possibility for delay and obstruction even though the details 
themselves would command overwhelming support. This is because 
each provision, clause, or word of a statute can become the focus of 
additional amendments or procedurally based attacks from a small 
but sufficiently determined minority.113 The amendments may be 
defeated, or the attacks overcome, but the time and resources ex-
pended will limit Congress's capacity to legislate in other areas. 
Treatment of subsidiary matters in text also increases the pros-
pect that more divisive collateral issues will have to be confronted 
by Congress. These collateral issues may be raised in the form of 
strategic amendments to jeopardize the bill's progress by attracting 
opposition that would not otherwise exist.114 Disagreement over 
such issues may delay for years the enactment of a bill that has 
broad majority support.115 Congress may even decline to pursue 
enactment of the underlying legislation for fear of disturbing settled 
expectations and precedent on collateral issues.116 
113. The difficulties of navigating the legislative process are in part a function of the 
typical legislative personality. See, e.g., Quotable, RoLL CALL, July 19, 1993, at 4 ("I believe 
if we introduced the Lord's Prayer here, Senators would propose a large number of amend· 
ments to it." (quoting Sen. Henry Wilson (R-Mass., 1812-1875))); Mikva, supra note 3, at 380 
(commenting on the difficulty of getting agreement on a single set of words from "435 prima 
donnas in the House and 100 prima donnas in the Senate"). But these difficulties also reflect 
the reality of a modem decentralized Congress in which members, individually or in small 
groups, are more disposed to throw their weight around. See, e.g., Ornstein et al., supra note 
81, at 21, 38 (discussing the strategic use of filibusters to extract concessions); Smith, supra 
note 86, at 270 (discussing the tactical use of holds or threatened filibusters). 
114. See Popkin, supra note 4, at 318. Collateral amendments may pertain to a single 
"hot-button" issue, or to a series of marginally controversial matters. See, e.g., Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). The legislation overrode 
the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), concerning 
the scope of statutory provisions prohibiting discrimination in federally funded programs. 
Although legislation to override Grove City was introduced early in 1984, it took four years 
to enact a bill into law. The delay was due in substantial part to collateral concerns about the 
bill's effect on the operation of religious institutions and small businesses. Compare S. REP. 
No. 64, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 22-23 (preserv: 
ing the longstanding exemption for educational institutions controlled by religious organiza-
tions) and 131 CONG. REc. 2150 (1985) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (describing same) with 
134 CoNG. REc. 393 (1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("[The bill] forc[es] churches and syna· 
gogues to bow under the heavy hand of Federal regulations just because they run a social 
service program in their basement which receives but $1 of Federal money.") and id. at 386 
(statement of Sen. Thurmond). See also 134 CoNG. REc. 4640 (1988) (statement of Sen. 
Mitchell) (criticizing a national lobbying effort that stated that the bill w6uld force churches 
to hire homosexuals and AIDS victims); id. at 4756-57 (statement of Rep. Hefner) (same). 
115. See, e.g., supra note 114 {discussing the Civil Rights Restoration Act). 
116. One can easily imagine such an example in light of Patterson v, McLean Credit 
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173-75 (1989) {declining to overrule a prior decision construing 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 to prohibit racial discrimination in private conduct). The Court in Patterson, 
after requesting the parties to brief whether it should overrule Runyan v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 
160 {1976), relied on the fact that its prior interpretation was consistent with our nation's 
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Of course, some explanatory material is meant to adqress ambi-
guities in text. Ambiguous statutory provisions may be deliberately 
inserted by a bill's authors or may be perceived by other members 
subsequent to the bill's introduction.117 But when textual ambigui-
ties appear during the legislative process, members may still deem 
the "cost" of clarifying amendments prohibitive. 
A decision to seek amendments at the committee stage may re-
sult in a lower agenda priority and lengthy delays in securing com-
mittee approval.118 Negotiating language changes takes time. Also, 
if there are to be multiple amendments or a committee substitute, 
the changes must be circulated for review by committee members. 
Assuming that the process takes weeks, this may mean committee 
consideration is postponed for several markups, often delaying ac-
tion for months. Such a delay can be critical in terms of floor 
scheduling. 
If the ambiguities are discovered after the committee has re-
ported the bill, parliamentary rules may make it inconvenient, time-
consuming, or otherwise logistically impracticable to resolve them 
through a floor amendment. In the House, the Rules Committee 
typically issues a limited rule allowing only certain agreed-upon 
votes.119 Providing for additional votes on amendments to resolve 
late-discovered ambiguities requires additional negotiation and per-
haps a new rule from the committee. In the Senate, if a bill has 
come up on unanimous consent, or on a unanimous consent time 
agreement with certain designated amendments, altering the proce-
dural arrangement will require securing unanimous consent for the 
addition of a new amendment.120 Such consent may be difficult to 
obtain.121 Finally, even when a floor amendment can be accom-
broad sense of justice and social welfare concerning racial discrimination. 491 U.S. at 174. 
But had the Court overruled Runyan and limited § 1981 to government conduct, the same 
broad sense of justice might well have inhibited corrective legislative action. Congress would 
have had to debate for years the scope and details of how to limit private intentional race 
discrimination under § 1981 - to consider, for example, whether remedies should be limited 
to the equitable relief then available under Title VII and whether "reverse discrimination" 
should be expressly prohibited. Supporters of broader coverage might well have concluded 
that such a debate was too costly in terms of disturbing the nation's broad sense of justice on 
this issue. 
117. See supra text accompanying notes 20-28; see also Allan C. Hutchinson & Derek 
Morgan, The Semiology of Statutes, 21 HARV. J. ON LEms. 583, 592-95 {1984) (reviewing 
DAVID R. MIERS & ALAN c. PAGE, LEGISLATION {1982)) {discussing the politicizatio,n of 
statutory interpretation under English law). 
118. See EVANS, supra note 85, at 48-52, 59. 
119. See supra note 86. See generally TIEFER, supra note 46, at 291-95. 
120. See generally TIEFER, supra note 46, at 468, 573-77. 
121. See id. at 576. The modification could be made through recommittal of the bill to 
the authorizing committee, with instructions to report out the bill as modified. See id. at 679-
32 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:1 
plished through the rules, the risks in terms of parliamentary tactics 
may be disproportionately high.122 
Obviously, some ambiguities that can significantly affect the 
thrust of the proposed law are resolved through amendment. Un-
less the textual ambiguities are of sufficient magnitude, however, 
Congress generally issues clarifying explanations through commit-
tee reports, floor statements by the bill's principal sponsor, or pre-
arranged floor colloquies between members.123 
C. Congressional Self-Governance 
Congress's reliance on legislative history as an integral aspect of 
managing its workload is not accidental. Rather, that reliance re-
flects a conscious decision in response to the changed realities of 
modern American government. Two developments within Con-
gress have played an especially important role in triggering this in-
stitutional response. 
First, Congress since World War II has striven to secure and 
maintain coequal policymaking status with the executive branch. 
Following the spectacular growth of executive-branch power during 
the New Deal era, Congress became concerned that it needed addi-
tional resources and expertise in order to reassert initiative in es-
sential aspects of lawmaking such as information-gathering, 
formulation of legislative options, and oversight.124 Beginning with 
83. But the recommittal may take some time to implement and may also flag the bill as more 
controversial than it really is. 
122. In the House, modifying the rule to add an amendment requested by the majority 
may lead to a negotiated addition of another amendment requested by the minority. In the 
Senate, modifying the bill on the floor through "committee amendments," which require no 
vote, may be attacked as evidence that members are being hoodwinked and will not know 
what version of the text they are voting on. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REc. S13,238-40, S13,241 
{daily ed. Sept. 17, 1990), reprinted in 1 LEms. HIST., supra note 59, at 148-53 (recounting 
Sen. Metzenbaum's modification of a bill and quoting Sen. Hatch as criticizing bill managers 
for "asking that the Senate proceed on a bill which ... the vast majority of Senators have 
barely had enough time to read, let alone analyze"); 133 CONG. REC. 18,128 {1987) (state-
ment of Sen. Quayle) {objecting to taking up a bill because of changes in text made while 
unanimous consent agreement was being negotiated). 
123. See Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 112-13 (statement of Prof. Stephen F. Ross); 
see, e.g., Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J.L. 
& PuB. POLY. 43, 46 {1988) (agreeing that legislative history may overcome some congres-
sional shortcomings, noting that the Comprehensive Crime Control Act's failure to refer to 
the Speedy Trial Act was cured by floor debate). 
124. See S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 {1946) (accompanying Legislative Reor-
ganization Act of 1946) {"Devised to handle the simpler tasks of an earlier day, our legisla-
tive machinery and procedures are by common consent no longer competent to cope 
satisfactorily with the grave and complex problems of the post-war world. They must be 
modernized if we are to avoid an imminent break-down of the legislative branch of the Na-
tional Government."); 92 CoNG. REc.10,039-40 {1946) (statement of Rep. Monroney); id. at 
10,046 (statement of Rep. Michener); id. at 6344-45, (statement of Sen. LaFollette). See gen-
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the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,125· Congress overhauled 
its network of standing committees and augmented the size of its 
committee staffs. The number of staff members grew steadily for 
several decades, increased explosively during the 1970s, and has 
largely stabilized since 1980. Committee staff, which plays the most 
significant role in and implementing legislative strategies, 
has grown in the House from 193 staff members in 1947 to 589 in 
1967, 1,917 in 1980, and 1,986 in 1989.126 Senate committee staff 
has grown at an almost comparable rate, rising from 290 staff mem-
bers in 1947 to 621 in 1967 and then 1,191 in 1980, before falling off 
slightly to 1,013 in 1989.127 
In the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970,12s Congress reaf-
firmed the central importance of committee staff efforts and author.:. 
ized substantially higher professional staff levels.129 Further, 
Congress since 1970 has greatly augmented its ability to conduct 
sophisticated factual and legal research and to evaluate ongoing 
and proposed government programs, through the creation and ex-
pansion of various support agencies that work closely with commit-
tee members and their staffs.130 
erally Fox & HAMMOND, supra note 99, at 20-22; KENNETii KoFMEHL, PROFESSIONAL 
STAFFS OF CONGRESS 3-4 {3d ed. 1977); MALBIN, supra note 80, at 5; David E. Price, Profes-
sionals and "Entrepreneurs": Staff Orientations and Policy Making on Three Senate Commit-
tees, 33 J. PoL. 316, 316 {1971). 
125. Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 {1946) (codifying 15 standing committees in the 
Senate and 19 in the House, and authorizing the hiring of four permanent staff members for 
each standing committee). See generally MALBIN, supra note 80, at 9-19. 
126. CQ GUIDE, supra note 86, at 483. Congress used the experience of professional 
staffing for its "money committees," including Appropriations and Finance, during the 1920s 
as models for its new staffing approach. See 92 CoNG. REc. 6395 {1946) (statement of Sen. 
LaFollette); MALBIN, supra note 80, at 11. 
127. CQ GuIDE, supra note 86, at 483. There has also been dramatic growth in the size of 
members' personal staffs - from 1440 to 7569 in the House between 1947 and 1989, and 
from 590 to 3837 in the Senate over the same period. Id. 
128. Pub. L. No. 91-510, 84 Stat. 1140 {1970). 
129. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1215, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1970), reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4417, 4431 {"The staffs of the committees of the House make vast contribu-
tions to the legislative, investigative, and oversight work all committees perform each Con-
gress. But while the quality of the staffs is high, their numbers are insufficient to meet the 
increasing workload of the committees they serve."). 
130, Among the established support agencies, the Congressional Research Service {CRS) 
had existed for decades, but it was during the 1970s that CRS first began to work closely with 
committee staff in analyzing and evaluating legislative proposals. Staff at CRS went from 332 
in 1970 to 806 in 1976 and to 860 in 1987. The General Accounting Office (GAO), estab-
lished in 1921, had long performed only traditional fiscal auditing furtctions. But Congress in 
the 1970 Legislative Reorganization Act directed the GAO to do cost-benefit studies of gov• 
emment programs. Pub. L. No. 91-510, § 204(a), 84 Stat. 1140, li68 (1970). By the late 
1970s, GAO reported that 35% of its workload and over half of its self-initiated work was 
"program evaluation," including evaluations of proposed - as opposed to already-operating 
- legislative programs. The GAO had over 5000 staff by the late 1980s. 
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Committees were an important instrument of congressional op-
erations before World War II.131 But larger committee staf(s, sup-
ported by expertise from other congressional agencies, have played 
a key role in transforming committees into aggressive policymaking 
entrepreneurs.132 Initial notions that committee staff would be 
"neutral professionals" - notions derived from the executive 
branch model - were dispelled rapidly as committee chairs har-
nessed the new expertise for predictably partisan ends.133 
Committees today vary in the degree to which staff merely im-
plement specific directives from the committee chair, as opposed to 
exercising discretion in carrying out the chair's general marching 
orders.134 Moreover, and directly related to the type of legislative 
history being considered here, modern committees also vary in the 
amount of attention and deference they are likely to give to deci-
sions of the federal courts.135 Yet even with due regard for these 
As for newer support agencies, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), created by 
statute in 1972, was responsible for "generating accurate, comprehensive, and objective infor-
mation about technology to facilitate its effective social management by political deci-
sionmakers." S. REP. No. 1123, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3568, 3584; see Pub. L. No. 92-484, § 2(c)(l), 86 Stat. 797, 797 (noting in the statement of 
purpose that federal agencies charged with reporting to Congress were "not designed to pro-
vide the legislative branch with adequate and timely information, independently developed, 
relating to the potential impact of technological applications"). OTA has over 140 staff mem-
bers devoted exclusively to analyzing and evaluating future policy choices being presented to 
Congress. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), created by statute in 1974, has more 
than 225 staff members, one-third of whom evaluate policy issues for Congress. See generally 
MALBIN, supra note 80, at 15-16; NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN ET AL., VITAL STATISTICS ON CON· 
GRESS 1993-1994 130 (1994). 
131. See, e.g., 92 CONG. REc. 10,040 (1946) (statement of Rep. Monroney) (recognizing 
that the committee system had grown in importance, and urging that it be reorganized and 
modernized to ensure adequate performance). 
132. See Price, supra note 124, at 335-36 (applying the term policy entrepreneur to com-
mittee staff); see also Shaviro, supra note 89, at 93. See generally KINGDON, supra note 79, at 
129-30 & n.3. 
133. See Fox & HAMMOND, supra note 99, at 20-25 (describing early aspirations for non-
partisanship as modeled on the executive branch, and stating that by the late 1940s members 
recognized that truly nonpartisan staff was difficult to come by and probably illusory); id. at 
152-53 (noting that staff were encouraged to take initiatives furthering interests of their re-
spective Congress members); MALBIN, supra note 80, at 12 (noting that committee chairs 
assert control over staffs). 
. 134. See MALBJN, supra note 80, at 46-74; Price, supra note 124, at 320-36. To some 
extent, this reflects differing personalities and leadership styles of individual chairs. But it 
may also reflect differences between committees with a largely fixed and budget-related 
agenda, such as Appropriations or Finance, and committees with a more open-ended mission, 
such as Judiciary, Environment and Public Works, and Labor. The former tend to have less 
entrepreneurial staffs and to operate in a somewhat less partisan fashion. See Price, supra 
note 124, at 326-31; see also EVANS, supra note 85, at 15-42 (discussing five contextual and 
individual variables that explain behavior of committee chairs in the U.S. Senate). 
135. See Mark C. Miller, Congressional Committees and the Federal Courts: A Neo-Insti-
tutional Perspective, 45 W. PoL. Q. 949 (1992). Miller discusses his study of three House 
committees that indicated that a committee with a constituency orientation - Interior and 
Insular Affairs - paid the least attention to judicial decisions, that a committee with a pri-
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variations, the. central point remains that for over four decades 
Congress has asserted its independent policymaking power primar-
ily through its system of committees.136 The manifestations of com-
mittee power include formulating policy recommendations as 
proposed text, developing explanatory materials that amplify the 
text, and building coalitions necessary to win approval of the text 
both in committee and on the floor.137 .The full body of each cham-
ber depends on its subbodies to perform this work, including the 
drafting of legislative history materials to explain and justify policy 
that stems from the text. Insofar as committee reports - and floor 
statements by committee chairs serving as bill managers - are a 
central part of the policymaking enterprise, they plainly reflect 
Congress's own design for the legislative process. 
The second principal development in triggering congressional 
reliance on legislative history has been the decentralization of 
power within Congress. During the 1950s and 1960s, Congress 
acted to modify the centripetal effects of the seniority system and to 
establish functioning subcommittees on a permanent basis. t3s 
Gradually, most Democratic senators, and many Democratic con-
gressmen, were able to chair a subcommittee and make use of its 
professional staff. By the late 1960s, Republicans - the minority in 
both chambers - were pressing for the opportunity to have their 
own professional minority committee staff. The Legislative Reor-
ganization Act of 1970 addressed this concern, 139 and minority com-
mittee staff were hired in increasing numbers during the 1970s. 
mary objective of securing power and prestige - Energy and Commerce - viewed courts as 
another political actor entitled to little deference, and that a committee with a policy orienta-
tion - Judiciary - treated judicial decisions with the most respect and deference. Id. at 
954-63. There are obvious parallels between the variations identified in committee interac-
tion with the courts and the distinct objectives that trigger members' interest in committee 
assignments. See supra note 79. 
136. This is the consistent conclusion reached by political scientists who have studied 
Congress in the last four decades. See generally KOFMEHL, supra note 124 (1950s); Price, 
supra note 124 (1960s); MALBIN, supra note 80 (1970s); EVANS, supra note 85 (1980s). 
137. See Ev ANS, supra note 85, at 2-3; George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and 
Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and 
Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DuKE LJ. 39, 66-67. 
138. The so-called Johnson Rule, in effect from 1953 to 1961, ameliorated the effects of 
the seniority system in the Senate by providing that no Democratic senator would receive a 
second "plum" committee assignment until every Democratic senator had at least one such 
assignment. See KoFMEHL, supra note 124, at 18 & n.3; see also Ornstein et al., supra note 81, 
at 20 (reporting a 1970 rule that limited members to service on only one of the four most 
prestigious committees). Also during the 1950s, the Senate Judiciary Committee established 
permanent subcommittees, setting a model for other committees and allowing for prolifera-
tion of majority subcommittee staff. See Fox & HAMMOND, supra note 99, at 23; MALBIN, 
supra note 80, at 13-14. 
139. See Pub. L. No. 91-510, § 302(b), 84 Stat. 1140, 1177-78 (1970) (allowing the minority 
party to select up to two of the six professional staff on each committee); see also H.R. REP. 
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Given that the goal of these reforms was to "democratize" Con-
gress, it is not surprising that one effect has been to disperse the 
power to initiate and negotiate legislative solutions. While the pri-
mary locus of decisionmaking remains at the full committee,140 indi-
vidual members have demonstrated an unprecedented interest in 
proposing their own legislative ideas and then pressing for those 
ideas to be adopted.141 Members have come to believe, apparently 
with good reason, that having a visible personal stake in a legisla-
tive solution enhances their status with their colleagues and also 
with the voters.142 Members now have the staff resources to trans-
late that belief into action on a regular basis.143 
In these circumstances, legislative history often provides an ef-
fective, alternative form of currency. A committee member may 
want to modify the language of a bill authored by the chair, but the 
member's policy concern may also be accommodated through lan-
guage in the committee report. Similarly, a senator or representa-
tive from off the committee who wishes to propose a floor 
amendment may, instead, negotiate a colloquy with the bill's floor 
manager that addresses the proposed policy change.144 In each in-
No. 1215, supra note 129, at 15-17, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4431-32 (explaining 
need for change). See generally Fox & HAMMOND, supra note 99, at 23-24; MALBIN, supra 
note 80, at 13. 
140. See EVANS, supra note 85, at 101-02 (discussing and rejecting the "subcommittee 
government" hypothesis). 
141. See MALBIN, supra note 80, at 44-45; Ornstein et al., supra note 81, at 19 (noting a 
marked increase in the proportion of floor amendments coming from senators off the com-
mittee of jurisdiction). A dramatic recent illustration is the fact that more than 100 distinct 
health care reform bills were introduced and discussed during the 102d Congress. See CON· 
GRESSIONAL RES. SERV., HEALTii INSURANCE LEGISLATION IN TiiE 1020 CONGRESS: PART 
II, at 1 (1993). 
142. See MALBIN, supra note 80, at 28; see also Price, supra note 124, at 320-22 (recount-
ing the example of Sen. Magnuson championing consumer legislation based on his desire to 
stand for something after near-defeat in the 1962 election). 
143. Subcommittee chairs often have staffs of their own, especially in the more decentral-
ized committees such as Senate Labor and Human Resources, House Education and Labor, 
and both Judiciary Committees. Members who are not subcommittee chairs need not rely 
only on their personal staffs. They often call on support agencies such as CRS, GAO, and 
OTA for assistance in gathering information, analyzing currently authorized programs, and 
proposing new or modified legislative approaches. See supra note 130. 
144. These are both regular practices in Congress. For an example of committee report 
language, see S. REP. No. 380, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1992). This report accompanied S. 
600, the Child Labor Amendments, and specified that despite the proposed prohibition on 
seafood processing by sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds, "teenagers would still be able to 
work for their parents on the family fishing boat." Id. Apparently, such practice is common 
in Rhode Island, and the report language was included at the request of committee member 
Senator Pell. Telephone conversation with Gail Laster, formerly counsel to Senate Labor 
Subcommittee (Feb. 1, 1994) (notes on file with author). For an example of a floor colloquy, 
see 133 CoNG. REc. 18,924 (1987) (statement of committee chair Kennedy) (assuring Sen. 
Reid (D-Nev.) that under the bill that eventually became the Worker Adjustment Retraining 
Notification Act, employers ordered by the Nevada State Gaming Authority to close down 
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stance, the individual member has achieved personal recognition on 
the issue, gaining credit with interested constituents and colleagues. 
The committee chair or floor manager has accommodated a col-
league's concern while avoiding the risks that accompany a revision 
of the text.145 
D. Valuing Legislative Efficiency 
The legislative process depicted in this Part is at odds with the 
idealized image of Congress as a collection of generalists who 
openly and thoughtfully debate the consequences of the legislation 
on which they are voting.146 There are many factors besides the 
vigorous initiative of committees and the proliferation of staff that 
help explain why Congress today does not function in a unified. de-
liberative mode. Advances in technology, notably electronic voting 
and live telecasts of floor proceedings, have resulted in members 
spending less time in the chamber, either listening to one another or 
discussing privately how they plan to vote.147 The need to raise 
money for reelection campaigns occupies a sizeable proportion of 
members' time while they are in office.148 Members also devote 
considerable time granting audiences to a burgeoning interest 
group community, as well as to large numbers of local constituents 
who come to Washington.149 Further, the sheer complexity of na-
tional problems has contributed to the steady growth of govern-
ment, of which Congress is a part.150 But whatever the reasons may 
be, one important consequence of these developments is that Con-
gress has paid increasing attention to the problem of managing its 
heavier workload - and the nation's more complex legislative 
immediately and without warning would not have to give 60 days' notice to their employees). 
See generally Stat. lnterp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 142-43 (statement of Prof. Stephen F. Ross). 
145. See supra text accompanying notes 79-123 (discussing delay, modification, and other 
opportunity costs). 
146. See MALBIN, supra note 80, at 241-42. 
147. See id. at 17. See also Connor & Oppenheimer, supra note 78, at 325 (confirming 
that the televising of floor proceedings coincided with a major decline in members' attend-
ance on the floor). 
148. This may be attributed to the high cost of purchasing "television tiµie" during cam-
paigns, as well as to the Supreme Court's conclusion in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-59 
(1976), that the First Amendment prohibits imposing limits on candidate expenditures. Cf. 
MALBIN, supra note 80, at 243 (reporting that members in 1977 spent on average 11 minutes 
per day engaged in research and reading, versus one full day per week as recently as 1965), 
149. See Connor & Oppenheimer, supra note 78, at 324; Jonathan Rauch, The Hyper-
pluralism Trap, NEW REPUBLIC, June 6, 1994, at 22. 
150. See MALBIN, supra note 80, at 245. 
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agenda - as effectively as possible. Congress uses legislative his-
tory as an integral part of its quest for successful operation.151 
This is not to suggest that legislative efficiency should be cele-
brated as a supreme value. There are constitutional constraints on 
the promotion of congressional efficiency.152 Moreover, Congress 
faces certain risks if it fails to balance efficiency against competing 
legislative values, such as fair notice to regulated entities and coher-
ence among related laws. Part III will discuss these constitutional 
and functional concerns. 
Still, this article does suggest that legislative efficiency ought to 
be valued, and a reader might well ask, "Why?" For example, as-
suming arguendo that the 1991 Civil Rights Act is weaker for plain-
tiffs in part because Congress expended key institutional resources 
on the OWBPA, a reader might ask why weaker civil rights laws are 
a bad result. More generally, one might argue that the powers of a 
determined minority to delay or derail the passions of an activist 
majority - that is, to interfere with legislative efficiency - are just 
what the Founding Fathers had in mind.153 
This objection deserves a more complete response than can be 
provided here, but several observations are worth making. First, 
the concern to check legislative efficiency developed in the late 
eighteenth century, when federal legislative power was conceived in 
very limited terms. In the post-New Deal era, we expect problems 
to be addressed by the national government, and Congress acts on 
151. It is apparent, of course, that Congress has not been steadfast or entirely successful 
in its effort to manage its agenda. Indeed, the democratization and decentralization of Con-
gress arguably have made the legislative process more fragmented and less efficient. See, e.g., 
Adam Clymer, The Gridlock Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1992, at Al; Martin Tolchin, If 
This Is Gridlock, Where's the Traffic Cop?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1984, at A26. Still, without 
legislative history as a lubricant for a more individualistic Congress, the problem of ineffi-
ciencies and opportunity costs would be far worse. This argument carries special force when 
democratization itself seems irreversible and when any structural efforts to limit its scope 
may well be effective only at the margins. See Janet Hook, Congressional Reform Panel 
Winds Up Work in Discord, 51 CoNG. Q. 3249, 3249-50 (1993) (reporting that modest reform 
proposals were recommended, House and Senate recommendations differed, and there was a 
strong partisan split in the House); Janet Hook, Fervor for Reform Wanes Amid Internal 
Misgivings, 52 CoNG. Q. 1265, 1274-75 (1994). 
152. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (holding that legislative action 
must comply with the procedural requirements of Article I); United States v. Carolene Prods. 
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (stating that legislative action may not conflict with a 
specific prohibition of the Constitution or unduly restrict essential political processes). 
153. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80-84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) 
(arguing that a system of representation controls factions), No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) 
(arguing that bicameralism hinders the abuse of legislative authority), No. 71, at 432 (Alexan-
der Hamilton) (asserting that elected representatives must not give "an unqualified complai-
sance to every sudden breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people may 
receive" but instead should "withstand the temporary delusion in order to give [the people) 
time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection"). 
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an unprecedented range of complex issues.154 When we seek to 
reconcile the modem paradigm of broad federal legislative powers 
with the reality of Congress as an institution of limited resources, 
legislative efficiency does become an important value. Forcing 
Congress to address issues in legislative text - including respond-
ing in text to every aspect of judicial decisions interpreting prior 
text - erects obstacles that diminish Congress's ability to control 
its own agenda and to fulfill its mandate in a framework of ex-
panded national government.155 
One alternative to promoting congressional efficiency by relying 
on legislative history is to delegate to administrative agencies the 
primary responsibility for interpreting inconclusive text.156 Such an 
attitude, however, cannot be a complete substitute for judicial use 
of legislative history. First of all, Congress often does not grant any 
agency the authority to interpret the statute in question.157 And 
second, even when it does, Congress may intend that the agency be 
constrained by relevant legislative history.158 Indeed, judicial defer-
ence to agencies on the meaning of inconclusive text may conflict 
with understandings expressed in legislative history that are fairly 
attributable to Congress.159 At the very least, normative issues are 
raised as to why agency deference should not be subordinated to 
appropriately reliable statements in legislative history. 
Finally, it is not at all clear that judicial interference with legisla-
tive efficiency will yield a higher quality textual product. Transfer-
ring legislative history details into statutory text may on occasion 
make Congress confront important substantive matters that ought 
154. See supra note 78. See generally CASS R. SuNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLU-
TION (1990). 
155. Increases in staff may enhance legislative productivity up to a certain point, but cru-
cial aspects of the legislative process, such as negotiating compromises and persuading indi-
vidual colleagues, require significant leadership from members. See, e.g., supra text 
accompanying notes 65-69 (describing the role of senators on OWBPA and the 1990 Civil 
Rights Act); McNollgast, supra note 58, at 726. Because that leadership is in large part non-
delegable, any depletion of members' own time and political capital makes Congress less 
capable of setting and fulfilling its own priorities. 
156. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843-45 (1984) (holding that "reasonable" agency interpretations will prevail "[i]f ... Con-
gress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue"). See generally David L. Sha-
piro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 921, 954-56 (1992); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 2071 (1990). 
157. The agency may be authorized to litigate but not to make rules; alternatively, there 
may be no agency authority at all. See Sunstein, supra note 156, at 2093-94. 
158. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). See generally Sunstein, supra note 
156, at 2109. 
159. Cf. McNollgast, supra note 58, at 737 (suggesting that judicial deference to agencies 
may reassign weight to the President's preferences even though the President's preferences 
were not pivotal, or even significant, at the time the legislation was developed). 
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not to be avoided. At the same time, the systematic addition of 
such details will often result in reduced textual coherence and a less 
inclusive legislative process.160 
In sum, Congress's increased use of legislative history is part of 
an institutional effort to augment and maintain its status as a co-
equal branch of government, while managing its consequently more 
burdensome workload. The end of having lawmaking authority ex-
ercised without domination from outside sources - be they inter-
est groups or executive branch agencies - is entirely appropriate 
under our system of separation of powers. The means chosen -
substantial reliance on committee specialists assisted by a bureau-
cracy of expert staff - is worthy of respect because Congress itself 
has made the choice and is most unlikely to reverse its decision.161 
Under these circumstances a refusal by courts to credit legisla-
tive history will have the predictable consequences of altering how 
Congress conducts legislative business and diminishing Congress's 
overall legislative product. Such results may or may not be desira-
ble from the standpoint of individual jurists, but they are not nor-
matively neutral. In particular, rejecting or systematically 
discounting legislative history is countermajoritarian, both in de-
clining to consult materials that are integral to Congress's chosen 
lawmaking process and in failing to acknowledge the substantial op-
portunity costs imposed on Congress. 
To be sute, the concerns expressed about judicial reliance on 
legislative history are not without foundation. It is worth consider-
ing, however, whether the concerns warrant total rejection or sys-
tematic discounting, as opposed to intelligent screening, of that 
history. Accordingly, I now turn my attention to those concerns. 
III. THE PROBLEMS OF RELYING ON LEGISLATIVE SIGNALS 
Despite Congress's regular creation of amplifying materials as 
part of its legislative process, there is considerable skepticism as to 
whether courts should rely on this legislative history when inter-
160. See infra notes 228-31 and accompanying text. 
161. Despite occasional complaints from members about misuses of legislative history, 
most members support judicial reliance on such history in appropriate circumstances. See 
infra text accompanying notes 219-24. There has been no serious effort to limit such reliance. 
By contrast, Congress in 1979 did entertain and take seriously an effort to limit or abolish 
judicial reliance on the validity of agency regulations. See 125 CONG. REC. 23,478-99 (1979) 
(recording the Senate's adoption of Sen. Bumpers's amendment to the Federal Courts Im-
provements Act after a motion to table failed 51-27, though the bill ultimately died in the 
House). See generally Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should 
Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 567-70 (1992). 
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preting federal statutes. Congressional commentary that expresses 
approval or disapproval for prior judicial interpretations of materi-
ally unaltered text provokes a broad range of arguments against the 
use of legislative history. Of course, it is anathema to those who 
refuse to credit any legislative history.162 But it also draws fire from 
those who would comfortably rely on other kinds of legislative sig-
nals, because it is both postenactment history163 and history associ-
ated with legislative inaction.164 
Although a thorough treatment of these positions lies beyond 
the scope of this article,165 this Part briefly considers and responds 
to each argument. In each instance, it will appear that the risks in 
having courts credit such statements of approval or disapproval are 
not so substantial as to warrant excluding them per se. At the same 
time, these risks are significant enough to justify judicially fash-
ioned limits based on certain considerations, which are set forth in 
Part IV. 
A. Constitutional Arguments for Disregarding or Devaluing 
Legislative History 
Justice Scalia has been the leading proponent of the idea that 
federal courts should reject legislative history when seeking to give 
meaning to congressional enactments in the context of a specific 
case.166 The justification for this so-called textualist approach is in 
part constitutional, based on considerations of separation of powers 
162. See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 616-23 (1991) (Scalia, 
J., concurring); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344-46 {1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 650-56 
(1990). 
163. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 378-80 n.17 {1984); Consumer Prod. 
Safety Commn. v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 {1980). See generally Aleinikoff, supra 
note 4, at 41 n.96. 
164. See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 1i9-22 {1940); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 
168, 185-86 n.21 {1969). See generally John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search 
for Legislative Intent: A Venture Into "Speculative Unrealities," 64 B.U. L. REv. 737 (1985). 
165. For more extensive analysis of these issues, see sources cited infra at notes 171, 183, 
191, 202-03 {discussing broad-based refusal to credit legislative history); infra notes 241 and 
243 {discussing refusal to credit postenactment history); and infra note 262 {discussing refusal 
to credit legislative inaction). 
166. It is not strictly accurate to say that Justice Scalia believes courts should never con-
sult legislative history. He has asserted that courts may do so in the rare cases when such 
history would enable them to avoid an absurd result apparently dictated by text. See Green 
v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that 
legislative history confirms that Congress nowhere contemplated or endorsed the absurd re-
sult suggested by a literal reading of text). 
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and legislative supremacy,167 and in part practical, based on con-
cerns about the inherently unreliable nature of committee reports 
and floor statements.168 The constitutional arguments will be dis-
cussed in this section; section III.B will discuss the practical argu-
ments for textualism. 
1. Separation of Powers 
One constitutional argument for ignoring legislative history 
stems from the Article I requirement that in order for a bill to be-
come "the law" it must be adopted by both chambers of the legisla-
ture and then presented to the President.169 Unlike bill language, 
committee reports and floor statements are not voted on by either 
chamber and are not presented to the President. Accordingly, a 
court's reliance on these materials impermissibly elevates the views 
of a legislative subgroup - a committee or individual members -
over that of Congress as a whole.17° 
This argument mistakenly conflates the Article I limits on con-
gressional power to make laws with the Article III powers exercised 
by courts to apply and interpret laws.171 Legislative history is not 
itself "the law," nor do courts that refer to such history typically 
regard it as "the law."172 Rather, courts consult committee reports 
and floor statements just as they do the dictionary, or the canons of 
construction, or prior agency interpretive practice. All these 
167. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345-46 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
168. See, e.g., Conroy, 113 S. Ct. at 1567; Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 
597, 619-22 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
169. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
170. See generally Starr, supra note 3, at 375-76. 
171. See Breyer, supra note 3, at 862-63; Eskridge, supra note 162, at 671-72; William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 365, 371-75 (1990); Note, Why 
Learned Hand Would Never Use Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1006-08 
(1992). 
172. Courts ordinarily use legislative history for one of three reasons - to confirm or 
reinforce plain meaning, to help resolve textual ambiguity, or to avoid an absurd or unconsti-
tutional result. See Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 5-6, 14-17 (statement of Chief Judge 
Patricia M. Wald) (reviewing each of these uses by the Supreme Court in its 1989 Term); 
Stephanie Wald, The Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation Cases in the 1992 
U.S. Supreme Court Term: Scalia Rails But Legislative History Remains on Track, 23 Sw. U. 
L. REv. 47 (1993). See generally Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Res. Group, 426 U.S. 1, 10 
(1976) ("When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is avail-
able, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words 
may appear on 'superficial examination'" (quoting United States v. American nucking 
Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940))). But cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402, 412 n.29 (1971) ("Because of this ambiguity [in the legislative history] it is clear that 
we must look primarily to the statutes themselves to find the legislative intent."). 
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sources help a court attribute meaning to the actual statutory lan-
guage - that is, to understand what Congress has enacted.173 
Judicial examination of relevant contexts might not be necessary 
if there were but one self-evident explanation of the text for each 
particular setting. As we have seen, however, statutory construc-
tion is often not this straightforward. Provisions enacted to adjust 
or extend an existing statutory scheme may include ambiguous 
language that permits more than one plausible meaning. Alterna-
tively, the statutory language enacted in the adjustment or exten-
sion may be incomplete because the issue before the court was not 
resolved or even considered by the enacting Congress. In either 
instance - ambiguity or incompleteness - congressional action 
has failed to address definitively the matter that is now presented in 
a specific case or controversy. The parties to this controversy agree 
that the statutory scheme as modified does resolve the matter, 
although they disagree over the nature of that resolution. The 
question, therefore, is Iiot whether an issue unresolved in an 
Article-I-approved context should be seen as resolved through non-
Article-I-approved materials from legislative history. Rather, the 
question is whether a judge may consult these materials to shed 
light on matters that are controlled or affected by an inconclusive 
text. In these settings, looking to the historical expectations of the 
statute's authors for assistance in formulating a coherent response 
is just as compatible with the letter of Article I as looking to other 
contextual sources.114 
173. Textualists may be on more solid ground in arguing that legislative history unat-
tached to any enactment is entitled to little or no weight. If Congress has not passed a law, 
then the statements of committee members or individual legislators cannot qualify as evi-
dence of any negotiation or compromise that was part of a lawmaking process. Moreover, 
from a practical standpoint, when a particular Congress has taken no action, any explanatory 
material is likely to be of indeterminate reliability. Either the material was not read because 
no bill was ever seriously considered, or it was read but one cannot say it was or would have 
been credited or endorsed because the accompanying bill never received the requisite sup-
port. At the same time, one cannot say it was or would have been rejected because there are 
so many different reasons for a bill's not receiving requisite support. See generally Johnson v. 
Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see infra note 
265. 
174. It is possible to contend that courts are more justified in using legislative history as a 
tool to address textual ambiguity than in using such history to fill gaps in a legislative scheme. 
See American Hosp. Assn. v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 617 (1991) (citing Public Employees Re-
tirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), for the proposition that legislative history uncon-
nected to "specific statutory language ordinarily carries little weight"). Filling gaps may be 
viewed as more akin to the fashioning of federal common law, which takes courts beyond the 
domain of the enacted statutory text. But this distinction between ambiguities and gaps 
seems overdrawn. At times, legislative history generally related to the statutory scheme Con-
gress has modified is wholly unrelated to the particular provisions that Congress seriously 
considered. Yet on other occasions when Congress has acted, legislative history may bear 
directly on provisions Congress decided not to change as well as on what it actually modified. 
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Nor does Article III specify what method the courts must follow 
when interpreting federal statutes. Although. the English courts 
had embraced a textualist approach to statutory interpretation 
before the adoption of the U.S. Constitution,175 that approach was 
not long adhered to in our newly established legal system. As far 
back as 1823, the attorney general invoked legislative history to in-
terpret private laws, and as early as 1860 the Supreme Court relied 
on committee reports and floor statements to construe public 
laws.176 Supreme Court reliance on legislative history increased 
steadily during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries1'' 
See, e.g., American Hosp. Assn. v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 658 (7th Cir. 1990), affd. on other 
grounds, 499 U.S. 606 {1991). In the Seventh Circuit opinion in American Hospital Associa· 
tion, Judge Posner reasoned: 
(I]n changing the domain of application of§ 9(b) (of the National Labor Relations Act], 
the 1974 amendments may have changed its meaning without changing its words. The 
[committee report commentary on § 9{b)] can therefore be regarded as a commentary 
on the meaning of the 1974 amendments and hence as equivalent to pre-enactment legis· 
lative history, rather than as a gratuitous comment unrelated to legislative action •••• 
899 F.2d at 658 (emphasis added). 
Although there are arguments on both sides, this article assumes that the distinction be· 
tween ambiguity and incompleteness at most addresses differences in degree as to reliability, 
rather than differences in kind as to legitimacy. Instead of pursuing that ex post distinction, 
the article focuses on a related ex ante question: whether a statutory text has been left incon· 
elusive - that is, ambiguous or incomplete - on a specific issue because Congress did not 
anticipate the issue or because the issue was too contentious to be resolved in text. See infra 
notes 332-40 and accompanying text. 
175. See Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 217 (K.B. 1769) (holding that the meaning of 
an Act of Parliament is taken from the text as enacted and not from the history of changes it 
underwent in the House of Commons). See generally FRANCIS BENNION, STATUTORY INTER-
PRETATION 455-59 {2d ed. 1992); P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERTS. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUB· 
STANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 100-02 {1987). 
176. See Note, supra note 171, at 1009 (discussiQg Opinion of the Attorney General); 
Dubuque and Pacific R.R. v. Litchfield, 64 U.S. 66, 87 (1860); see also Blake v. National 
Banks, 90 U.S. 307, 319-20 (1875); Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1879). 
There are reasons to distinguish the approaches of English and American courts on this 
issue. In the parliamentary system, legislative power is tightly controlled by the executive -
that is, the Cabinet, supported by the civil service - and majority party discipline is rigorous. 
Parliamentary committees rarely initiate legislation on their own, and successful legislative 
forays by individual members are almost unthinkable. Further, unlike Congress, the British 
Parliament has virtually all laws drafted by a professional drafters' office, with few if any 
intermediate amendments. Under these circumstances, the "process" of legislative enact-
ment involves little or no negotiation and compromise, and that process accordingly has little 
to offer in the way of amplification or explanation of text. See ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra 
note 175, at 298-323; see also Breyer, supra note 3, at 868. But cf. Pepper v. Hart, 3 W.L.R. 
1032 (1992) (relaxing the traditional English rule and holding that parliamentary materials 
may be relied upon to construe ambiguous or obscure text in certain circumstances). See also 
J.H. Baker, Case and Comment: Statutory Interpretation and Parliamentary Intention, 52 
CAMBRIDGE LJ. 353 (1993) (criticizing Pepper v. Hart). 
177. Landmark cases include Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 
457, 464-65 (1892), and Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928). 
There also was persistent support from academics for this judicial reliance. See, e.g., HENRY 
C. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS§ 96 (2d 
ed. 1911); James M. Landis, Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 893 (1930); Harry 
Willmer Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal 
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and has grown at an accelerated pace since 1940.178 In short, 
neither Article I nor Article III prohibits or even discourages the 
use of legislative history to assist in statutory interpretation, and 
such use is now supported by longstanding Supreme Court 
precedent. 
2. Legislative Supremacy 
A related, constitutionally based attack on the use of legislative 
history stems from an asserted respect for democratic theory and 
the lawmaking supremacy of Congress. Judges and scholars have 
argued that the text alone reflects the "intent" of Congress as a 
whole. Judicial reliance on materials that reflect the views of some 
mere subdivision of the elected membership, or even the views of 
unelected staff or lobbyists, undermines the supremacy of the legis-
lative branch. The use of legislative history makes such undermin-
ing inevitable, the argument continues, because legislative history 
contains so many details, nuances, and even conflicting statements 
that federal judges end up with broad discretion to substitute their 
own ideological or personal views for the congressional text.179 
But the appeal to considerations of legislative supremacy gives 
rise to problems of its own. Congress's authority to exercise ''all 
legislative powers" under Article I includes the authority to organ-
ize itself in order to fulfill its legislative mission.180 Over two hun-
dred years, Congress has developed a distinctive organizational 
approach. Each chamber delegates to committees the primary re-
sponsibilities for initiating, explaining, and justifying particular leg-
islation. Committees in turn rely on professional staff for much of 
their work. In addition, Congress publishes a daily record through 
which members have prompt access to one another's views on 
pending legislative matters. Given that Congress as an institution 
has chosen to order its legislative affairs in this manner, considera-
Statutes, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 2, 25 (1939). See generally J. WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF 
AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS 187-88 (1950); Note, supra note 171, at 1010-11. 
178. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 543-49 (1940). 
See generally Note, supra note 171, at 1010-11; Wald, supra note 3, at 195. Such growth is not 
surprising, given that statutes have grown in numbers and complexity, and the need to inter-
pret them - and reconcile them with one another - comprises an ever-greater portion of 
the federal courts' workload. 
179. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); 
Eskridge, supra note 162, at 653-54; Starr, supra note 3, at 376. 
180. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Pro-
ceedings .... "); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3 ("Each House shall keep a Journal of its Pro-
ceedings, and from time to time publish the same .... "). 
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tions of deference toward Congress would seem to warrant respect 
for its designated legislative process as well.181 
If anything, a court will appear less deferential toward the legis-
lative branch when it resolves textual ambiguities by reference to 
the dictionary or judicial canons of construction while discounting 
or ignoring statements from key legislators on which their col-
leagues relied in casting votes.182 The explanations offered in com-
mittee reports or in bill managers' floor statements at least derive 
directly from Congress's own policymaking authority. Absent evi-
dence that Congress relied on, or was even aware of, extralegisla-
tive explanatory sources - evidence that would presumably be 
found in the legislative history - invoking these sources appears 
less "legitimate" from the standpoint of legislative supremacy.t83 
In this regard, the record of recent congressional overrides of 
Supreme Court statutory interpretation rulings is instructive. The 
Court in recent years has placed greater reliance on dictionary defi-
nitions184 and the canons of construction185 and somewhat less reli-
ance on legislative history186 when interpreting statutes. Many of 
the well-publicized overrides have promptly reversed decisions in 
which the Court had relied on plain meaning or on the canons of 
181. See Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 7, 19 (statement of Chief Judge Patricia M. 
Wald). Obviously, such respect is not without limits. One can imagine Congress choosing a 
form of internal organization that produces unacceptable, antidemocratic consequences -
for example, giving five votes to all committee chairs, or disenfranchising junior members of 
the minority party. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 ("[E)ach Senator shall have one Vote."). 
See generally JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
182. See McNollgast, supra note 58, at 738; Mikva, supra note 3, at 385-86. The fact that 
statements are written by staff or even lobbyists is of no constitutional significance; members 
do not write statutes either. Staff are hired by and are responsible to members: "The job of 
congressional staff is to implement, not to thwart, their bosses' legislative agendas." Costello, 
supra note 137, at 67; see also Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 32 (statement of Judge 
Stephen Breyer). Insofar as congressional staff depart from or frustrate the wishes of a mem-
ber, that is a practical problem of manipulation or abuse. See infra section III.B. 
183. See Edward 0. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 CASE 
W. REs. L. REv. 1129, 1130, 1137-38 (1992); Costello, supra note 137, at 64; cf. Eskridge, 
supra note 171, at 394-95 (noting observation by earlier legal process scholars that legislative 
history's "great advantage" was its ability to provide more comprehensive contextual frame-
work that "minimiz[ed) the role of the judge's personal preferences"). 
184. See David 0. Stewart, By the Book: Looking up the law in the dictionary, A.B.A. J., 
July 1993, at 46, 46-47 (reporting that Justices recited dictionary definitions of key phrases 54 
times in 38 cases between Jan. 1, 1992 and May 17, 1993, compared to only four cases in 1951-
1952); Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 101 HARV, L. REV. 
1437, 1438 (1994) (hereinafter Looking It Up) ("Over the past decade, the Supreme Court's 
use of dictionaries in its published opinions has increased dramatically."); see also Schauer, 
supra note 21 (discussing the Court's use of the dictionary in the 1989 Term). 
185. See Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 83 (statement of Prof. William N. Eskridge). 
186. See id. at 5-6 (statement of Chief Judge Patricia M. Wald); id. at 83 (statement of 
Prof. William N. Eskridge). 
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construction.187 Indeed, growing congressional frustration over the 
Court's approach is suggested by the increasing percentage pf over-
rides that have occurred within a short period following the Court's 
decision.188 At bottom, the Court's textualist approach seems to 
thwart, rather than respect, the will of Congress.189 
B. Practical Arguments for Disregarding or Devaluing 
Legislative History 
Even if it is not suspect on constitutional grounds, legislative 
history is often criticized as dangerously unreliable. Judges and 
scholars have expressed concern that the positions taken in commit-
187. See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), overridden by Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 113, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079; Public Employees' Re-
tirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), overridden by Older Workers Benefit Protection 
Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 
234 (1985), overridden by Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, 
§ 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845; Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), overridden by Handi-
capped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796. See generally 
Eskridge, supra note 8, at 347-48 (concluding that Congress is more likely to override "plain 
meaning" decisions than any others, since nearly half of the overrides since 1967 address 
decisions in which the primary reasoning was plain-meaning or canons-of-construction rea-
soning, whereas overrides of decisions based on statutory "purpose" are rare); Solimine & 
Walker, supra note 14, at 448 (noting that a disproportionate number of decisions between 
1968 and 1988 that were overridden by Congress relied on a "plain meaning" analysis). 
188. See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 450-55 (reporting data on overrides that indicate that 
62% of statutory overrides between 1987 and 1990 occurred within two years of the Court's 
decision, whereas 44% of overrides between 1982 and 1986, and 32% of overrides between 
1967 and 1981, were within two years of the Court's decision). While an "override" Congress 
may be reacting to the Court's disregard for prior congressional purposes, the override Con-
gress and the "previously enacting" Congress are of course two distinct entities that may 
have separate purposes. At the same time, a number of recent overrides have occurred 
promptly enough to allow for continuous participation by key legislators. See, e.g., 124 
CoNG. REc. 8218 (1978) (statement of Sen. J;ivits, coauthor of 1967 ADEA) (asserting dur-
ing a floor debate on a conference report to override the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the ADEA that the Supreme Court misconstrued an earlier congressional purpose respecting 
the scope of the employee benefit plan exception); 131 CoNG. REc. 21,392 (1985) (statement 
of Sen. Simon, original House co-sponsor of the Education of All Handicapped Children 
Act) (asserting as part of the floor debate accompanying a bill to override the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the Act that the Court misconstrued an earlier congressional pur-
pose respecting availability of certain remedies against states). 
The tension between a Congress that expresses certain collective understandings through 
legislative history and a judiciary that disregards such evidence as unauthoritative has dis-
tinctly historical overtones. See Strauss, supra note 112, at 343-46 (noting that earlier in this 
century, legislative history was viewed as providing context that forced judges to respect so-
cial purposes of statutes); Eskridge, supra note 171, at 392 (noting that legislative history as 
evidence of statutory purpose became a dominant theme after 1938). 
189. See Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 
62 U. Cow. L. REv. 37 (1991); Abner J. Mikva & Jeff Bleich, When Congress Overrules the 
Court, 79 CAL. L. REv. 729 (1991); see also West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 
115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[W]e do the country a disservice when we needlessly 
ignore persuasive evidence of Congress' actual purpose and require it 'to take the time to 
revisit the matter' and to restate its purpose in more precise English whenever its work prod-
uct suffers from an omission or inadvertent error." (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 
1031 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting))). 
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tee reports and key :floor statements are unlikely to be representa-
tive of the statutory text being enacted. They contend that the 
history is produced secretly, whereas text may be openly debated 
and must be openly voted on; that it is produced by congressional 
staff, who are not accountable to any member except their own boss 
and who often act even without her knowledge and consent; and 
that it is especially susceptible to pressure from individuals or 
groups outside Congress, who are less able to effect comparable 
modification in text.190 
Several observers maintain that reservations about the reliabil-
ity of legislative history have come to assume special significance in 
very recent times. They note that as judges have more regularly 
and visibly consulted legislative history and as drafters of that his-
tory have recognized the judicial propensities, the drafters have ac-
quired an incentive to introduce statements solely to affect the 
meaning of the text as applied in court. Thus, it is argued, those 
who create legislative history no longer confine their interest to the 
legitimate "political" objective of informing members or persuading 
them to vote for the bill. They now have a powerful additional in-
terest in the distinct "legal" objective of altering the way a court 
will construe the bill's provisions subsequent to enactment.191 
This argument is more appealing than the formal, constitutional 
arguments previously discussed. It also has direct application to the 
type of legislative history we are considering - approvals and dis-
approvals of court decisions construing materially unaltered statu-
tory provisions that are now being reenacted. Insofar as the 
statements of approval or disapproval contained in the committee 
report have no specific analogue in text, they do not explain any-
thing the committee itself has drafted.192 Thus, the contention that 
these statf:(ments illuminate the meaning of text approved by the 
committee and by Congress seems less persuasive. Moreover, com-
mentary on court decisions may use technical, "legal" vocabulary 
190. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. frl, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Popkin, 
supra note 4, at 310-12; Starr, supra note 3, at 376-77. 
191. See Strauss, supra note 112, at 340-43; Stat. lnterp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 140-41 
(statement of Prof. William N. Eskridge); Note, supra note 171, at 1015-18. Some might 
question, however, whether this concern over the potential for abuse in the creation of legis-
lative history is really all that new. See Glendon M. Fisher, Jr. & William J. Harbison, Note, 
Trends in the Use of Extrinsic Aids in Statutory Interpretation, 3 V AND. L. REV. 586, 596 n.29 
(1950) ("The freedom with which the federal courts have resorted to the use of extrinsic 
materials has probably tended to encourage an abuse in the legislative process itself; namely, 
the 'manufacturing' of 'legislative history' for statutes."). 
192. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566-67 (1988) (Scalia, J.); Costello, supra 
note 137, at 43. 
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that is more familiar to judges than to the "average" member who is 
not an attorney. This heightens the suspicion that inclusion of such 
commentary is part of an agenda to manipulate courts rather than 
to inform or persuade legislators. 
Still, the fact that legislative history can be unreliable and the 
concern that manipulation may be more common today than in 
prior decades do not justify condemning judicial reliance on all such 
history. In order to address the claim of "systematic unreliability," 
one must consider two principal contentions made in support of this 
claim: (i) the committee-based process of drafting legislative his-
tory is corrupted by the drafters themselves - congressional staff, 
lobbyists, and agency personnel; and (ii) the committee-based prod-
uct cannot be imputed to Congress as a whole. 
1. The Corruption Argument 
It is widely recognized that congressional staff play the major 
role in drafting legislative history.193 Commentary on court deci-
sions does not differ from other committee report explanations in 
this respect. At least some members of the committee in whose 
name the report is filed, as well as many members of Congress at 
whom the materials are aimed, will lack the time and expertise to 
become familiar with any case law that is discussed.194 These mem-
bers will then rely on the initiative and judgment of their own pro-
fessional staff, just as they do when it comes to understanding and 
endorsing text.19s Such reliance is not troubling if one makes the 
sensible assumption that, as a general matter, professional staff re-
193. See, e.g., KoFMEHL, supra note 124, at 118-26; Costello, supra note 137, at 67; Ev-
ANS, supra note 85, at 2. 
194. Considerations of time may be more consistently important than limited expertise. 
Despite assertions about their lack of legal sophistication, members are more likely to be 
familiar with case citations than some critics suggest. In the 102d Congress (1991-1992), 46% 
of all members listed law as their profession. See Characteristics of Congress, 49 CoNG. Q., 
118 (1991). This compares with 49% of all members in 1983-1984, 59% of all members in 
1965-1966, and 57% of all members in 1945-1946. See WILLIAM J. KEEFE & MORRIS s. 
0GUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CoNGRESS AND THE STATES 112 (6th ed. 
1985); JAMES C. KIRBY, JR., CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 78 (1970); GEORGE B. GAL-
LOWAY, CONGRESS AT THE CROSSROADS 28-29 (1946). One study suggests that lawyer-
members "pay more attention to the courts and are much more familiar with legislative op-
tions in reacting to court decisions than are their non-lawyer colleagues." Mark C. Miller, 
Lawyers in Congress: What Difference Does It Make?, 20 CoNGRESS & PRESIDENCY 1, 12 
(1993). 
195. See supra section 11.C (describing the use of staff and decentralization leading to 
staff resources for even junior members). 
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fleet the substantive views of their principals and act with the trust 
and sanction of those principals.196 
While some staff on occasion may draft report language to pro-
mote legislative objectives that extend beyond or are at odds with 
the views of their boss, repeated actions taken to further independ-
ent agendas are likely to come to the member's attention and result 
in discipline or discharge. In this regard, certain factors may make 
congressional staff more loyal or dedicated as "agents" than would 
be true elsewhere in the labor market. First, staff are recruited and 
hired to work for particular chairs or other committee members. 
Loyalty and congruence of viewpoints are highly relevant hiring 
considerations if one is to promote the member's own legislative 
values and policies.197 Further, considerations of political accounta-
bility make the member sensitive to conduct that may threaten her 
own job security and provide an incentive to monitor office per-
formance. That incentive is enhanced by the prospect of publicity 
or media exposure for conduct at odds with the member's stated 
goals or objectives. Finally, congressional staff are unusually vul-
nerable "at will" employees, not covered by most federal statutory 
protections or by recent common law erosions of the at-will 
doctrine.19s 
Apart from the central role played by committee staff, regulated 
entities likely to be affected at the postenactment stage often lobby 
for the inclusion of specific report language focused on statutory 
decisions by federal courts.199 They may do so to assert a preferred 
resolution of ambiguous text or simply to assure sufficient instruc-
tion to minimize uncertainty and attendant litigation costs.200 Simi-
larly, executive branch agencies may negotiate with committee staff 
to include legislative history about prior statutory decisions that will 
affect the way they perform as enforcers of the new law. Further, 
what appears in the committee report to "guide" the federal courts 
196. See Popkin, supra note 4, at 309-10; Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 32 (statement 
of Judge Stephen Breyer); Costello, supra note 137, at 67. 
197. See Fox & HAMMOND, supra note 99, at 148, 153 (arguing that staff are hired for 
loyalty, expertise, and judgment and that most staff reflect or even reinforce the member's 
views and values); Price, supra note 124, at 320-25 (presenting an example of an aggressively 
proconsumer committee staff that reflected the chairman's desire to be known as a strong 
consumer advocate). 
198. See Janet Hook, Search for Consensus Delays Markups, 51 CoNo. Q. 2605, 2617 
(1993) (reporting that the Joint Committee on Organization of Congress was likely to recom-
mend that Congress for the first time must comply with the workplace laws it imposes on 
others). 
199. See generally Eskridge, supra note 8, at 359-64. 
200. See, e.g., Ferguson et al., supra note 27, at 806-08. 
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will probably be scrutinized by representatives of the regulated en-
tities, by groups promoting the regulatory approach, and by agency 
personnel. 
A skeptic might well suggest that allowing agency bureaucrats 
or interested groups to have drafting input, or even to assume sub-
stantial monitoring powers, invites systematic subversion of the text 
voted on by members.201 In fact, the regular participation of these 
"outsiders" is unlikely to produce such results. Because the nonleg-
islative interests - the agencies charged with implementation, the 
groups promoting regulation, and the entities to be regulated -
collectively bring both technical expertise and a diversity of per-
spectives to the legislative table, the prospect of insertions or ma-
nipulations that are systematically inconsistent with text is 
minimized. 
In particular, agency personnel are promptly answerable to 
Congress through legislative oversight and annual appropriations. 
The close, ongoing relationship with key legislators and their staffs 
makes it unlikely that agency personnel will sanction uses of legisla-
tive history that regularly undermine or depart from the thrust of 
the text. Indeed, one scholar has suggested that the need to main-
tain internal morale .in an agency of career professionals, as well as 
considerations of political accountability, may well militate in favor 
of an agency's taking the most principled approach to drafting and 
monitoring the use of legislative history.202 
As for so-called interest group agendas, these too are unlikely to 
depart systematically from textual objectives. For one thing, pri-
vate interest groups may well endorse the principled or "public pol-
icy" ends· of the legislation.203 Economically based interest groups 
may aggressively pursue a "public good" because it serves their 
long-term economic needs or even because it burnishes their public 
201. See generally Popkin, supra note 4, at 311-12, and sources cited therein. 
202. See Strauss, supra note 112, at 329-33. But cf. Note, Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in 
Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DuKE LJ. 
160, 189 (suggesting that agencies may ignore committee report directives); Stat. Interp. Hrg., 
supra note 27, at 106-10 (statement of Prof. Stephen F. Ross) (suggesting that agencies at 
times do ignore such directives and act opportunistically). An agency's more immediate 
functional accountability to a contemporary Congress for interpretation of an enacting Con-
gress's legislative history creates a different dynamic from what exists between Congress and 
the courts. See generally Strauss, supra note 112. 
203. See Shaviro, supra note 89, at 94-96 (noting that interest group members often join 
for broad purpose objectives, not just material wealth advancement, and that interest group 
leaders pursue combinations of goals just as members of Congress do); Popkin, supra note 4, 
at 312 (noting that private interest groups may support public values). 
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image.204 Further, many of the interest groups most active in the 
legislative process today are issue-oriented rather than economi-
cally oriented. Their vigilance regularly provides a counterbalance 
to the efforts of private economic interests. Issue-oriented groups 
include groups advocating protection for civil rights, a cleaner envi-
ronment, reform of political campaign practices, and numerous 
other public policy objectives that do not further the economic in-
terests of the groups' members. Indeed, such issue-oriented groups 
often offset one another during the legislative enactment process. 
The years-long battle over the Brady Bill, pitting pro- and antigun-
control groups against each other, is only one prominent exam-
ple.205 Under these circumstances, there is no reason to believe 
that the input to legislative history from "outsiders" systematically 
undermines the input of committee members and their staffs. 
2. The Unrepresentative Character Argument 
The most "influential" legislative history - that is, that which is 
taken most seriously by members, regulated entities, executive 
agencies, and courts - is a product of the committee system.206 
Once again, coinmittee report approval or disapproval of court de-
cisions is part and parcel of this committee-based product. An im-
portant assumption underlying the claim of systematic unreliability 
204. For example, during the 1980s many major chemical companies supported both the 
Labor Department's successful promulgation of its Hazard Communication Standard - re-
quiring private manufacturers to provide information to workers who face risks from expo· 
sure to chemicals while on the job - and an unsuccessful effort in Congress to establish a 
national program for federal identification, notification, and monitoring of workers exposed 
to toxic substances. In addition to promoting the "public good" of improved occupational 
health and safety, chemical industry support for these substantial regulatory efforts also pro· 
moted possible preemption of more restrictive state and local regulation, as well as possible 
protection against excessive tort liability afforded by compliance with federal standards. Fi-
nally, industry support promoted a responsible public image, which was not unimportant to 
chemical manufacturers in the context of the 1984 mass disaster in Bhopal, India - when 
over 2000 persons were killed in a gas leak at a Union Carbide plant - and other less dra· 
matic incidents in this country. See generally OSHA Hazard Communication Final Rule, 
Preamble, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,280, 53,282-83, 53,323 (1983) (discussing chemical industry support 
and preemptive efforts); S. REP. No. 166, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 16, 32-33 (1987) (discussing 
chemical industry support for S. 79, the High Risk Occupational Disease Notification and 
Prevention Act, and the effects of legislation on employer liability). 
205. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the Comm. 
on the Judiciary to Consider H.R. 7, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 102d Cong., 
1st Sess. (1991) (testimony from the National Rifle Assn. and Handgun Control); Hearing 
Before the Subcomm on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary to Consider H.R. 993, the 
Handgun Violence Prevention Act, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (testimony from Handgun 
Control, the Coalition to Stop Violence, the National Rifle Assn., and the Citizens' Commit· 
tee for the Right to Keep and Bear Arms). 
206. Committee reports and conference report explanations are the key examples, but 
floor statements by the bill manager and other leading sponsors also are likely to be drafted 
by committee staff. See generally KoFMEHL, supra note 124, at 123-24. 
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is that no good reason exists to impute the committee's product to 
Congress as a whole. Inasmuch as only a few members participate, 
even indirectly, in writing and ratifying this history - whereas the 
entire body is said to participate in writing and ratifying the statu-
tory text - the prospects for manipulation of the many by these 
few are simply too great.207 
The alleged dichotomy between how text and legislative history 
are "created" does not withstand scrutiny. As previously discussed, 
there is no uniformly generated "collective intent" accompanying 
each statutory text.208 Most members most of the time do not par-
ticipate in any way in drafting the text on which they are asked to 
vote. Nor do these members derive whatever understanding they 
may have of the proposed statute from any general deliberative 
process in which they all can participate. Rather, the deliberative 
process that shapes each bill, and the votes of most legislators, in-
volves a smaller circle: leaders and interested members from the 
committee of jurisdiction, committee staff, and concerned actors 
from the executive branch and the private sector.209 Because mem-
bers and staff with specialized responsibility and expertise change 
from one bill to another, the picture that emerges is not of one large 
deliberative body producing a uniform institutional intent. Rather, 
the true picture is of a system of small deliberative bodies that over 
time allows most members to influence the meaning of some 
statutes.210 
Accordingly, there is no reason to conclude that committee-
drafted legislative history is significantly less imputable to Congress 
than committee-drafted text. The same actors who draft legislative 
history are involved in drafting statutory language, monitoring the 
amendment process, and advising legislators about which way to 
vote. The fact that members vote on text does not give them the 
independence of judgment to "rise above" the information and ar-
guments on which they must rely when casting their votes.211 
207. See Popkin, supra note 4, at 313-14, and sources cited therein. 
208. See supra text accompanying notes 99-108. 
209. See KINGDON, supra note 79, at 123, 146-48, 169-70; Hall, supra note 80, at 161-62. 
210. See Correia, supra note 183, at 1154-56. 
211. There is nothing distinctively educational or reflective about the process of voting in 
Congress. Many votes on final passage of legislation are taken by unanimous consent based 
on a preapproved "script," without members being present at all. See, e.g., 132 CoNG. REc. 
28,559-658 (1986) (recording the Senate's passage of more than 20 bills by unanimous con-
sent, including complex legislation such as the Bankruptcy Reform Act and the Rehabilita-
tion Act Amendments (overriding Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 
(1985)) while the only senators participating on the floor were Stevens for the majority and 
Byrd for the minority); 135 CONG. REc. Sl6,117-57 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1989) (recording the 
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A related version of the "unrepresentative character" argument 
is that committee memberships do not adequately reflect the com-
position of the chamber as a whole. Some scholars point out that 
committee assignments are heavily influenced by member demand 
and that members seek to join committees on which they can pur-
sue their intense policy preferences. The result, they argue, is a pat-
tern of "preference outlier" committees, each of which expresses 
policy preferences in its area of jurisdiction that are more extreme 
and homogeneous than the preferences of the larger body.212 
Other scholars acknowledge the importance of self-selection but 
observe that preferences are likely to exist on opposite sides of 
many issues and that these preferences tend to offset one another. 
For them, the result is most often a heterogeneous membership ad-
equately reflecting both sides of the policy spectrum.213 
The debate over the preference-outlier status of congressional 
committees is beyond the scope of this article. But regardless of 
how extensive such status may be, it does not follow that commit-
tee-based legislative history will be "biased" in the sense that com-
mittee report commentary or related floor statements regularly 
would depart from the meaning of committee-drafted text. Certain 
factors operate to encourage accuracy and probity by the members 
themselves. In the short term, members must rely - and know 
that they must rely - on one another's representations as to what a 
bill means. The institution depends upon the accuracy of commit-
tee-based information in moving its agenda each session. Further, 
legislators typically aspire to a long-term relationship with their col-
leagues and with the institution. Under these circumstances, the 
desire to be viewed as honest and fair even during fierce partisan 
disputes creates a strong incentive for committee leaders and floor 
managers not to overstate or understate the bill's general or specific 
objectives.214 
passage of numerous bills on unanimous consent with members absent from the floor); 136 
CoNG. REc. Sl8,220-61 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1990) (same); see also supra note 87 (discussing 
bills passed on Suspension Calendar with few members on the floor). Moreover, the vast 
majority of recorded votes involve members rushing to the floor when bells ring, casting their 
vote, and then returning to their prior business. See supra text accompanying note 147 (dis-
cussing technology's effect on voting). 
212. See KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JmsAw PUZZLE 246-48, 259-60 (1978); Barry 
R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legis-
latures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. PoL. EcoN. 132, 148 (1988). 
213. See KREHBIEL, supra note 90, at 123, 130-33 (reporting that data indicates that of 
nine House standing committees studied, only one, Armed Services, fits the classic profile of 
homogeneous outlier preferences). 
214. See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory 
Interpretation, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoss., Winter, 1994, at 3, 27 ("The willingness of the floor 
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In sum, neither the role played by nonlegislators nor the preem-
inence of committees is sufficient to establish that legislative history 
- including the commentary on judicial decisions - should be re-
garded as systematically unreliable. Further, whatever the risks of 
unreliability in particular cases, they cannot overcome the justifica-
tions for crediting committee report discourse as both a useful and 
necessary element of statutory interpretation.215 In this regard, 
viewing statements of approval or disapproval as focusing on either 
the "legitimate" audience of legislators weighing their votes or the 
"illegitimate" audience of postenactment judges is unduly reduc-
tive.216 Such a simplified vision slights the institutional accommo-
dations and trade-offs that allow Congress to find its collective 
voice. As has been demonstrated, such accommodations and trade-
offs often entail complicated and nuanced dimensions of 
expression. 
A more apt description of committee report commentaries 
might recognize at least four distinct groups of listeners or readers. 
The committee report materials may be directed at members and 
their staffs, as a source of information and possible persuasion for 
anticipated floor proceedings. In addition, the commentaries may 
be directed at regulated entities, providing clarification and instruc-
tion as to how the new law should apply. They may also be directed 
at executive branch agencies, offering guidance about implementa-
tion and enforcement of the proposed new statute.217 Finally, the 
committee report materials may be directed at the courts, offering 
to give members of a committee gatekeeping authority over future bills as well as the com-
mittee's efforts in crafting a bill are at risk if they misconstrue the meaning of the bill that 
they propose ... when acting in an official capacity as agent for the majority."). See generally 
McNollgast, supra note 58, at 707, 741 (contrasting discourse by honest agents of the enacting 
coalition with unreliable "cheap talk" by members who are not part of that coalition or are 
not held accountable for their statements by the coalition). To be sure, individual committee 
leaders may, on occasion, decide to risk their reputations with their peers by using report 
language to misrepresent the meaning of the text. See Miriam R. Jorgensen & Kenneth A. 
Shepsle, A Comment on the Positive Canons Project, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Winter, 1994, 
at 43, 47 ("The temptation [for opportunistic behavior] is especially great for those who in-
tend to move on to higher office or to retirement .... "). The problem of unreliability with 
respect to particular statements is addressed in the proposal set forth infra in Part IV. 
215. See generally supra section 11.B. 
216. See supra text accompanying note 191. 
217. One study suggests that committee staff are more interested in affecting the conduct 
of executive agencies than of courts. See Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf 
Between Courts and Congress: A Challenge for Positive Political Theory, 80 GEo. LJ. 653, 
663 (1992). Agencies will be inclined to follow committee report instructions in recognition 
of their ongoing exposure to committee oversight and their prompt vulnerability to the ap-
propriations process. Given these considerations of political accountability, the dialogue be-
tween committees and agencies may justify a different analytic approach from that adopted 
here. See also supra note 202. 
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an interpretive gloss on unambiguous provisions and an insight into 
the meaning of provisions that are inconclusive on their face. 
The last audience is often not separable from one or more of the 
first three. Indeed, to the extent that committee report explana-
tions reflect contributions from or appeals to individual members, 
interested outsiders, and agency personnel responsible for imple-
mentation, this may well make them more rather than less reliable 
indicators as to the meaning of inconclusive text.21s 
3. Other Factors 
Apart from analytic considerations, the perceptions of legisla-
tors themselves are worth noting. In recent years, the practice of 
relying on legislative history to discern the meaning of statutes has 
been endorsed by an array of current and former senators and rep-
resentatives.219 Among these legislators, it is perhaps not surprising 
that certain members of the historically Democratic majority in 
Congress have identified committee reports as the road map or 
"bone structure" of a statute, performing a "central explanatory 
function" and resolving ambiguities,220 or have asserted on behalf 
of "most" members that reports, and other sources of legislative 
history, "can explain and amplify legislative language in ways that 
are instructive to the courts"221 as well as to the members them-
selves. It is significant, however, that prominent members of the 
218. See Stat. lnterp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 34 (statement of Judge Stephen Breyer) (stat-
ing that responsible legislative history often reflects consensus on matters of interest to the 
relevant policymaking community). 
On occasion, legislative history is characterized as being directed primarily at an adminis-
trative agency. See American Hosp. Assn. v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 617 (1991) (stating that an 
admonition in a committee report was "best understood as a form of notice" to the agency). 
But even in such instances, courts should not ignore this form of notice. In "instructing" the 
agency through a committee report, Congress presumably expects a reviewing court to look 
with favor on the agency's honoring of its instruction and to look with disfavor on the 
agency's flaunting its instruction. This presumption carries added weight given that Congress 
has at its disposal other means of "instructing" an agency that would be less likely to come to 
the attention of a reviewing court. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Post-Enactment Legislative 
Signals, LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Winter, 1994, at 75, 81-82 (1994) (stating that Congress 
can send legislative signals to agencies through oversight hearings, revised appropriations 
levels, and informal contacts). But cf. Stat. lnterp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 26-29 (statement of 
Judge James L. Buckley) (viewing a committee report instruction to the NLRB as a trade-off 
for a key committee member's withdrawal of a controversial amendment, and urging courts 
to be skeptical of such "losers' history" even if agencies take it seriously). 
219. See, e.g., Hatch, supra note 123, at 45-48; Mikva, supra note 3, at 385-86; Stat. lnterp. 
Hrg., supra note 27, at 21-22 (statement of Judge James L. Buckley); id. at 2 (statement of 
Rep. Kastenmeier); id. at 2-3 (statement of Rep. Moorhead); see also Senator Joseph R. 
Biden, Jr., Who Needs the Legislative Veto?, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 685, 694-700 (1984) (in-
voking legislative history in the foreign policy context). 
220. Mikva, supra note 28, at 184. 
221. Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 2 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). 
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Republican minority - while highly critical of abuses in the pro-
cess - also conclude that the English Rule is unworkable in our 
setting,222 that even as members of the minority they often looked 
to majority committee report explanations to understand what they 
were voting on,223 and that legislative history can serve to focus 
general statutory text, offer meaning when a provision is produced 
in the course of floor debate, and prevent slippage from agreements 
reached in Congress.224 
This broad-based support for legislative history as reliable and 
valuable, at least in principle, is not surprising given that the alter-
native is far less workable. It is doubtful that Congress would be 
able to add to text the details and explanations now included in 
legislative history. Tue ambiguities and incompleteness of legisla-
tive language reflect an appreciation for both the need to draft rules 
of sufficient generality in an increasingly complex society225 and the 
need to conserve scarce institutional resources.226 Given the con-
tinuing presence of these twin constraints, one should not expect a 
substantial change in congressional working habits.221 
Moreover, even if Congress were able to expand text in this 
manner, the result probably would not be a "better job" of statu-
tory drafting. The effort to add details and illustrations would likely 
yield a text that is more precise but less coherent.228 Excessive at-
tention to particulars might give rise to conflicts with a broader stat-
utory purpose. Alternatively, more particularized text might 
become significantly underinclusive and overinclusive in ways that 
could not have been anticipated.229 
222. See Hatch, supra note 123, at 47. 
223. See Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 21 (statement of Judge James L. Buckley). 
224. Hatch, supra note 123, at 46-48; see also Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 65, 67-68 
(statements of Rep. Moorhead) (urging that courts pay attention to relevant explanatory 
materials). The fact that members of both parties have continued to participate in creating, 
negotiating, and relying on legislative history suggests that complaints are isolated voices of 
protest. See 128 CoNG. REc. 16,918-19 (1982) (statement of Sen. Armstrong) (criticizing 
report language not written or read by members); 98 CONG. REc. 7299 (1952) (statement of 
Rep. Jenkins) (same); id. at 7429 (statement of Rep. Curtis) (same). See generally KoFMEHL, 
supra note 124, at 122. 
225. See supra text accompanying notes 109-12. 
226. See supra text accompanying notes 113-123. 
227. See generally Stat. lnterp. Hrg., supra note 27; see also Popkin, supra note 4, at 311. 
228. See A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning and Context in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoLY •. 71, 78 (1994). 
229. See supra text accompanying notes 109-12; Popkin, supra note 4, at 310-11. Under 
either option, this specificity may well leave a judge with more, not less, discretion to inter-
pret in accordance with personal preferences. See Schwartz et al., supra note 90, at 55. 
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The risk of a less coherent text is further enhanced when one 
considers the method by which such details would likely be added. 
Whatever its shortcomings, the current, committee-centered legisla-
tive drafting process is a relatively "public" experience. There is 
considerable opportunity for notice to affected government and pri-
vate groups and for participation by those groups. They can ex-
press their views in open hearings, reach substantive compromises, 
and suggest technical improvements or clarifications in proposed 
text as well as in legislative history. To the extent Congress legis-
lates more furtively, without Sl,lch input from interested and techni-
cally competent outsiders, it often produces a shoddier product: 
provisions written or modified in haste during floor debate, or re-
written during a hectic end-of-session conference, are oft-cited 
examples.230 
Advocates of due process in lawmaking would presumably want 
to have laws made through an open, broadly accessible process. 
Rejection of legislative history inevitably devalues the open process 
of hearings, compromises, and participation by private and public 
groups.231 But given the reality of procedural obstacles and re-
source limitations, such rushed and secretive drafting techniques 
are likely to gain more favor if Congress attempts to capture in text 
the many details and explanations now contained in committee 
reports. 
4. Anecdotal Unreliability 
Even if legislative history is not systematically unreliable, legiti-
mate concerns remain about the potential for abuse. There are 
many professional staff who are encouraged to take initiatives on 
behalf of members, creating substantial opportunity for unreviewed 
230. See, e.g., Shine v. Shine, 802 F.2d 583, 5fl>7 {1st Cir. 1986) (correcting a textual draft· 
ing error made in a "harried and hurried atmosphere" at the end of a session); see also 
United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 118-19 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
Court's failure to correct careless drafting). Such carelessness occasionally has its lighter 
moments: 
Smoking a big cigar, the Speaker [of the House of Representatives] got angry again over 
the slap-dash quality of the bill [that became the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1981], with parts of it photocopied from memorandums, other parts handwritten at the 
last minute, and some final sections hastily crossed out in whorls of pencil marks .... 
But then he smiled, too, noting such cryptic and accidental entries in the bill as a 
name and phone number - "Ruth Seymour, 225-4844" - standing alone as if it were a 
special appropriation item. 
Sorensen v. Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 867 n.2 {1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
{alteration in original) (quoting Francis X. Clines, O'Neill Ready to Rejoin Battle Over the 
Budget, N.Y. T1MES, July 1, 1981, at A16). 
231. See Breyer, supra note 3, at 872-73. 
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exercises of discretion. There are many private groups and execu-
tive branch personnel who are as interested as the members and 
legislative staffs in leaving their mark on the legislative product.232 
There is abundant legislative history being produced, often in the 
form of lengthy committee reports, or floor colloquies or state-
ments inserted unspoken into the Congressional Record, all provid-
ing opportunities for manipulation.233 
The principal danger in such manipulation is that legislative his-
tory will contain explanations or assertions about the text that de-
part from the authoritatively expressed or widely , shared 
understanding of what that text means. Such inconsistencies arise, 
for example, when the identified legislative history was not en-
dorsed by the principal authors or would not have been embraced 
by the members who voted for the text. Assuming that the identi-
fied history went unnoticed or uncriticized by authors and other 
supporters, its promotion as "relevant" or "probative" before a 
court in subsequent litigation may be highly misleading. 
Still, given that these instances of abuse are anecdotal rather 
than systemic, efforts to control the abuses must be targeted so as 
not to undermine the basic legislative process. Thus Congress and 
the courts ought to adopt cautionary practices and rules. 
Congress already has in place some means for controlling poten-
tial abuses. Individual views in a committee report can point out a 
report's failure to represent adequately or accurately the views of 
the majority.234 Moreover, minority views can highlight areas of 
disagreement, including specific objections to assertions made by 
the committee majority. By focusing attention on areas of disagree-
ment, the minority views provide notice· to members, staff, and the 
leadership about the possible need to consider certain controversial 
matters when the bill reaches the floor. The table of contents for 
the committee report reflects the inclusion of supplemental or mi-
nority views, so that members and staff may immediately perceive 
the presence of controversy.235 Such consideration may lead to re-
port language's being debated and even modified in the course of 
232. See Shaviro, supra note 89, at 86-87 (noting that the emphasis of various "players" 
on being influential in the policymaking arena creates a bias for action over inaction and for 
more complexity in the drafting of statutes). 
233. See generally Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 140-41 (statement of Prof. William 
N. Eskridge). 
234. See Costello, supra note 137, at 44-45. 
235. See TIEFER, supra note 46, at 183-84. Under House and Senate rules, committee 
members have three calendar days in which to file supplemental, minority, or additional 
views. Id. at 184. 
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floor debate.236 In addition, Congress has received suggestions to 
amend its rules to improve the reliability of legislative history. Re-
cent proposals include having committee members sign or vote on 
committee reports, as more tangible evidence of member aware-
ness,237 and having sponsors and major players identify themselves 
as such speaking on the fioor.238 
Current and proposed congressional controls can do something 
to address the issue of abuse. Judicial efforts to limit abuse are cer-
tainly appropriate as well. One such effort is recommended and 
discussed in Part IV.239 
236. See, e.g., Hatch, supra note 123, at 46-47 (describing the floor debate that focused on 
rewriting portions of the committee report that accompanied the 1986 Balanced Budget 
Amendment); 136 CoNG. REc. H8619 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., 
supra note 59, at 24 (recording the statement of floor managers modifying the language of 
the committee report that accompanied the 1990 Older Workers Benefit Protection Act). 
Report language is often relied upon in floor debate by proponents as well as opponents of 
the legislation. See, e.g., 131 CoNG. REc. 34,645 (1985) (statement of Rep. Glickman) (dis-
cussing Judiciary Committee report language supportive of Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act); 98 CONG. REc. 5938-39 (1952) (statement of Sen. Smith) (discussing 
Foreign Relations Committee report language supportive of Mutual Security Act). 
237. See Stat. Interp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 119-21 (statement of Prof. Stephen F. Ross); 
id. at 90 (statement of Prof. William N. Eskridge). 
238. Id. at 123-24 (statement of Prof. Stephen F. Ross). Modest recommendations also 
have been made for improving legislative drafting techniques. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY 
COMMITIEE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 1liE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL 
COURTS STUDY CoMMITIEE 89-93 (1990). These recommendations include (i) use of a 
checklist by legislative staff when reviewing proposed legislation for technical problems; and 
(ii) adoption of Callback or default rules for certain issues not specifically addressed in a 
statute, such as the applicable statute of limitations. See generally Gregory E. Maggs, Red11c-
ing the Costs of Statlltory Ambiguity: Alternative Approaches and the Federal Courts Study 
Committee, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 122 (1992). 
A further proposal would have Congress formally endorse legislative history, either 
through (i) a generic provision encouraging or requiring courts to consider certain types of 
legislative history when construing federal statutes, or (ii) a vote to approve the committee 
report, or other portions of the legislative record, on a bill-by-bill basis. See generally Stat. 
Interp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 90, 92-93 (statement of Prof. William N. Eskridge). Apart 
from possible constitutional questions regarding congressional efforts to dictate the exercise 
of judicial authority, but cf. CAL PENAL CoDE § 4 (West 1988) (prohibiting courts from ap-
plying Rule of Lenity), statutory endorsement of legislative history raises practical concerns. 
A generic statute, focusing on certain types of history while excluding others, may well be 
insufficiently sensitive to the variations and complexities of the legislative process. A sepa-
rate vote on approving particular legislative history for each statute might address that prob-
lem, but at considerable cost to Congress - full deliberation and debate on the explanations 
and illustrations accompanying the text would leave far less time for other legislative 
business. 
239. A separate practical concern about relying on legislative history involves the issue of 
access for practicing attorneys and others seeking to understand and comply with the law. 
See United States v. Public Utilities Commn., 345 U.S. 295, 319-21 (1953) (Jackson, J., con-
curring). Justice Jackson's concerns about lack of access appear to have been overstated 
even 40 years ago, at least with regard to committee reports and floor debates. See HENRY 
M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKINO 
AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1278-83 (tent. ed. 1958) (noting that there are three or more 
depository libraries for U.S. government documents in every state, and that the Congres-
sional Record and committee reports are routinely collected in these libraries). 
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C. Refusals to Credit Postenactment Legislative History 
While legislative history in general has received criticism, con-
gressional commentary on judicial interpretations of previously en-
acted text is subject to more targeted critical review. Both courts24o 
and commentators241 have voiced reservations about taking the 
views expressed by members of a later Congress as in any way pro-
bative regarding the meaning of a statute enacted years or decades 
earlier. They argue that even assuming legislative history is a legiti-
mate source of context to help attribute meaning to inconclusive 
text, the legitimacy derives from the fact that Congress generated 
the explanatory material as part of the enactment process; that is, 
the history sheds light on what the enacting Congress has done, or 
meant to do. The later Congress is a separate decisionmaking en-
tity, which has no constitutional role in explaining or interpreting 
what the earlier body has done. 
Indeed, the argument continues, once Congress has acted, the 
formal responsibility for saying what the law means rests with the 
courts, not Congress. When congressional committees purport to 
ratify or reject judicial interpretations of earlier-enacted text, they 
are improperly interfering with the function of the judiciary.242 
Considering such postenactment history also allows the original un-
derstanding of enacted text to be buffeted on the shifting waves of 
critical commentary expressed by numerous subsequent legisla-
tures. This undermines the important value of predictability in our 
public laws.243 
Access to legislative materials is less problematic today than in Justice Jackson's time. In 
technical areas such as tax law, ordinary people rely on experts to decipher the tax code, and 
the expert community of tax professionals has ready access to all pertinent legislative history. 
See Ferguson et al., supra note 27, at 807. In nontechnical areas, the U.S. Code may be 
available more immediately and at lesser expense to an attorney, especially in a small prac-
tice or a rural area, than are the Congressional Record, the U.S. Code Congressional and 
Administrative News (which contains committee reports and citations for enacted laws), or 
the transcript of committee hearings. Still, the online capabilities of Westlaw and LEXIS 
provide access to these materials as well. While cost is a relevant factor, the cost of these 
online services may not differ greatly from the cost of securing access to agency regulations. 
See generally Breyer, supra note 3, at 868-69. 
240. See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 
(1980); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960). 
241. See, e.g., Grabow, supra note 164, at 747-48; Posner, supra note 4, at 809-10; 
Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 41 n.96. 
242. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 (1988); see also Waterman Steamship 
Corp. v. United States, 381 U.S. 252, 268-69 (1965) (noting that President Truman vetoed a 
1950 amendment to a 1946 statute, expressing his disagreement with committee report asser-
tions that the later amendment was a mere clarification, as opposed to a significant altera-
tion, of the meaning of the original statute). 
243. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Inter-
est-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 875, 885 (1975); Posner, supra note 4, at 809-10; see 
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A partial response to these concerns is to clarify that the type of 
congressional commentary that is the focus of this article is gener-
ated as part of an enactment process - the reenactment of earlier 
text. Thus, for instance, when committee reports accompanying a 
contemporary reenactment explain the meaning of a textual provi-
sion enacted ten years earlier, that explanation bears on what the 
current Congress has done or has meant to do by leaving the earlier 
provision unmodified.244 Crediting the explanation as in principle 
authoritative amplifies the meaning of the earlier text on a prospec-
tive basis. Admittedly, efforts to apply this contemporary explana-
tion to controversies that arose before the recent reenactment -
that is, under the originally enacted statute - must be justified, if 
at all, on separate grounds.245 But the contemporary explanation is, 
at least in formal terms, a "relevant context" for understanding in-
conclusive aspects of the reenacted text to which it is attached. 
Yet, assuming this subsequent legislative history is deemed "le-
gitimate" in formal terms as an explanation of what the current 
Congress means, issues of practical reliability again arise. The later 
congressional commentary, while it accompanies a new enactment, 
is unconnected to any new language in the reenacted text.246 Many 
members, both on and off the committee. responsible for drafting 
the report, were not members when the statute was originally en-
acted and have no reason to know, or care, whether the original 
text is being accurately or fairly characterized by the committee. 
Even those who were members at the time may forget or misrepre-
sent what they and their colleagues understood the text to mean 
when they drafted and approved it. Accordingly, there is reason to 
question whether recent committee report commentary regarding 
unaltered textual provisions should be considered a reliable state-
also Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 538-39 (arguing that allowing postenactment legislative 
history to affect the meaning of earlier-enacted text "dishonor[s] the procedural aspects of 
the legislative process"). 
244. See United States v. Board of Commrs., 435 U.S. 110, 129-35 & n.25 (1978); School 
Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1987); supra note 174 (discussing American Hosp. Assn. 
v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 651, 658 (7th Cir. 1990), affd. on other grounds, 499 U.S. 606 (1991)). 
245. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1505 (1994) (relying on a general 
rule disfavoring retroactive application of statutes absent clear congressional intent to the 
contrary). 
246. What is referred to as "reenactment of earlier text" typically takes one of two forms: 
(i) reauthorization of, for example, a federally funded assistance program, which often in-
volves recodifying a lengthy text without specifying where changes have been made, if at all; 
or (ii) updating a regulatory statute, which generally involves text that specifies modifications 
or additions to an original law that is simply cross-referenced. In either case, members will 
have scant basis for discerning whether the report commentary refers to new text or text that 
is unchanged. But see infra note 249 and accompanying text. 
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ment of what the updated legislation means or what the current 
legislature intends.247 
These practical concerns are important, but not dispositive. To 
begin, the congressional commentary at issue here is likely to be 
noticed on a regular basis, at least by the relevant legislative sub-
group.248 The fact that there has been a judicial interpretation of 
the original text means that a controversy has arisen and is being 
litigated. If regulated entities, and groups promoting the regulatory 
approach, care enough to go to court, some of them probably will 
care enough to alert and pester relevant members of Congress. In-
deed, such initiative presumably helps explain how the committee 
report comes to express approval or disapproval for a judicial inter-
pretation in the first place.249 
Moreover, the practical concern that members will be inatten-
tive to report commentary unconnected to new text rests on the 
assumption that members pay close - or at least closer - atten-
tion to new text than to old text they are merely reenacting or 
cross-referencing. But, as previously noted, members often read re-
port commentary rather than the bill itself in the first fustance - in 
part because most bills are reenactments that modify existing U.S. 
Code provisions and are therefore largely incomprehensible as free-
standing documents.25o 
Even with this likely awareness by the committee-based "policy 
community," there may be ample institutional justification for the 
failure to update text on which the committee report is comment-
ing. As discussed earlier, the issue the report explains - including 
an explanation that involves review of judicial interpretations -
may be minor or subsidiary in the context of the bill as a whole. 
Alternatively, it may be awkward or burdensome to frame the issue 
succinctly as a matter of legislative draftsmanship. Under such cir-
cumstances, failure to include a textual analogue may reflect a judg-
ment that the benefit of adding a clarification to text - even one 
commanding broad support - is outweighed by the risk that the 
modification in language would trigger procedural wrangling or col-
247. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566-67 (1988). See generally Eskridge, supra 
note 218, at 83-85 (describing the Rehnquist Court as noticeably more hostile to postenact-
ment signals than was the Burger Court). 
248. See supra text accompanying notes 208-10; see also supra note 92 (discussing special-
ized policy communities). 
249. Cf. Katzmann, supra note 217, at 662 (explaining that staff awareness of case law 
relates in part to requests for legislative relief from a losing party or a large interest group). 
250. See supra text accompanying note 108 (describing remarks of Sen. Specter). 
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lateral skirmishes resulting in delay or obstruction of the 
reenactment.251 
To be sure, the proposition that a particular committee report 
explanation would command broad contemporary congressional 
support rests on the assumption that Congress may be character-
ized as in some meaningful sense aware of the issue being ex-
plained. Such implied awareness is not self-evident where, as here, 
the explanation relates back to a text considered and enacted by a 
previous Congress. 
But it is reasonable to determine whether such awareness 
should be imputed not on the basis of a priori pronouncements but 
rather by examining the particular factual circumstances. For ex-
ample, assume a statute is reenacted with no textual changes at 
all,252 after only an abbreviated legislative process,253 and the com-
mittee commentary involves a judicial decision that has received lit-
tle or no public attention. In such an instance, there is only a weak 
justification for presuming that most members or their staffs have 
familiarized themselves with the previously enacted text on which 
the report is commenting, much less that they approve of the com-
ments. On the other hand, if a reenacted statute contains numerous 
and substantial modifications in text, if it was enacted following a 
more inclusive legislative process, and if the case commented on by 
the committee has been more prominently featured in public de-
bate, there is a stronger basis for imputing such familiarity and en-
dorsement to Congress.254 The problem of where to draw lines 
between acceptable and unacceptable levels of presumed awareness 
is addressed in Part IV. But the fact that such lines can be drawn 
251. See supra text accompanying notes 113-23; see also Farber & Frickey, supra note 89, 
at 467 (citing higher drafting costs at the time of reenactment if the courts ignore subsequent 
legislative history). Such risks or costs may be less substantial if the textual clarification is 
included from the start as part of the reenactment process. But when the texts being reen-
acted are the subject of frequent or ongoing litigation, judicial interpretations may arise or 
come to the attention of committee members only after the reenactment bill has been 
introduced. 
252. This may occur in the case of periodic reauthorization - that is, the extending of an 
existing federal assistance program for another five years in its previously enacted form. 
Such reauthorizations will usually include at least a few textual changes, both because altered 
social conditions, or glitches in operation, invariably suggest the wisdom of some modifica-
tions, and because members of the current Congress generally want to take credit for some-
thing new as opposed to simply rubber-stamping an old program. See supra text 
accompanying notes 141-45. 
253. See supra note 211 (referring to the unanimous consent process in the Senate and 
suspension of rules in the House). 
254. Cf. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629-30 n.7 (1987) (discussing 
the fact that Congress's failure to alter judicially interpreted text in the course of a reenact-
ment may be probative of the meaning of that text to varying degrees). 
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means that the issue is one of how to weigh the legislative history in 
each instance, rather than whether to admit or systematically dis-
count such evidence altogether. 
One issue not yet addressed is the concern that by crediting 
committee report explanations about the meaning of previously en-
acted text, courts will undermine the predictive value of our laws.255 
It is true that if courts allow statutory language enacted years or 
decades earlier to be given additional or different meaning by a 
later Congress, they may compromise the "original understanding" 
reached by the principal legislative actors and relied upon by indi-
viduals and entities seeking to order their conduct. Nevertheless, 
making such an adjustment is hardly unusual in the field of statu-
tory construction: courts regularly invoke more contemporary con-
texts to clarify or update earlier legislative understandings. 
When consulting dictionary definitions of key statutory words, 
the Supreme Court often has looked to dictionaries that were pub-
lished decades after the date the statutory language was originally 
enacted.256 When invoking the canons of construction, notably the 
canon that statutes should be interpreted to avoid constitutional 
problems, the Court has regularly consulted current constitutional 
doctrine rather than the doctrine that would have applied at the 
time of statutory enactment.257 Even when relying on agency inter-
255. See supra text accompanying note 243. 
256. See, e.g., Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 1489, 1494-96 (1992) 
(relying on a 1983 dictionary definition to explicate text originally enacted in 1938); Missis-
sippi v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 549, 553 (1992) (relying on a 1942 dictionary definition to expli-
cate text originally enacted in 1911); Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 479-80 (1990) 
(relying on a 1950 dictionary definition to explicate text originally enacted in 1921); see also 
K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 324 n.2 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) 
(relying on a 1981 dictionary definition to explicate a nineteenth-century statutory text). But 
cf. Looking It Up, supra note 184, at 1447-48 (noting that the Court's recent choice of dic-
tionaries shows "no [consistent or principled] relationship between the age of the dictionary 
and that of the statute under consideration"). 
257. See, e.g., Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985) (finding possible First Amendment 
problems if the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 is interpreted to cover publication of 
nonpersonalized investment newsletters, relying on commercial speech doctrine developed in 
the 1970s and 1980s); NLRB v. Catholic Bishops of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (finding 
possible First Amendment problems if NLRA is interpreted to cover church-operated 
schools, relying on free exercise doctrine developed in the 1960s and 1970s). The canon that 
statutes should be construed so as to give effect to each also may result in the narrowing of 
earlier-enacted language to allow a later enactment to take full effect. But cf. Morton v. 
Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) (stating the canon the repeals by implication are not fa-
vored); St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 788 (1981) 
(citing Morton for the same proposition). See generally Aleinikoff, supra note 4, at 38-39. 
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pretations, the Court may invoke recent interpretations rather than 
those that were contemporaneous with original enactment.258 
In each of these instances, the Court has updated earlier text 
without regard to cost in terms of predictability or notice based on 
an original understanding of that earlier text. Such action reflects 
an appreciation that statutes are meant to be effective over an ex-
tended period and that, accordingly, they must respond to social 
and legal developments that were unforeseen or even unforesee-
able at the time of original enactment.259 The same considerations 
that may justify reliance on the "context" of postenactment diction-
ary usage, canons of construction, and agency interpretations also 
justify reliance on postenactment legislative history in this regard. 
The risk of abuse remains but is not dispositive. 
D. Refusals to Credit Legislative Inaction 
The previous section reviewed the difficulties associated with re-
lying on subsequent legislative history - that is, recent committee 
report commentary regarding text that was enacted by an earlier 
Congress and is not materially altered after the related reenactment 
by a more recent Congress. One can also analyze these difficulties 
with reference to the problem of whether to credit legislative 
inaction. 260 
The failure to alter a specific textual provision after an interven-
ing judicial interpretation of that provision is a form of legislative 
silence or inaction. Once again, both courts261 and commenta-
258. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 584-93 (1983) (relying on 
altered concepts of national policy to sustain a 1970 IRS ruling that updated the meaning of 
nineteenth-century statutory language governing the tax-exempt status of charitable trusts). 
259. See supra text in paragraphs following note 109. 
260. Reservations about legislative inaction, like skepticism regarding subsequent legisla-
tive history, reflect a concern that precisely because Congress has never changed the particu-
lar text in question, there is no basis for assigning meaning to any other kind of "legislative 
event" that has since occurred. But whereas the debate over postenactment history focuses 
on the affirmative "event" of statements on the floor or in committee reports in a later Con· 
gress, the debate over inaction focuses on the negative "event" of textual silence in a later 
Congress in light of intervening interpretive statements from the judiciary. Not surprisingly, 
policy concerns regarding reliance on legislative inaction are often similar to those expressed 
with regard to crediting subsequent legislative history. See, e.g., Johnson v. 'Il"ansportation 
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671 {1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that any reliance on the 
intent of the current, inactive Congress unfairly distorts the elements of the original deal 
agreed to by the enacting Congress). 
261. See, e.g., Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-20 {1940); see also 480 U.S. at 671-
72 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 22-24· {1946) (Rutledge, J., 
concurring). 
October 1994] Congresszonal Commentary 67 
tors262 have raised concerns about attributing any legal significance 
to such institutional silence. Inaction, by definition, amounts to the 
absence of a "lawmaking occurrence"; accordingly, some have ar-
gued that such inaction should not be given any meaning at all.263 
Congress on occasion may attribute legal significance to future leg-
islative inaction by including "sunset" provisions that expire in a 
certain period of time unless reenacted by a subsequent Con-
gress.264 But the very fact that Congress from time to time enacts 
laws giving legal significance to future ·congressional inaction sup-
ports the argument that no legislative meaning should inhere in fu-
ture silences unless such meaning has been expressly provided for 
by the enacting Congress. 
As was the case with respect to postenactment legislative his-
tory, a partial response to the forn.lalist critique reaffirms that there 
is a "lawmaking occurrence" here - the reenactment or alteration 
of an earlier-enacted statute. Congress has not simply acquiesced 
in a judicial interpretation by failing to act in any way to override it. 
Rather, Congress has revisited the statute, engaged in new lawmak-
ing to modify or extend the text as a whole, and - as part of that 
new law - left the interpreted textual provision unchanged. Be-
cause Congress has engaged in legislative action, the threshold con-
cern about the absence of a legitimate lawmaking occurrence 
evaporates.265 
Attributing meaning to a reenactment that fails to modify the 
text in question does, nevertheless, raise certain practical concerns. 
262. See generally William N. Eskridge Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. 
REv. 67 {1988); Grabow, supra note 164; Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid, 
57 IND. L.J. 515 {1982). 
263. See, e.g., Grabow, supra note 164, at 741, 746-47. 
264. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
592, §§ 3, 6, 100 Stat. 3342, 3342, 3344 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 624 (1988)) 
{abolishing mandatory retirement effective January 1, 1987, and exempting tenured univer-
sity faculty and public safety officers from the abolition of mandatory retirement through 
December 31, 1993). See generally Tribe, supra note 262, at 528. 
265. Moreover, the formalist argument that true congressional acquiescence should never 
be given meaning may well go too far. Although there are many different possible explana-
tions for Congress's failure to enact a law addressing an intervening judicial interpretation of 
earlier text, it does not follow that the failure to act is meaningless regardless of the sur-
rounding legal landscape. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-84 (1972) (finding "posi-
tive inaction" when Congress had repeatedly rejected amendments to override earlier 
Supreme Court precedents and apply antitrust laws to baseball, even though professional 
sports in general were subject to antitrust regulation); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 
U.S. 574, 599-602 {1983) (crediting Congress's repeated rejection of amendments to overturn 
an agency interpretation of an Internal Revenue Code provision that had denied tax exemp-
tion to racially discriminatory private schools at a time when racial discrimination was pro-
hibited as contrary to public policy by numerous other statutes and Supreme Court rulings). 
See generally Grabow, supra note 164, at 741-44. The argument, however, need not be re-
solved in this context. 
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The decision to change some textual provisions but not others may 
reflect nothing more than a narrow congressional attention to the 
language being updated. Although some have contended that Con-
• gress has a duty, when revisiting a statute, to make known any disa-
greement with 'court interpretations of its former language,266 this 
inference of congressional responsibility surely goes too far in em-
pirical terms. As has been discussed, Congress regularly has a com-
plex and heavy legislative agenda. Each year, hundreds if not 
thousands of court cases interpret language from earlier-enacted 
statutes that are up for reauthorization or are being amended in 
some other section or title. It is unrealistic to presume that Con-
gress or its committees are aware of decisions, especially lower 
court decisions, about which they have said absolutely nothing.267 
But once again, that issue is not what confronts us here. Some 
degree of legislative awareness is demonstrated by the committee 
commentary itself. Whether the awareness expressed in the legisla-
tive history is a sufficient basis for imputing familiarity and agree-
ment to Congress as a whole may vary from one instance to 
another.268 Distinguishing among the alternatives on a principled 
basis is essential if courts are to be able to decide when to credit 
committee commentary approving of intervening judicial interpre-
tations.269 As was true with postenactment history, drawing these 
266. See, e.g., Lorillard, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978); Girouard v. United States, 
328 U.S. 61, 76 (1946) (Stone, CJ., dissenting). 
267. Compare Eskridge, supra note 8, at 342-43 (describing substantial awareness of 
Supreme Court decisions by Judiciary Committees' members and staffs) with Katzmann, 
supra note 217, at 656-62 (noting that committee staffs were generally unaware of D.C. Cir-
cuit decisions - even leading qr controversial ones). 
268. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 252-54. As was the case with respect to posten-
actment committee report commentary, the failure to modify or reject an intervening judicial 
interpretation approved in the committee report may indicate (i) a Jack of notice or under-
standing about the substance of the commentary; (ii) general agreement with the committee 
report commentary and no sense of urgency to codify that agreement; (iii) widespread ap-
proval of the commentary combined with a recognition that some modest controversy exists 
and a reluctance to delay or jeopardize the reenactment process by adding the issue to text; 
or (iv) an understanding that the commentary is quite controversial but there is no agree-
ment on how to modify the underlying judicial interpretation. Cf. Cleveland v. United 
States, 329 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
269. Similar alternatives are presented with regard to committee-expressed disapproval 
in certain circumstances, such as the 1978 conference committee disapproval of the Supreme 
Court's "pre-Act/post-Act" interpretation of subterfuge in United Airlines v. McMann, 434 
U.S. 192 (1977), set forth supra at notes 39-48 and accompanying text. Congress's failure to 
modify the word subterfuge in text may indicate (i) a Jack of awareness that pre-Act validity 
was even an issue; (ii) general agreement with the conference committee's disapproval but a 
conclusion that codification was unnecessary given that the McMann holding was already 
being overridden; (iii) support for the disapproval combined with a reluctance to delay the 
legislation by forcing a new issue into text at the last moment; or (iv) conscious lack of agree-
ment on the pre-Act validity question. See infra text accompanying notes 384-95. 
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distinctions raises questions about how to weigh the legislative his-
tory evidence in each case or each type of case, not whether to con-
sider that evidence at all. 
In sum, the challenges mounted against judicial consideration of 
congressional commentary on earlier-enacted textual provisions are 
of two kinds - those based on legitimacy and those based on relia-
bility. The challenges based on legitimacy are unpersuasive. Legis-
lative history, while not itself text, may provide relevant context 
and is at least as legitimate in principle as other sources of context. 
Moreover, because this particular type of history accompanies a 
subsequent enactment, it avoids the formalist problems identified 
with respect to postenactment legislative history and legislative 
inaction. 
The challenges based on reliability are less readily dismissed. 
Legislative history commenting on materially unaltered text raises 
special concerns about imputing broader awareness and approval to 
Congress as a whole. It is to those concerns that I now turn. 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR INTERPRETING LEGISLATIVE SIGNALS 
By this point, it should be clear that a systematic judicial rejec-
tion or discounting of legislative signals - and in particular of leg-
islative history commenting on earlier judicial interpretations of 
materially unaltered text - imposes significant costs on Congress. 
These costs include diminishing or diluting Congress's legislative 
output and also disrespecting Congress's chosen form of legislative 
organization. Further, while there are practical risks in having 
courts credit the subsequent committee commentary, those risks 
justify a careful analysis of the signals rather than their blanket ex-
clusion or denigration. 
Although the analysis could be pursued with respect to legisla-
tive history as a whole, I propose to devote primary attention to the 
type of history that has been my focus thus far: the treatment of 
judicial decisions in committee reports accompanying subsequent 
textual enactments. At the same time, I will continue to refer to the 
corpus of legislative signals in general. As indicated in the discus-
sion concerning manipulation of these signals,270 the central issue in 
determining how much weight courts should give them is reliability: 
how reliable are the statements or conclusions contained in legisla-
tive history in reflecting the shared understanding of Congress as a 
whole? 
270. See supra text accompanying notes 232-34. 
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A. Examining the Issue of Reliability 
Certainly, some legislative history may be deemed highly relia-
ble. Let me begin with three examples. In each instance, reliability 
attaches mainly because the history is a product of legislative mech-
anisms that the generality of members have embraced. Conse-
quently, most members would readily have agreed that the text 
meant what the legislative history said it meant. 
As a first example, one or both houses of Congress may take 
statements made in committee reports as the basis for altering col-
lective legislative conduct. In the Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act of 1980,271 Congress conferred a right of access to 
certain private lands, or "inholdings," located within national forest 
areas. The statutory text was inconclusive, however, as to whether 
it affected national forests nationwide or only those in Alaska.272 
Later in the same Congress, the Colorado Wilderness Act273 was in 
conference; the Senate version had conferred a similar right of ac-
cess to inholdings in Colorado, while the House version was silent 
on the subject of access.274 The conferees agreed to delete the Sen-
ate language, on the express understanding that the Alaska Lands 
Act already covered access to national forests in Colorado.21s By 
accepting the House version on access and receding from the Sen-
ate version, for the reasons explained in the conference report and 
271. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 16 U.S.C. and 43 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
272. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act § 1323(a}, 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a) 
(1988); see Montana Wilderness Assn. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 80-3374 (9th Cir. May 14, 
1981), reprinted in part in ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 89, at 743-49 (finding ambiguity 
in both the text and the legislative history regarding the application outside Alaska of the 
access provisions of the Alaska Lands Act, but determining that the text is most sensibly read 
to favor "Alaska-only" coverage and that the legislative history fails to overcome that 
reading). 
273. Pub. L. No. 96-560, 94 Stat. 3265 (1980) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 192b-
9, 1132, 1133 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
274. Compare H.R. 5487 as passed by the House, 125 CONG. REC. 35,133-34 (1979) (no 
provision on access) with H.R. 5487 as passed by the Senate, 126 CONG. REc. 27,280, 27,282 
(1980) (§ 7 covers access). 
275. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1521, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980}, reprinted in 126 CoNo. 
REc. 31,858 (1980). The Joint Explanatory Statement reads: 
9. ACCESS 
Section 7 of the Senate amendment contains a provision pertaining to access to non-
Federally owned lands within national forest wilderness areas in Colorado. The House 
bill has no such provision. 
The conferees agreed to delete the section because similar language has already 
passed Congress in Section 1323 of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation 
Act. 
126 CoNG. REc. at 31,864. 
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reiterated on the Senate and House :floors,276 Congress as a whole 
adopted the understanding that the earlier-enacted Alaska Lands 
Act conferred a nationwide right of access.211 
A further example of highly reliable legislative history is report 
language designed by the relevant committees and understood by 
Congress to provide controlling guidance on a textual provision. -In 
the Revenue Act of 1962,278 Congress confronted the issue of 
whether taxpayers were gaining unjustified tax-free benefits by de-
ducting an array of personal entertainment costs as ordinary and 
necessary business expenses. President Kennedy had recom-
mended that Congress completely disallow the deduction of the 
cost of such business entertainment to eliminate widespread abuses. 
Congress, while agreeing that abuses should be curbed, was unwill-
ing to go along with a complete disallowance.219 
The House Ways and Means Committee proposed adding a new 
section 274 to the Internal Revenue Code, allowing business en-
tertainment costs to be deductible only if they were "directly re-
lated to the active conduct of the taxpayer's· trade or business."280 
The committee report language made clear that the "directly re-
lated to" standard was meant to exclude deductions for entertain-
ment expenses aimed at promoting "goodwill" unless business was 
transacted or at least discussed during the entertainment.281 When 
276. See 126 CoNG. REc. 32,403 (1980) (statement of Sen. Hart) ("The Conference Com-
mittee did not accept the Senate bill's provision on access to inholdings in Colorado wilder-
ness areas, because Congress has recently enacted - as part of the Alaska lands bill - a 
similar provision to apply to access to inholdings in all public lands."); id. at 32,405 (state-
ment of Sen. Armstrong) ("Access to privately owned inholdings ... is especially important 
today [, and Senate access language] has been dropped from this final legislation only be-
cause even more comprehensive language is included in the Alaska Lands legislation .... "); 
id. at 32,408 (printed comparison of House, Senate, and conference versions); see also id. at 
31,882 (statement of Rep. Johnson) (inserting a "factsheet" into the record which states that 
the relevant access provisions are in the "Alaska Lands Bill"). 
277. See Montana Wilderness Assn. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(withdrawing an earlier decision on the basis of the new statute and in particular its legisla-
tive history), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). See generally EsKRIDGE & FrucKEY, supra 
note 89, at 743-59. 
278. Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 4, 76 Stat. 960, 974-77 (1962) (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. § 274 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). 
279. See H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1962); S. REP. No. 1881, 87th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3304, 3327-28. 
280. H.R. 10,650, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4, at 27-28 (reported Mar. 16, 1962); see H.R. 
REP. No. 1447, supra note 279, at 19-26 (describing the text ofH.R.10,650 as it was reported 
on Mar. 16, 1962). 
281. For example, the report explained, 
[A taxpayer] will have to show more than a general expectation of deriving some income 
at some indefinite future time .... 
If the expenditure is for entertainment which occurs under circumstances where 
there is little or no possibility of conducting business affairs or carrying on negotiations 
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the House bill reached the Senate, the Senate Finance Committee 
balked at such a restrictive approach to goodwill entertainment ex-
penses. The committee added language inserting the words or asso-
ciated with after the words directly related to. Thus, under the 
Senate version of section 274(a)(1), business entertainment costs 
would be deductible if "directly related to or associated with the 
active conduct of the taxpayer's trade or business."282 In its report, 
the Finance Committee specified that the additional textual lan-
guage - language made necessary "[t]o eliminate the harshness re-
sulting from the House report" - was intended to permit 
deduction of expenses for goodwill entertainment.283 
In conference, both the House and Senate language were re-
tained, with an added reference that the Senate test should apply in 
cases in which the entertainment was linked sequentially to a sub-
stantial and bona fide business discussion.284 At the same time the 
conferees emphasized that goodwill entertainment expenses would 
be deductible as set forth in the Senate Finance Committee Re-
port.285 In sum, although the concept of "goodwill entertainment" 
or discussions relating thereto, the expenditure will generally be considered not to have 
been directly related to the active conduct of business. 
H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note 279, at 20-21. 
282. H.R. 10,650, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4, at 41-42 (reported Aug.16, 1962), reprinted in 
STAFF OF CoMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 90ni CONG., lST SESS,, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
H.R. 10650, 87TH CoNGRESS: THE REVENUE Acr OF 1962, at 1959, 1999-2000; see S. REP. 
No. 1881, supra note 279, at 25-26, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3328-29 {describing 
changes from House version). 
283. S. REP. No. 1881, supra note 279, at 26, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3328; see 
id. at 25, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3328 (noting that the effect of the House provi-
sion "has been modified to permit the deduction of expenses for goodwill where a close 
association is established between the expense and the active conduct of a trade or busi-
ness"); id. at 28-29, reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3331 (stating that "[g]oodwill has long 
been recognized as a legitimate objective of business entertaining" and that such expenses 
"ordinarily will continue to be deductible" unless they are against public policy - for exam-
ple, if they violate public morals as expressed in local law); id. at 29, reprinted in 1962 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3332-33 {listing examples of expenses deductible as goodwill entertaining). 
284. Thus, the final language of26 U.S.C. § 274(a){l), with the language added in confer-
ence italicized, allowed deduction for entertainment costs only if "the taxpayer establishes 
that the item was directly related to, or, in the case of an item directly preceding or following a 
substantial and bona fide business discussion (including business meetings at a convention or 
otherwise), that such item was associated with, the active conduct of the taxpayer's trade or 
business •... " 26 U.S.C. § 274(a){l) (1988) (emphasis added). 
285. 
It is the understanding of the conferees, both on the part of the House and the Senate, 
that the alternative Senate "or associated with" test as described in the report of the 
Finance Committee would apply to certain entertaining primarily to encourage goodwill 
where the evidence of business connection is clear, whether or not business is actually 
transacted or discussed during the entertainment. ..• The conditions under which an 
item is "associated with" the active conduct of a trade or business are contained in the 
report of the Committee on Finance. 
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1962), reprinted in 108 CoNo. REc. 
21,708, 21,746 (1962) (statement of House Managers). 
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is never referred to in text, both authorizing committees and the 
conference committee explained the textual language as applying to 
that concept. The committees understood certain report language 
to be controlling in this regard, and both the House and the Senate 
were advised of that understanding through the conference report 
and in subsequent floor debate.286 Finally, Congress as a whole 
adopted that understanding by approving the conference report 
version of the text. 
Still another example of highly reliable legislative history is an 
explanatory statement that one may objectively describe as encom-
passing the full range of interested legislative viewpoints. In the 
Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990,287 Senators Pryor 
and Metzenbaum were coauthors of the legislation and leading 
spokesmen for its proponents, while Senator Hatch was the princi-
pal advocate and floor manager for the opposition. After the bill 
reached the Senate floor, Metzenbaum, Pryor, Hatch, and other 
senators long involved in the legislation began negotiations to re-
solve their differences.288 When they finally reached an agreement, 
the compromise included changes in the text of the bill that had 
been pending on the floor, accompanied by a detailed Statement of 
Managers explaining the new substitute bill.289 The substitute text 
and the jointly issued Statement of Managers were presented as a 
unified compromise on the Senate floor and were described and 
endorsed by Metzenbaum, Pryor, and Hatch.290 After a brief de-
bate, the substitute passed by 94-1 in the Senate.291 A week later, 
the identical substitute, accompanied by the identical Statement of 
Managers, was debated briefly in the House and then approved by 
a vote of 406-17.292 Under these circumstances, the explanations 
286. See 108 CoNG. REc. 21,742 (1962) (statement of Rep. Mills); id. at-21,707 (statement 
of Sen. Kerr); id. at 21,710-12 (statements of Sens. Javits and Kerr). See generally Ferguson 
et al., supra note 27, at 813. 
287. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990). The bill is discussed in detail supra at 
notes 53-67 and acompanying text. 
288. See 136 CONG. REc. S13,405 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1990) (statement of Sen. Mitchell), 
reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 59, at 96. 
289. See 136 CoNG. REc. S13,594-9i (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., 
supra note 59, at 46-51 (text), 51-53 (Statement of Managers). 
290. See 136 CONG. REc. S13,597-98 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., 
supra note 59, at 54-55 (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum); id. at S13,603-04, reprinted in 1 
LEGIS. HIST., supra note 59, at 70-72 (statement of Sen. Pryor); id. at S13,599-600, reprinted 
in 1 LEGis. HIST., supra note 59, at 60-62 (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
291. 136 CoNG. REc. S13,611 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra 
note 59, at 90. 
292. See 136 CoNG. REc. H8614-16 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990), reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., 
supra note 59, at 11-16 (Senate text); id. at H8619-20, reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 
59, at 24-26 (Statement of Managers); id. at H8616-27, reprinted in 1 LEGIS. HIST., supra note 
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and guidance contained in the Statement of Managers may be pre-
sumed to reflect the understanding of Congress. 
What makes these three legislative history examples "reliable" 
as illuminating what Congress has done in the accompanying text? 
Their reliability stems from the fact that each represents an integral 
part of the shared understanding reached by Congress as a whole. 
In the first example, the Senate had voted to ensure access to wil-
derness inholdings in Colorado. The Senate then changed its posi-
tion only because its designated representatives, the conferees, 
advised officially and openly that this very Congress had already 
conferred such access in a recently enacted law. Similarly, in the 
tax example, the designated technical experts for the House and 
Senate reached an understanding of statutory language and com-
municated that understanding to each full body in clear terms. The 
bodies then endorsed that statutory language as explained. In the 
age discrimination example, both chambers approved an under-
standing reached by political adversaries. In effect, Congress pro-
nounced their statement authoritative because its authors reflected 
the entire ideological spectrum. 
In each instance, the legislative history is reliable not because 
each member has agreed to it in the way a member "agrees to" text 
through a vote.293 Rather, the members have assigned primary re-
sponsibility for drafting a text and explaining or amplifying its 
meaning to a subgroup of colleagues trusted for their technical ex-
pertise, their ideological commitment, or both. The subgroup then 
has explained its agreed-upon position in a manner likely to be un-
derstood by the body as a whole at a time when members could 
have challenged or debated the explanation. Accordingly, one can 
conclude that the members either did agree, or surely would have 
agreed if asked, that the text they approved meant what their desig-
nated colleagues said it meant. 
The reality of the relationship between reliable legislative his-
tory and the shared understanding reached by Congress as a whole 
is reinforced when one considers the other end of the spectrum -
legislative history that may be deemed highly unreliable. For exam-
ple, the views expressed in a committee hearing or even a commit-
tee report that accompanies a bill never taken up by the full House 
or Senate, much less enacted into law, seem wholly suspect. When 
59, at 16-44 (debate); see also 136 CoNG. REc. H8738 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990), reprinted in 1 
LEGIS. HIST., supra note 59, at 10-11 (House vote on final passage). 
293. Technically, a vote on the conference report is only a vote on text, not on the at-
tached Statement of Managers. See Costello, supra note 137, at 48. 
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both chambers consider and approve the same textual provisions, 
they have effectively come to an institutional agreement to change 
a particular statutory scheme in certain ways.294 The existence of 
such an agreement makes it possible to ask - and determine -
whether explanations contained in the accompanying history were 
part of Congress's understanding of what the now modified statute 
means.29s By contrast, the absence of such an agreement makes it 
more difficult to imagine any "shared understanding" attributable 
to Congress as a whole.296 More significantly for present purposes, 
the failure to secure even consideration of the proposed textual re-
visions by either chamber makes it impossible to conclude that the 
explanations accompanying the proposed changes would ever have 
been noticed, much less endorsed, by the entire Congress.297 
B. Three Central Considerations in Determining Reliability 
As one distinguishes legislative history that courts should label 
generally reliable from history they should regard as unreliable, cer-
tain key elements begin to emerge. For present purposes, I assume 
we are presented with our paradigmatic situation: a committee re-
port298 that expresses approval or disapproval of prior judicial in-
294. By "statutory scheme," I refer to the related matrix of provisions in the U.S. Code. 
Thus, for instance, a new tax law may change the Internal Revenue Code, or specific titles or 
chapters thereof, in certain ways, or a new civil rights law may similarly change Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and perhaps other titles as well. 
295. This understanding may encompass the agreed-upon changes, the provisions left un-
changed, and the statutory scheme as a whole. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 271-
77 (discussing the Alaska Lands Act and the Colorado Wilderness Act). -
296. See supra ncite 173; supra text accompanying notes 261-64 (discussing legislative 
inaction). 
297. For example, S. REP. No. 349, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), which accompanied the 
Employee Health and Safety Whistleblower Protection Act, analyzed and approved or ques-
tioned various state and federal court decisions addressing protection for whistleblowers. 
The bill, however, was never considered by the full Senate, and the companion bill, H.R. 
3368, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), was never taken up in committee. Another example is the 
Freedom of Information Act: Hearings Before Subcomm on the Constitution of the Comm. 
on the Judiciary on S. 587, S. 1235, S. 1247, S. 1730, and S. 1751, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) 
(recording seven days of hearings in 1147 pages of testimony that discussed, criticized, and 
endorsed numerous federal court decisions). Textual changes favored by the committee were 
set forth at S. REP. No. 690, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), accompanying S. 1730. The bill was 
never taken up on the Senate floor, and there was no companion bill in the House. 
Once again, one need not reject all reliance on legislative inaction in order to reject reli-
ance on the legislative history accompanying this particular form of inaction. As discussed 
supra at note 265, the failure to act may be given significance based on the surrounding legal 
landscape. But that involves imputing to Congress as an ongoing institution knowledge of 
the surrounding legal landscape, which all prior Congresses have created over time. 
Whatever the merits of that imputation, a different issue arises when one imputes to a partic-
ular Congress knowledge of commentary by its own subgroups when the commentary was 
never presented to or considered by members off the committee. 
298. I have chosen the committee report as the paradigm for application of my three 
considerations. As previously discussed, legislation is usually drafted in committee, and the 
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terpretation of materially unaltered text and that accompanies a 
reenactment or modification of the statutory scheme containing the 
unaltered text. Absent a vote by the full House and Senate on the 
expression of committee approval or disapproval, I believe a re-
viewing court should seek to determine whether this expression 
would have been (i) understood, (ii) noticed, and (iii) accepted by a 
reasonable member of Congress. In this regard, a reviewing court 
should examine the legislative history to evaluate (i) how thought-
fully or elaborately the report expresses the approval or disap-
proval of the court decision; (ii) how salient or prominent the 
expression of approval or disapproval is within the legislative his-
tory as a whole; and (iii) how the approval or disapproval fits into 
the larger context of the statutory change that is being enacted. 
To the extent that a committee report elaborates on its endorse-
ment of a prior judicial interpretation, a reasonably thoughtful leg-
islator who is not a member of the committee would be more likely 
to understand the meaning of the committee approval, either on her 
own or through a presentation from her staff. To the extent that the 
committee discussion is featured prominently in the report, or is 
amplified, reiterated, or even referred to during floor debate, a rea-
sonably attentive legislator would be more likely to notice the exist-
ence of the committee approval. And to the extent that the 
committee report is generally regarded as the most coherent and thoughtful explanation of 
the proposed statute as well as the problems that statute is meant to address. See Zuber v. 
Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 {1969) {observing that committee reports represent the "considered 
and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying pro· 
posed legislation"), quoted with approval in Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984). 
Apart from its claims to being coherent and genuinely reflective of the text, the commit-
tee report is in a format that is readily accessible to other members as well as the courts and 
the public. For all these reasons, committee reports are recognized as a more authoritative 
form of legislative history than hearings, floor debates, or statements by sponsors. Thorn· 
burg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 {1986); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 
U.S. 384, 395 {1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also EsKRIDGE & FRtCKEY, supra note 89, 
at 709. 
These factors apply with at least equal force to conference committee reports. Confer-
ence reports include an explanation of all textual changes made to reconcile versions previ· 
ously passed by the House and Senate. The explanatory statements, as well as the agreed· 
upon text, are generally read on the floor, or printed in the Congressional Record, or both, 
when the conference report is taken up for discussion. See TtEFER, supra note 46, at 825-31. 
See generally Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of 
Legislative History: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JuRIMETRICS J. 294, 304 {1982) (calculating that 
between 1938 and 1979 almost 50% of the Supreme Court's references to legislative history 
were to committee reports (including conference committee reports), about 20% to floor 
debates, and less than 15% to hearings). But cf. Popkin, supra note 4, at 317 (criticizing 
hastily written conference reports). 
This does not mean that the analysis developed in Part IV applies only to committee 
reports. Such reports may be less authoritative when a bill has been drafted - or its provi· 
sions significantly amended - during floor debate. Under these circumstances, a statement 
of managers or a colloquy among leading participants may be more useful. See, for example, 
the Hatch-Pryor-Metzenbaum Statement, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 287-92. 
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discussion is consonant with the relevant objectives or overall pur-
pose of the text that is being enacted, a reasonably responsible leg-
islator would be more likely to accept that the committee approval 
faithfully reflects the statutory text as a matter of substance. If all 
three elements - elaboration, salience, and consonance - are 
present, then a reasonable legislator would be likely to agree that 
the committee commentary is an explanation or amplification of 
the meaning of text being voted on by Congress. 
Conversely, a committee report's endorsement of a prior judi-
cial interpretation may be elliptically, as with a mere cita-
tion to the case, unelaborated in any way. The committee 
endorsement also may be presented in an obscure manner, as in an 
isolated footnote to the report, or with no subsequent reference at 
all during the floor debate in either chamber. Finally, the commit-
tee's expression of endorsement may be irrelevant to, or at odds 
with, the basic thrust of the textual changes being made by Con-
gress. To the extent that the elements of elaboration, salience, and 
consonance are all absent, it is highly unlikely that a reasonably 
thoughtful, attentive, and responsible member of Congress would 
embrace the committee endorsement as connected in any way with 
the bill she was voting on. 
It is worth emphasizing here that the focus of my proposed in-
quiry is not whether a majority of senators, or a designated "repre-
sentative member" of the Senate, did actually understand the 
committee approval to be an amplification or extension of the en-
acted text. Such a factual inquiry will rarely if ever yield a determi-
nate answer. No one polls the members about their support for -
or even their knowledge of - particular aspects of legislative his-
tory. We have no way of ascertaining who has read or been briefed 
on the report prior to floor consideration, or for that matter who 
was listening when members discussed the report on the floor. 
Rather, the inquiry I propose is whether a hypothetically "reason-
able" member of the Senate - a fictional construct to be sure -
would have reached such an understanding based on the available 
legislative history. 
Several concerns may be raised regarding this approach. An ob-
vious question is whether one can justify encouraging reviewing 
courts to apply such fictional constructs when all that can be known 
with certainty is what text members voted to support. But judges 
already regularly employ similar fictional constructs as aids to statu-
tory interpretation. Faced with text that is inconclusive in a particu-
lar controversy, judges look for alternative sources of 
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enlightenment as to the text's meaning.299 The principal alternative 
sources other than legislative history all depend on the notion of the 
"reasonable member." Thus judges already assume, either implic-
itly or explicitly, that the legislators who enacted the text should be 
thought of as having behaved in certain reasonable ways. 
For example, Justice Scalia has stated that he will attribute 
meaning to statutory text based on two factors. The first requires 
looking for "which meaning is ... most in accord with context and 
ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by 
the whole Congress which voted on the words of the statute."30o 
Implicit in this formulation is the idea that the "whole Congress" 
consists of legislators who should be regarded as reasonably 
thoughtful about the linguistic world around them - that is, legis-
lators who were "most likely to" have had in mind a meaning that is 
the closest to ordinary usage.301 Justice Scalia's second factor in-
volves looking for "which meaning is ... most compatible with the 
surrounding body of law into which the provision must be inte-
grated - a compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume 
Congress always has in mind. "302 Here, the explicit "benign fiction" 
is that Congress consists of legislators who are reasonably attentive 
to the landscape of statutes and judicial interpretations that exists 
when they are considering and adopting a new text.303 
Apart from ordinary usage and the surrounding legal structure, 
judges also rely on the canons of statutory construction as a source 
of meaning for inconclusive text.304 Once again, reliance is justified 
in part by the assumption that legislators should be thought of as 
reasonably attentive to and in agreement with the "background of 
299. See supra text accompanying notes 21-28. 
300. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
301. See also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 
11 HARv. J.L. & Pus. PoLY. 59, 65 (1988) (concluding that the court's role is to "look at the 
statutory structure and hear the words as they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objec-
tively reasonable user of words," implying that this is how the words should have sounded in 
the mind of a reasonable legislator). 
302. 490 U.S. at 528 (emphasis added). 
303. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 258 (1981) ("One 
important assumption underlying the Court's decisions [interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1983) is that 
members of the 42d Congress were familiar with common-law principles •.. and that they 
likely intended these common-law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the con-
trary."); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (finding an incon-
clusive bankruptcy code provision best understood by reference to the structure of the 
remaining provisions). See generally Costello, supra note 137, at 63-65; Nicholas S. Zeppos, 
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statu-
tory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1319-21 (1990). 
304. See generally Symposium: A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Interpretation, 
45 V AND. L. REv. 529 (1992). 
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customs and understandings of the way things are done."3os For 
example, one scholar suggests that the linguistic canon inclusio 
unius est exclusio alterius is useful precisely because legislation is 
change enacted against a backdrop of continuity.306 Accordingly, 
the argument continues, legislators should be viewed as reasonably 
aware both of the changes they are making and of their willingness 
to remain silent regarding areas they have left unchanged.307 Simi-
larly, the substantive canon that statutes should be interpreted to 
avoid constitutional problems rests in part on the assumption that 
legislators should be regarded as reasonably aware of the existence 
of potential constitutional conflicts, including judicial decisions 
identifying such conflicts, and reasonably responsible in not want-
ing to enact an unconstitutional law.3os 
In short, courts frequently invoke the benign fiction of "reason-
able legislators acting reasonably" to justify reliance on statutory 
structure and on extrinsic sources such as ordinary usage, common 
law background, or certain canons of construction. It is no less 
plausible to invoke the same benign fiction when evaluating the re-
liability of legislative history that treats prior judicial decisions.309 
If anything, the benign fiction of a legislator who is reasonably 
thoughtful, attentive, and responsible about legislative history may 
be even more legitimate and realistic. It may be more legitimate 
305. Shapiro, supra note 156, at 942. 
306. Id. at 927-28, 942. 
307. See id. at 928-29, 942-43. Shapiro offers other distinct justifications for relying on 
the canons favoring continuity. See, e.g., id. at 943-44 (discussing "process values" of predict-
ability and fair notice). But his argument that application of canons favoring continuity 
should be viewed as "the best reconstruction of what the drafters were trying and not trying 
to do," id. at 943, rests on the "benign fiction" that legislators are reasonably attentive to the 
legislative status quo. 
308. See Public Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989) ("[W]e 
are loath to conclude that Congress intended to press ahead into dangerous constitutional 
thickets in the absence of firm evidence that it courted those perils."); Edward J. DeBartolo 
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (stating 
that the canon "not only reflects the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be 
needlessly confronted, but also recognizes that Congress, like this Court, is bound by and 
swears an oath to uphold the Constitution"); see also Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. 
Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (stating that Congress should be understood to legislate 
with the expectation that the common law principle of preclusion will apply); Johnson v. 
Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 86 (1991) (stating that Congress is presumed to legislate with 
an understanding of prior judicial constructions of a statutory term). 
309. Other commentators have linked the reliability of legislative history to assumptions 
about the reasonableness of legislators in certain settings. See, e.g., Costello, supra note 137, 
at 68-69 (stating that when confronted with two equally plausible interpretations of ambigu-
ous statutory text, a court should consider how a reasonable legislator would have inter-
preted the language as explained in the committee report); Ferguson et al., supra note 27, at 
808 (arguing that legislators should be thought of as relying on report language authored by 
the expert tax staff to whom drafting responsibility was institutionally delegated). 
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because legislators considering the committee reports or floor state-
ments of their colleagues are considering an institutional product, 
one that flows directly from Congress's exercise of its authority to 
order its own proceedings under Article I.310 And it may be more 
realistic because many, if not most, legislators regularly do rely on 
committee report explanations to understand the meaning of the 
statutory scheme on which they are asked to vote.311 
A further question is whether adoption of my proposed ap-
proach would alter the behavior of Congress, by allowing or even 
encouraging more opportunistic insertions of legislative history ap-
proving or disapproving judicial decisions. I think not, for at least 
two reasons. As a practical matter, members would still devote pri-
mary attention to developing and negotiating text rather than legis-
lative history. Legislators can continue to serve their principal 
objectives - promoting public policy goals, securing status and re-
spect from colleagues, and advancing reelection prospects with con-
stituents312 - through the enactment of laws; the prospect of 
influencing judicial interpretation of those laws many years later 
will not produce major changes in legislators' motivations. 
More important, any changes produced should tend to discour-
age opportunistic conduct. If courts reyiewing congressional com-
mentary on judicial decisions credit only those approvals or 
disapprovals that are well reasoned, prominently featured, and con-
sistent with the larger statutory context, legislators and their staffs 
will have to address these considerations. Legislative history com-
mentary that satisfies these considerations also is more likely to be 
noticed and understood by a reasonable legislator from off the com-
mittee and therefore to be broadly supported or - if it is contro-
versial or manipulative - to be openly questioned or challenged by 
310. See supra text accompanying notes 182-89. By contrast, the notion that legislators 
consider the ordinary usage of words that appear in text, or refer to the judicially developed 
canons of construction, rests on an assumption that legislators behave like other reasonable 
· persons outside the legislative arena. This assumption may be plausible, but it is not as di-
rectly linked to specific legislative policymaking. 
311. See supra text accompanying notes 99-123. I do not mean to suggest that the benign 
fictions invoked in support of ordinary usage, statutory structure, or the canons are unjusti-
fied. One need not reject alternative sources of meaning in order to find a place for legisla-
tive history as a legitimate and practically useful source. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 156, at 956-
59 (arguing that reliance on a "guideline" or a "canon" must be combined with careful analy-
sis of legislative purpose). But see Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use the Dictionary, 68 AM. 
SPEECH 50, 51-56 (1993) (criticizing the Court's use of dictionaries from a linguistic perspec-
tive); Looking It Up, supra note 184, at 1444-52 (criticizing the Court's use of dictionaries as 
unprincipled and perhaps manipulative). · 
312. See supra note 79. 
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other legislators. In short, adoption of the proposed approach 
should improve the quality of this legislative history. 
Yet, however legitimate or realistic it may be from the perspec-
tive of the members, and even assuming arguendo it enhances the 
quality of commentary that is produced, one senator-turned-judge 
has criticized this benign fiction of the reasonable legislator as too 
elusive for judges to grasp.313 He has argued that judges should not 
be expected to understand the political environment in which legis-
lative history is produced, because judges, "confined to the printed 
page and occupying a world far removed from the pressure cooker 
life on Capitol Hill," cannot readily distinguish statements intended 
to enlighten or persuade colleagues from those motivated by the 
desire to address interest groups or other local constituencies, or 
even to manipulate courts.314 Indeed, the argument continues, any 
gains in congressional efficiency will be more than offset by the 
losses in judicial efficiency when courts and litigants must spend 
countless hours sifting through thousands of pages of legislative his-
tory to try and determine what a reasonable legislator might have 
understood or accepted.315 
This argument is not persuasive, in part for reasons discussed 
earlier. As to motivation of the actors, the drafters of legislative 
history are acting as agents to the committee or member that em-
ploys them. The fact that they are more open to interest group ex-
pression or pressure than judges does not make them less honest. 
There is no basis for concluding they will act in a devious or irre-
sponsible manner, and there is sound reason to believe the 
contrary.316 
Admittedly, there are challenges in the judicial task of distin-
guishing between legislative history that reflects a broad-based un-
derstanding and history that reflects a narrow or parochial 
perspective. But the task itself is not more intrinsically difficult 
than other challenging tasks of judicial interpretation, such as con-
313. See Stat. lnterp. Hrg., supra note 27, at 21-22 (statement of Judge James L. Buckley). 
This differs from, but is related to, the argument that legislative history is too inaccessible for 
litigants to be effectively charged with knowledge. Concerns about accessibility for litigants 
are addressed supra at note 239. 
314. See id. 
315. See generally Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(arguing that reliance on legislative history "condemns litigants ... to subsidizing historical 
research by lawyers"); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 {1987) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (criticizing "exhaustive analyses" of legislative history). 
316. See supra text accompanying notes 193-205. 
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struing the oral understandings surrounding a written contract317 or 
the legislative intent behind an allegedly unconstitutional redistrict-
ing scheme.318 Discerning motivation or attributing collective un-
derstanding, based on a record that documents oral as well as 
written statements, is a traditional judicial function that competent 
and fair-minded judges should be expected to perform.319 Finally, 
to the extent that judges must work hard to becbme familiar with 
the complexities and nuances of legislative history, it is entirely ap-
propriate that they do so for the reasons of legitimacy already men-
tioned. The three considerations set forth here are intended to 
facilitate that fudicial effort. 
C. Corollaries to the Three Considerations 
Before applying the "reasonable legislator" construct to com-
mittee commentary that endorses or rejects judicial interpretation 
of materially unaltered text, I want to address two corollary issues. 
These are issues that may affect how the key elements of that con-
struct are to be weighed. The first is whether to view committee 
endorsements or approvals of judicial interpretations in a different 
light from committee rejections or disapprovals. The other is 
whether to distinguish between committee commentary addressing 
text that is inconclusive due to lack of foresight and commentary 
addressing text that is inconclusive from lack of will.320 
1. Approvals and Disapprovals 
As a general matter, especially when Supreme Court interpreta-
tions are involved, committee commentary expressing approval 
ought to enjoy a presumption of support from a reasonable member 
of Congress. This is because committee approval simply involves 
endorsement of the status quo; Congress need not write new text in 
order to validate a Supreme Court result. Given the risks involved 
317. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570-72 (1960) 
(Brennan, J., concurring); Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers of 
Am., 310 F.2d 244, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1962). 
318. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993); see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 
55 (1980); Zeppos, supra note 303, at 1342-43. 
319. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 287 (1985) 
(responding to the criticism that judges will lack the imagination to reconstruct original legis-
lative intent by noting that when judges invoke any source of context, "the irresponsible 
judge will twist any approach to yield the outcomes that he desires, and the stupid judge will 
do the same thing unconsciously"). 
320. This distinction is explained supra at text accompanying notes 27-28. 
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in opening up a textual provision in order to modify its language,321 
committee leaders or bill managers may be disinclined to initiate 
such changes even as part of a related reenactment or reauthoriza-
tion. Indeed, the primary practical reason for Congress to change 
text in this setting, as opposed to merely expressing approval in re-
port language, is to prevent the Court from reversing itself later. 
Such reversals are not likely, both because the Supreme Court 
rarely concludes that it has erred322 and because even if it reaches 
such a conclusion, the doctrine of stare decisis is likely to keep the 
Court constant.323 
Although committee approval is presumptively reliable, the pre-
sumption is not irrebuttable. Thus, for example, if committee ap-
proval is expressed in a cursory, obscure, or isolated manner and is 
irrelevant to or inconsistent with the thrust of the statiitory changes 
that are being made, then the approval may well not deserve the 
endorsement of a reviewing court.324 
Moreover, the presumption accompanying approval is less 
weighty when committee approval of lower court decisions is in-
volved. This reduced weight is due in part to the greater likelihood 
of reversal. Courts of appeal may modify or overturn district court 
decisions, appellate court doctrines may be revisited because of 
conflict with other circuits, and the Supreme Court may alter or 
supersede textual interpretations from any lower court. In light of 
the greater possibility of reversal, reasonable legislators who agree 
with a lower court holding should be more inclined to try and codify 
that holding. Any failure to do so is less clearly consistent with a 
firm desire to embrace the lower court's position. 
The presumption accompanying approval of lower court deci-
sions also is weaker because reasonable legislators are less likely to 
be aware of lower court cases. Unlike Supreme Court decisions, 
321. See supra text accompanying notes 113-23 (discussing the risk that textual modifica-
tions on subsidiary matters will delay or dilute the overall legislative package). 
322. Once the Court decides a statutory question, there may be no occasion to revisit the 
matter because lower court implementation fails to raise any "cert-worthy" disagreements. 
The Court may decide sua sponte to re-raise the correctness of its earlier holding, see, e.g., 
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491U.S.164, 171 (1989) (inviting the parties to address 
the question of whether its prior interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 should be overturned), 
but this is exceedingly rare. 
323. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172-75; California v. 
FERC; 495 U.S. 490 (1990). But cf. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 
(1978) (overruling an earlier decision on grounds of clear initial misapprehension plus effects 
of subsequently decided Supreme Court cases and a subsequently enacted related statute). 
See also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (limiting the scope of stare decisis 
doctrine to exclude cases in which precedents are "unworkable or are badly reasoned"). 
324. See infra text accompanying notes 354-69. 
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which are fewer in number and receive extensive media coverage, 
most decisions by lower courts are not noticed even by committee 
leaders and their staff, much less by members outside the commit-
tees of jurisdiction.325 Accordingly, there is a greater chance that 
approval inserted into a committee report may result from aware-
ness by only a small number of staffers - perhaps the product of 
an exchange with one interested group or agency official.326 Under 
these circumstances, the possibility of insincere or manipulative use 
of legislative history supports a more rigorous application of the 
three factors described above. 
Not surprisingly, committee report disapproval of Supreme 
Court interpretations is presumptively unreliable for much the 
same reasons that justify reliance on committee approval. In order 
to invalidate a Supreme Court result, Congress must pass a law 
overriding that result. The failure to take such specific action car-
ries particular weight here, both because Congress has focused on 
the statute in question by modifying or reenacting related textual 
provisions and because the committee responsible for initiating the 
textual changes has focused on the judicial construction of the dis-
tinct provision that is being left unchanged. It therefore seems en-
tirely appropriate to infer that Congress as a whole was unwilling to 
translate committee commentary into text and that a reasonable 
member of Congress would not endorse the disapproval expressed 
by the committee. 
Once again, however, the presumption should not be viewed as 
irrebuttable. When Congress reenacts or modifies a particular stat-
utory scheme,327 the "distinct provision that is being left un-
changed" may not be so distinct from the textual changes that 
Congress is actually making. Thus, for example, Congress may 
override a Supreme Court result by making specific textual 
changes, while at the same time failing to change other textual pro-
visions also addressed or implicated by the Court's opinion. Com-
mittee commentary accompanying the override text may voice 
disapproval for these additional aspects of the Court's opinion, but 
the disapproving commentary may lack a precise textual 
analogue.328 
325. See Katzmann, supra note 217, at 662. 
326. See id. (finding that staffers tend to be aware of lower court decisions because the 
losing party or an interest group or trade association brings it to their attention while seeking 
a legislative "fix"). 
327. See supra note 294 (defining statutory scheme). 
328. See, for example, the statutes and Supreme Court decisions cited supra at note 11. 
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Admittedly, Congress could go further and incorporate its com-
mittee critique into text through additional statutory modifications. 
But the presence of an override provision means that Congress has 
rejected the Court's basic approach, and Congress's failure to do 
more should be analyzed from that perspective. In particular, the 
absence of additional changes raises a different and more familiar 
set of concerns than the failure to codify disapproval at all. The 
sponsors of the override text may have neglected to codify commit-
tee commentary that the override Congress would have whole-
heartedly supported. Or· these sponsors may have concluded that 
the commentary expressed views that, while widely shared, were 
not readily adaptable to text. Alternatively, the override Congress 
may have viewed additional codification as unnecessary because 
Congress had done all that was required to restore the status quo 
ante. Finally, Congress may be thought of as having concluded that 
the disapproval expressed in committee commentary was collateral 
or subsidiary to the override text. Thus, even if the commentary 
was not especially controversial and would have been broadly en-
dorsed, the majority might have omitted it from the text to mini-
mize procedural or tactical obstacles that could delay enactment.329 
Under these circumstances, the presumption accompanying dis-
approval of Supreme Court decisions survives, but with less weight 
attached. Further analysis of the committee commentary is war-
ranted to reveal which, if any, of the alternative explanations most 
plausibly accounts for the commentary's absence from text. To de-
termine whether a reasonable legislator would understand the com-
mittee commentary to be an amplification of the text she was voting 
on, courts should pay close attention to the three considerations set 
forth above. 
Commentary disapproving lower court decisions may be ana-
lyzed in similar terms when it accompanies a textual change over-
riding the lower court result. Moreover, the presumption of 
unreliability may be further weakened in the lower court context 
because of the sheer volume and rapidly evolving status of these 
decisions.33° Congress would be overwhelmed if it attempted to 
codify each committee-based disagreement with a lower court rul-
ing, or even each committee-based judgment taking sides on an is-
329. See supra text accompanying notes 251 and 268. See generally infra text accompany-
ing notes 384-412 (analyzing committee expressions of disapproval in two particular override 
settings). See also Aleinikoff & Shaw, supra note 4, at 692-96 (analyzing the tension between 
plain meaning and legislative purpose in a third override setting that included committee 
disapproval). 
330. See supra note 16. 
86 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 93:1 
sue of tension or conflict among the lower courts. Indeed, a judicial 
rule requiring such codification would lead to courts' viewing the 
failure to codify a committee-based criticism as tantamount to con-
gressional acquiescence if not approval. Such a rule might well 
have the unfortunate effect of chilling congressional inquiry into 
and understanding of lower court decisions, out of fear that expres-
sions of awareness would almost always be cited as signifying ac-
ceptance of the result. 
This does not mean, of course, that Congress's failure to codify 
its committee-based disapproval of a lower court decision is without 
significance. But in some instances, it will be plausible to ask 
whether a critical committee commentary - for example, taking 
sides in a lower court conflict - accompanying a reenactment of 
related text that does not override the criticized decision should be 
accorded weight based on the three considerations we have identi-
fied. At the same time, the potential for lack of member or staff 
awareness331 counsels against overcoming the presumption too 
readily. 
2. Lack of Foresight and Lack of Will 
Often, statutory text on its face does not resolve a particular 
issue, but legislative history commenting on earlier judicial inter-
pretation of that text suggests a solution. The fact that parties are 
now litigating the issue indicates that in some meaningful sense it 
has become "controversial." In deciding whether to rely on the leg-
islative history, courts should distinguish between situations when 
legislators display some awareness of the potential for controversy 
and situations when they fail to do so. 
As discussed earlier, Congress regularly does not anticipate or 
foresee the full range of instances to which a statute might apply.332 
Committee reports may include guidance amplifying the meaning 
of the text in certain specific settings.333 Often, this guidance will 
address matters npt perceived as controversial at the time. The dis-
cussion appears in history rather than text because it is too com-
monplace to warrant inclusion in text, or because including it would 
suggest that failure to include other equally subsidiary observations 
has diminished their reliability, or even because capturing the dis-
cussion in text would be unduly cumbersome from the standpoint of 
331. See supra text accompanying note 325. 
332. See supra text accompanying notes 27, 109-12. 
333. For the same reasons discussed supra at text accompanying notes 109·12, this gui· 
dance likewise is not meant to be exhaustive or all-inclusive. 
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drafting technique. Each of these rationales may apply to the par-
ticular type of committee report guidance that is our focus here: 
commentary endorsing or rejecting the hoJding or reasoning of an 
intervening judicial interpretation. As long as a reasonable mem-
ber of Congress would have noticed, understood, _and accepted the 
committee commentary, there is no reason to be especially suspi-
cious about possible manipulative or insincere creation of such 
commentary. 
There is greater cause for concern, however, when the legisla-
tive history addresses a politically contentious matter. Once again, 
the relevant committee actors have anticipated that the new text 
would apply to a specific situation, although Congress has left the 
text inconclusive as to that situation. But the presence of contro-
versy is flagged by a committee report or floor debate that reflects 
conflicting views as to how the text is to apply. Under these circum-
stances, courts may be misled by legislative actors in the majority 
seeking a resolution of the controversy through legislative 
history.334 
At the same time, courts also may be misled by legislative actors 
who are in a small minority but who seek to create the appearance 
of serious controversy about a matter Congress did not include in 
text. If courts will disregard specific committee commentary when-
ever that commentary is challenged through dissenting or minority 
views in the report, or through opposing remarks on the floor, dis-
gruntled "losing" members will have an unhealthy incentive to neu-
tralize legislative history that fairly and faithfully reflects what the 
majority would have endorsed. 
The problem of distinguishing "truly" contentious from "rhetor-
ically" contentious legislative history may be addressed by re-
turning to the distinction between procedural and substantive 
reasons for not resolving an issue in text.335 Assume first that a 
handful of members opposes both a bill and the majority commen-
tary on a "controversial matter" as expressed in the committee re-
port accompanying the bill. Although the minority lacks the 
numerical strength to prevent passage, it still can cause delays by 
forcing debate and votes on amendments to "clarify" inconclusive 
text.336 The committee managers of the bill may decide to forgo 
offering such clarifying amendments, even though the majority 
334. See Popkin, supra note 4, at 315; see also Jorgensen & Shepsle, supra note 214, at 46 
(distinguishing between intended and unintended gaps in statutory text). 
335. This distinction is first discussed supra at note 28. 
336. See supra text accompanying notes 113-16. 
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would ultimately prevail on them. Perhaps they believe the situa-
tion that prompted the bill demands more urgent action, or perhaps 
they have other matters they wish to raise in committee before the 
Congress adjourns, or perhaps the congressional leadership does 
not want debate on the bill to tie up the floor.337 Under these cir-
cumstances, the procedural difficulties of effecting a change in text 
result in a politically contentious matter being addressed in legisla-
tive history. So long as the bill's supporters also support the com-
mentary in this controversy, there is little reason to discount the 
committee commentary.338 Indeed, because the debate is openly 
joined and the disagreement parallels disagreement over support 
for the bill itself, it is more likely that considerations of salience and 
consonance339 have been satisfied. 
On the other hand, there are doubtless occasions when other 
members who support the bill question the majority views ex-
pressed by the committee managers on a particular matter. The 
managers might well be able to add a clarifying amendment in com-
mittee, but this amendment might fail to hold the requisite majority 
or supermajority support on the floor. Removal of the amendment 
after it has been added may create an adverse inference as to the 
meaning of the once-again ambiguous text. Moreover, the propo-
nents' failure to prevail on a controversial matter may undermine 
the confidence or commitment of other supporters. Under these 
circumstances, the managers may decide that given the substantive 
difficulties of effecting a change ·in text, they will continue to ad-
dress the matter only through legislative history. Here, however, 
the contentiousness involves supporters as well as opponents. This 
broader scope of controversy will be demonstrated through concur-
ring or supplemental report views filed by supporters on the com-
mittee and through floor statements made by supporters off the 
committee. The existence of such differences among supporters 
makes it less likely that a reasonable member aware of the differ-
337. See supra text accompanying notes 113-16. 
338. The Supreme Court has often observed that statements of opponents are entitled to 
little weight as a substantive matter in construing a statute. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 204 n.24 (1975); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1313 n.13 
(1973); Mastro Plastics v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288 (1956). Under the proposed approach, 
however, such statements may enhance the reliability of supporters' statements, for reasons 
explained in text. Such enhancement may be less justified when the bill's opponents are a 
substantial minority - for example, a minority potentially numerous enough to filibuster 
clarifying amendments. 
339. See supra text accompanying note 298. 
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ences would understand the conflicting history as reliably explain-
ing the text.340 
D. Specific Applications of the Considerations and Corollaries 
Some caveats are in order before the various considerations and 
corollaries discussed above are applied to this article's paradigmatic 
legislative history.341 Given the variety and complexity of factual 
situations portrayed in even this designated type of history, the ex-
amples chosen here cannot be defended in empirical terms as "typi-
cal" or "representative." At the same time, given its focus on 
legislative history to the exclusion of other contextual sources like 
the canons, ordinary usage, or the surrounding body of law, the dis-
cussion that follows may appear to oversimplify the difficult task of 
statutory interpretation. 
Accordingly, it is important to be clear about the limited objec-
tives of this section. I have chosen certain examples in an effort to 
demonstrate that the proposed approach can be a workable instru-
ment in the hands of a reviewing court. I begin by contrasting two 
instances of committee commentary approving Supreme Court in-
terpretations. The contrast serves to illustrate how the three con-
siderations may be used to identify relevant differences in the 
reliability of committee approvals. I then consider several instances 
of committee reports disapproving Supreme Court interpretations. 
One such instance is the age discrimination example set forth in 
Part I. I also examine two other instances of committee disapproval 
to put the ADEA case in perspective. Finally, although this ap-
proach may assist a reviewing court in assessing certain types of 
legislative history, it is hardly a panacea. It need not be the only 
method of evaluating legislative history, and it should not be the 
only aid to reviewing and understanding inconclusive text. 
340. Inevitably, there will be some difficulty in line drawing between the truly conten-
tious and the rhetorically contentious - for example, when one or two supporters align 
themselves with the opposition on a particular matter, or when an opponent characterizes a 
supporter as "on my side on this issue." Moreover, the distinction presupposes that disagree-
ment among supporters will become evident on the legislative record, and this may not al-
ways be true - for example, a lukewarm supporter may not care enough to express 
disagreement on some relatively minor issue. Still, the distinction drawn here is important in 
principle and is sufficiently workable to allow for meaningful refinements beyond an "all-or-
nothing" approach to committee commentary that is politically controversial. 
341. For an explanation of why I have chosen this particular type of legislative history, 
see supra note 298. 
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1. Approvals: Comparing Reports from Two Statutes 
a. 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act. In 1972 Congress 
passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act,342 creating en-
forcement authority for the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) and otherwise broadening protections available 
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.343 While the bill was 
being considered in committee in 1971, the Supreme Court decided 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 344 its first case interpreting Title VII. 
The Court in Griggs held that practices or procedures that were 
neutral on their face violated Title VII if they had a discriminatory 
impact on minorities and could not be justified as a matter of busi-
ness necessity.345 
Both the House and Senate committee reports accompanying 
the 1972 Act discussed at some length and expressly approved the 
holding and reasoning of Griggs.346 The reports emphasized that 
testing programs should be reexamined to ensure compliance with 
Griggs by public and private employers.347 In addition, each report 
cited Griggs to support its basic conclusion that because employ-
ment discrimination was more complex and pervasive than had 
been previously believed - characterizep "in terms of 'systems' 
and 'effects' rather than simply intentional wrongs"34B - the 
EEOC needed broad and meaningful enforcement powers. Griggs 
also was discussed with approval by the bill's manager during de-
bate on the House fioor349 and by several Senators, including the 
342. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 {1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
5 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
343. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 {1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-h 
{1988)). 
344. 401 U.S. 424 {1971). 
345. 401 U.S. at 431 {"The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices 
that arc fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity, If 
an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to 
job performance, the practice is prohibited."). The Court's reasoning has been applied to 
facially neutral practices such as education requirements, employment tests, and minimum 
height or weight requirements, which have a disparate impact on females. The Court's "dis-
parate impact" doctrine had no precise textual analogue: the statute on its face prohibited 
discriminatory treatment. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 253, 255 (1964) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2{a)(1) (1988)). 
346. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 20-22-(1971), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2144, 2155-57; S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 & n.1, 14-15 {1971). 
347. See H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 346, at 20-22, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
2156-57; S. REP. No. 415, supra note 346, at 14-15. 
348. H.R. REP. No. 238, supra note 346, at 8-9, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2144· 
45; S. REP. No. 415, supra note 346, at 5. 
349. See 117 CONG. REc. 31,961 {1971) (statement of Rep. Perkins). 
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bill's manager during Senate floor debate.350 The bill as enacted 
contained no change in the material text of Title VII.351 But the 
endorsement of Griggs was regarded as authoritative for nearly two 
decades352 before being reaffirmed in text in the last two years. 353 
b. 1975 Securities Act Amendments. In 1975 Congress enacted 
the Securities Act Amendments,354 making substantial revisions to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.355 The amendments con-
tained certain provisions expanding the scope of the self-regulatory 
responsibilities of national securities exchanges and registered se-
350. See 118 CONG. REc. 3371 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams); id. at 944 (statement 
of Sen. Spong) (quoting from committee report); id. at 4937-38 (statement of Sen. Cranston) 
(quoting from committee report). 
351. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(h), 78 Stat. 253, 257 (1964), (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(h) (1988)) (protecting employment decisions based on professionally developed 
ability tests). The Senate committee version did not propose any change in the language of 
§ 703(h). The House committee version included language modifying § 703(h) to codify the 
Griggs holding. See H. REP. No. 238, supra note 346, at 37, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
2165 (noting that the bill as reported "changes the testing provisions to stipulate that such 
tests must be directly related to the determination of bona fide occupational qualifications 
reasonably necessary to perform the normal duties of the particular position concerned"); id. 
at 22, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2157 (asserting that this new provision was "fully in 
accord with the decision of the Court [in Griggs]"). 
This committee language fell out of the House bill during an unrelated battle over EEOC 
powers on the House floor. Representative Erlenbom proposed a substitute on behalf of the 
Nixon administration. The focus of disagreement between the administration and House 
Democrats was on the nature of the EEOC's new enforcement mechanism. The House 
Democrats had proposed giving the EEOC the authority to issue cease and desist orders, 
modeled on the NLRB, whereas the Nixon administration wanted the EEOC to go to district 
court to enforce discrimination complaints. The administration prevailed on the Erlenbom 
Substitute. See 117 CONG. REc. 31,958 (1971) (statement of Rep. Bolling); id. at 31,979-81 
(statement of Rep. Erlenbom); id. at 32,111 (vote on substitute); see also 118 CoNG. REc. 
7567 (1972) (statement of Rep. Erlenbom) (discussing conference report). No one on either 
side of the fight over EEOC enforcement powers appears to have criticized or questioned the 
committee report commentary on Griggs. See generally L. Camille Hebert, Redefining the 
Burdens of Proof in Title VII Litigation: Will the Disparate Impact Theory Survive Wards 
Cove and the Civil Rights Act of 1990?, 32 B.C. L. REv. 1, 42-45 (1990). 
352. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 n.8 (1982) (quoting 1972 committee 
report language as "demonstrat[ing] that Congress recognized and endorsed the disparate-
impact analysis employed by the Court in Griggs"); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 
747, 765 n.21 (1976) (quoting with approval 1972 committee report language on" 'systems' 
and 'effects' " concept of discrimination). See generally Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of 
Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judgments, 63 CH1.-KENT L. REv. 1, 11n.53,14-17 
(1987) (noting the courts' extensive reliance on Griggs as endorsed by Congress). 
353. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, .1074-75 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (1988)) (adding new§ 703(k)). Of course, there is a separate 
and more complex question as to the precise scope and meaning of Griggs, which was hotly 
debated during deliberations over the 1991 Act. But disagreements over the exact scope of 
Griggs and cases that followed should not obscure the point that Congress in 1972 endorsed 
the Court's creation of a cause of action for disparate impact under Title VII, as well as a 
basic evidentiary approach to litigating that cause of action. 
354. Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a 
through 80b-17 (1988)). 
355. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-
78kk (1988)). 
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curities associations - known as self-regulatory organizations, or 
SROs - and strengthening the oversight role of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) with respect to these SROs.356 In ap-
proving one provision affecting arbitration proceedings between 
SROs and their members or participants, the House and Senate 
conferees stated their understanding that the amendment did not 
change the existing law as set forth in Wilko v. Swan. 351 The Court 
in Wilko had invalidated an agreement to arbitrate certain future 
controversies arising under provisions of the 1933 Securities Act,358 
concluding that compulsory recourse to the "suspect" arbitral fo-
rum was incompatible with Congress's desire to protect the rights of 
buyers of securities.359 
Twelve years after the conference report's endorsement of 
Wilko, the Court in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMa-
hon360 held that an agreement to arbitrate certain future disputes 
arising under similar provisions of the 1934 Act was valid. The Mc-
Mahon Court declined to apply Wilko's holding to the 1934 Act, 
although many lower courts previously had done so.361 The Court 
reasoned in part that Wilko's suspicion of arbitrators and arbitral 
tribunals as inadequate to protect investors' rights was difficult to 
reconcile with the 1975 amendments giving the SEC new oversight 
power to ensure full and fair arbitral proceedings.362 The McMa-
hon Court also noted the 1975 conference report language referring 
to Wilko, but rejected the argument that this language signified 
356. Pub. L. No. 94-29, §§ 3, 16, 18, 89 Stat. 97, 100, 146-50, 156-58 (1975) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(26), 78s(a-c), 78w(b-c) (1988)) (amending 1934 Act, §§ 3(a)(26), 19(a-c), 
23(b-c)); see also S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 22-23, 28-29 (1975). 
357. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The conference report explanatory statement reads in relevant 
part as follows: 
11. Arbitration Proceedings. 
The Senate bill amended section 28 of the (1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb] ..•. The 
House amendment contained no comparable provision. The House receded to the Sen-
ate. It was the clear understanding of the conferees that this amendment did not change 
existing law, as articulated in Wtlko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), concerning the effect of 
arbitration proceeding provisions in agreements entered into by persons dealing with 
members and participants of self-regulatory organizations. 
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1975) (emphasis added). For the 
amended text of§ 28, see Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 21, 89 Stat. 97, 160-61 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78bb(b-c) (1988)). The amended text addresses disputes among securities industry profes-
sionals, not disputes between SROs and investors. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 235-36 (1987); 482 U.S. at 246 n.4 {Blackmun, J., dissenting in part). 
358. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa {1988)). 
359. 346 U.S. at 434-37. 
360. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). 
361. 482 U.S. at 227-38; see also 482 U.S. at 247-48 & n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in 
part) (citing lower court decisions that extended Wilko to Exchange Act claims). 
362. 482 U.S. at 233-34. 
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congressional approval for extending Wilko to claims under the 
1934 Act.363 
c. Relevant Distinctions. Applying our three considerations, 
there are important distinctions between the committee report ap-
proval of Griggs and the committee report approval of Wilko. First, 
the committees expressed their approval of Griggs in terms that are 
elaborate and would be understandable to a reasonably thoughtful 
member. The House and Senate committee reports explain the 
Griggs test and the Court's underlying analysis in some detail. 
They also apply that test to encourage specific responses from em-
ployers. By contrast, the approval of Wilko cites the case with no 
meaningful elaboration. Indeed, the conference report's reference 
to not disturbing "existing law ... concerning the effect of arbitra-
tion proceeding provisions"364 omits any discussion of what the 
conferees understood this "existing law" to be.362, 
Second, the references to Griggs are frequent and prominent 
enough to be noticed by a reasonably attentive member. In addi-
tion to the extensive discussion in both committee reports, the bill 
managers as well as other legislators describe and approve Griggs in 
the course of floor debate. Again by contrast, Wilko is mentioned 
only in the one instance; no member refers to it even indirectly dur-
ing floor debate on the conference report.366 
Finally, the approval of Griggs comports with the overall thrust 
of the 1972 amendments to Title VII and thus would have been 
accepted by a reasonably responsible legislator. Congress in 1972 
recognized that employment discrimination was more than simply 
the product of certain identifiable "bad actors." Its decision to ex-
pand coverage and enforcement authority reflects an emerging 
awareness of the deeper and more systemic nature of such discrimi-
nation. Approval of the Griggs decision plainly is consonant with 
that broader perspective. 
363. 482 U.S. at 235-38. In dissent, Justice Blackmun relied in part on the conference 
report language. 482 U.S. at 246-47. 1\vo years later, in a case involving arbitration agree-
ments under the 1933 Act, the Court overruled Wilko, holding that it was no longer consis-
tent with the Court's endorsement of federal statutory policies favoring arbitral resolution of 
disputes. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
364. For the full text, see supra note 357. 
365. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 237-38 (identifying three plausible understandings that 
conferees may have had in mind, only one of which supported extending Wilko to Exchange 
Act claims). 
366. See 121 CoNo. Rec. 15,370-72 (1975) (Senate debate on conference report); id. at 
15,848-50 (House debate on conference report); see also id. at 101711-37 (debate on Senate 
bill); id. at 11,740-68 (debate on House bill). 
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On the other hand, the 1975 Securities Act Amendments had 
more diverse objectives. In an effort to foster a more efficient se-
curities market system, Congress directed new government inter-
vention in some areas while deemphasizing regulation in others.367 
Of particular relevance here, the provisions dealing with SROs may 
point away from ready access to a judicial forum. They strengthen 
self-regulation in the securities industry while giving the SEC, as 
opposed to the courts, general authority to ensure that SRO arbi-
tration procedures are adequate and fully comport with the objec-
tives of the Act.368 This is an authority the SEC did not possess in 
1953 when Wilko was decided. Accordingly, there is at least some 
tension between the relevant objectives of the 1975 amendments 
and the approval of a Wilko decision that evinced a profound mis-
trust for arbitration. 
In sum, the three considerations strongly suggest that committee 
report endorsement of Griggs should be credited as reliable by a 
reviewing court, while report approval of Wilko should not.369 
2. Disapprovals: Three Distinct Settings 
a. The 1989 Budget Reconciliation Act: Suspicious Insertion. 
Congress in 1989 enacted an Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
367. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 75, supra note 356, at 2 (outlining the bill's objectives of "vest-
ing in the SEC power to eliminate all unnecessary or inappropriate burdens on competition 
while at the same time granting to that agency complete and effective powers to pursue the 
goal [of] centralized trading of securities in the interest of both efficiency and investor protec-
tion"); 121 CoNG. REc. 11,741 (1975) (statement of Rep. Mccollister) (stating that the bill 
aimed to "create a regulatory framework which permits the evolution of the marketplace free 
from unnecessary and artificial restraints on competition while at the same time focusing 
adequate authority in the Securities and Exchange Commission"); see also id. at 10,731 
(statement of Sen. Williams); id. at 11,740-41 (statement of Rep. Staggers). 
368. See Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 16, 89 Stat. 148 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b)(2), 
78s(c) (1988)) (amending 1934 Act§§ 19(b)(2), 19(c)). 
369. There are other grounds on which one might justify extending Wilko's holding to 
claims brought under the 1934 Act: (i) assuming that Congress as a matter of law has fore-
closed waiver of access to a judicial forum under the 1933 Act, and given that the waiver 
provision of the 1934 Act is identical in all material respects to the language of the 1933 Act, 
any subsequent change in the adequacy or inadequacy of arbitration as an alternate forum is 
simply irrelevant; (ii) even if Wilko held only that arbitration was inadequate to protect pri-
vate investors' rights under the 1933 Act, the same reasoning applies to protect investors 
against professionals under the 1934 Act, regardless of intervening judicial rulings addressing 
disputes between more equally situated commercial parties; (iii) considerations of stare deci-
sis - based on 32 years of appellate court decisions extending Wilko to the 1934 Act -
suggest that any mistake in this extension is best remedied by Congress. See generally Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 249-61 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing in part); 482 U.S. at 268-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); Note, Arbitrability of Claims 
Arising Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1986 DuKE LJ. 548, 555-60. But under 
the analysis of this article, none of these arguments should be allowed to rely on the 1975 
conference report language for support. 
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Act.370 Included in the legislation was a proVisiori' authorizing the 
Secretary of Labor to bring suit under a new Civil penalty section of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) that ad-
dressed failures to comply with applicable health insurance continu-
ation requirements.371 The provision, which was projected to raise 
revenues for the federal government, was accompanied by language 
in the House Budget Committee Report. This language explained 
how the Secretary could bring such lawsuits against employers, plan 
administrators, insurance companies, or health maintenance 
organizations.372 
The House committee report then went on to express concern 
over both the growing practice of insurance companies' denying 
medical claims in bad faith and the absence of suitably severe reme-
dies for such denials.373 The report cited the recent Supreme Court 
decision in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux374 as contributing to 
this unfair situation. In Pilot Life, the Court had interpreted 
ERISA as preempting a state common law remedy for bad faith 
denial of medical claims.375 The committee report, while not disap-
proving Pilot Life's decision preempting remedies at state common 
law, was highly critical of the Court's conclusion that remedies 
under federal common law were limited to those enumerated under 
section 502 of ERISA.376 The report urged that "in light of the leg-
islative history on this issue" the federal courts should develop an 
370. Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989). In reconciliation legislation, Congress 
acts to "reconcile" budgeted spending levels with actual amounts being expended by raising 
additional revenues or reducing expenditures in particular programs. 
371. Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 2101, 103 Stat. 2106, 2123 (1989) (codified at 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1132(a)(6), 1132(1) (Supp. V 1993)) (amending ERISA, §§ 502(a)(6), 502(1)). The provi-
sion authorized the Secretary to assess a civil penalty of 20% of t_he applicable recovery 
amount for cases involving breach of fiduciary responsibility. 
372. H.R. REP. No. 247, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1906, 1947-48. This report language was submitted by the Committee on Education and La-
bor, pursuant to normal Reconciliation procedure. 
373. Id. 
374. 481 U.S. 41 (1987). 
375. See 481 U.S. at 47-57. 
376. H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 372, at 56, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1948-49 
(characterizing Pilot Life as declining to fashion a federal common law remedy that goes 
beyond § 502 and adding that "[t]he Committee disagrees with this latter conclusion"). The 
report further notes: 
The Committee believes that the legislative history of ERISA and subsequent expan-
sions of ERISA support the view that Congress intended for the courts to develop a 
Federal common law with respect to employee benefit plans, including the development 
of appropriate remedies, even if they are not specifically enumerated in section 502 of 
ERISA. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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expansive federal common law of remedies, specifically including 
punitive and compensatory damages.377 
This disapproval of Pilot Life should not be deemed reliable. To 
begin with, Congress took no action to override any aspect of Pilot 
Life or even to address the decision at all, and the committee re-
port's criticism in the absence of such action is of doubtful prov-
enance. Moreover, the particular expression of disapproval here 
satisfies at most one of our three considerations. The report lan-
guage is elaborated and expressed in reasoned terms, so that the 
critique of Pilot Life would presumably be understood by a 
thoughtful legislator. Still, the report does not credibly explain why 
the committee has left unaltered statutory language that has been 
definitively interpreted by the Court in a way the committee finds 
objectionable.378 This failure to address contrary prevailing law in 
any way in text would be very troubling to a reasonably thoughtful 
member, suggesting a possible lack of resolve on the committee's 
part.379 
In addition, the report's analysis occurs in a single paragraph of 
a committee report that runs over 1500 pages and includes unedited 
contributions from ten different House committees. 3so There was 
no Senate committee report at all, and neither the conference com-
mittee report nor the floor debates include any reference to Pilot 
Life.381 Accordingly, there is considerable reason to doubt whether 
the analysis would have been noticed by a reasonably attentive 
legislator. 
Finally, the analysis urging policy changes in substantive law to 
expand individual remedies is contained in a committee report ac-
companying legislation designed to balance revenues and expendi-
tures for the federal government. The Pilot Life discussion is at 
377. Id. 
378. The report's assertion that "the Committee [on Education and Labor] believes such 
action is unnecessary," id., seems self-serving and less than credible, especially because the 
report acknowledges that this very committee in the past had considered amending the stat-
ute to add certain remedies not enumerated under § 502 yet had not done so. Id. 
379. For a discussion of why disapproval is presumptively unreliable, see supra text in 
paragraph following note 326. 
380. See H.R. REP. No. 247, supra note 372, reprinted in part in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
1906. The ten committees listed in the table of contents made report contributions ranging 
from less than five pages (five of the committees) to over 500 pages (Ways & Means Commit-
tee) and totaling 1555 pages. The report language from Education and Labor runs 87 pages. 
Each committee submits its own report language to Ways & Means; all language is then 
"bundled" for insertion in the Omnibus Bill Report. 
381. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 386, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. § 2101 (1989), reprinted in 135 
CoNG. REc. 30,828-29 (1989); id. at 30,948-49 (Joint Explanatory Statement); id. at 31,097-
128 (House debate); id. at 31,403-31 (Senate debate). 
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best anomalous in light of the revenue-specific purpose of the pro-
vision itself.382 Indeed, substantive legal analysis inserted as an iso-
lated feature of an omnibus budget reconciliation report should be 
viewed as suspicious in general, based on both the salience and con-
sonance factors.383 In this case, the analysis also seeks to reject 
Supreme Court precedent without changing relevant text at all. 
Under all these circumstances, the disapproval of Pilot Life is best 
viewed as untrustworthy history drafted for strategic purposes by a 
diligent staff assistant or interest group. 
b. The 1978 ADEA Amendments and Subterfuge: Lack of 
Foresight Without Political Contentiousness. As discussed at length 
in Part I,384 Congress in 1978 enacted amendments to the ADEA. 
These amendments extended the upper age limit for the protected 
class from sixty-five to seventy for all but federal employees, abol-
ished mandatory retirement altogether for federal employees, con-
firmed the right to a jury trial, and prohibited employee benefit 
plans from requiring or permitting mvoluntary retirement before 
age seventy.385 The last provision, which was mea,nt to resolve a 
split in the courts of appeal, had already been approved by both 
houses when the Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion in 
McMann. 
After McMann, the House and Senate conferees retained the 
bill language that now constituted an override of the Supreme 
Court decision.386 As noted earlier, the conferees also added an 
explanatory statement to the conference report expressly rejecting 
the Court's reasoning on the subterfuge issue.387 In debating the 
report on the House floor, the bill manager and other members spe-
cifically endorsed the conferees' conclusion that an employee bene-
fit plan that discriminates on the basis of age is not protected by 
virtue of its being in place prior to enactment of the ADEA.388 The 
ranking minority member in the Senate, who had been the principal 
382. One could perhaps argue that by expanding individual remedies to include punitive 
damages, the federal government could reap more revenues by collecting penalties totaling 
20% of a far greater "applicable recovery amount." See supra note 371. But no such argu-
ment is ever raised in the report's analysis. 
383. Cf. Strauss, supra note 112, at 343 (legislative history accompanying omnibus recon-
ciliation measures "may reflect little more than the tactics o.f exploitation and exasperation"). 
384. See generally supra text accompanying notes 29-67. 
385. See supra text accompanying notes 39-45. 
386. See supra text accompanying note 46. 
387. See supra text accompanying note 47. · 
388. See 124 CoNG. REc. 7881 (1978) (statement of Rep. Hawkins); id. at 7888 (statement 
of Rep. Waxman); see also id. at 7886 (statement of Rep. Pepper); id. at 7887 (statement of 
Rep. Weiss). 
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author of the ADEA, also spoke on the floor condemning the rea-
soning as well as the holding of McMann. 389 Yet eleven years later, 
the Court in Betts declined to follow this legislative history.390 
Our three considerations strongly suggest that the disapproval 
of McMann on the subterfuge issue is reliable and should be 
credited. First, the disapproval is expressed in elaborated and un-
derstandable terms. The conference report declares that plan pro-
visions are not to be judged by whether they antedate the ADEA 
or its amendments, thereby expressly repudiating the McMann 
Court's subterfuge analysis. 
Further, in contrast to the Piiot Life example, there is a credible 
explanation for why this disapproval does not appear in the statute. 
Congress was already overriding the McMann decision in text, by 
altering the language of section 4(f)(2) with respect to mandatory 
retirement. Once Congress invalidates the result reached by the 
Court, its failure to invalidate the result twice may reflect nothing 
more than a conclusion that it has done all that is needed.391 In this 
instance, Congress's forbearance from amending section 4(f)(2) in a 
separate place was surely understandable, given that the McMann 
Court had focused on the mandatory retirement issue while analyz-
ing subterfuge as a subsidiary matter.392 From Congress's perspec-
tive, both chambers had fully addressed the primary issue prior to 
conference and did not need to revisit it. At the same time, the 
subsidiary matter of subterfuge was technically beyond the scope of 
conference. Therefore, efforts to alter text could have resulted in 
time-consuming parliamentary maneuvers and perhaps given rise to 
unrelated political risks.393 
Significantly, there was no hint of political contentiousness sur-
rounding the subterfuge issue. The most natural explanation for 
leaving disapproval out of text is not a lack of resolve by the confer-
389. See id. at 8218 (statement of Sen. Javits). 
390. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52. 
391. Cf. text accompanying notes 328-29. Congress has taken legislative action to invali-
date the Court's result, and it is simply unrealistic to assert as a general matter that a failure 
to invalidate the result in several different ways raises the inference that Congress lacks the 
resolve to reject all other aspects of the Court's opinion. Although such an inference might 
become persuasive when the Court's additional analysis gamers some support or even posi-
tive interest within Congress, there is no evidence of any such support or interest with respect 
to the subterfuge analysis. 
392. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38. While the conference report could have 
characterized the Court's treatment of subterfuge more accurately as a "secondary holding" 
rather than simply as "reasoning," the report did get the basic distinction right: subterfuge 
was of subsidiary importance. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 950, supra note 11, at 8. 
393. See supra note 46 (discussing conference rules); supra text accompanying notes 113-
22 (discussing political risks). 
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ees but rather a failure to anticipate that the issue would ever be-
come controversial in a benefit plan setting other than mandatory 
early retirement,394 coupled with a perceived need to get on with 
other legislative business. Under these circumstances, the confer-
ees• decision to limit their expression of disapproval to report lan-
guage was entirely sensible. 
In addition to being reasoned and understandable, the disap-
proval is prominent and salient in the legislative history. The con-
ferees• position on subterfuge was expressly reaffirmed on the floor 
of both the House and Senate by leading proponents of the bill. 
Finally, the disapproval is consonant with the overall thrust of the 
legislation. The 1978 ADEA amendments were meant to 
strengthen the rights of older workers. The legislation expanded 
coverage, added procedural protections, and contracted the scope 
of a key exemption. Disapproyal of an interpretive approach that 
would have used this precise exemption to immunize all pre-Act 
plans is entirely consistent with the objectives of the 1978 
amendments. 
Accordingly, a reviewing court should credit the conference re-
port position rejecting the McMann reasoning on subterfuge. The 
Supreme Court's refusal to do so in Betts was unjustified.395 
394. This failure to anticipate may be inferred from the different ways in which members 
in their floor remarks characterized the conferees' rejection of the McMann reasoning on 
subterfuge. Compare 124 CONG. REc. 7881 (1978) (statement of Rep. Hawkins) (observing 
that the conferees rejected the Court's reasoning, "particularly its conclusion that an em-
ployee benefit plan which discriminates on the basis of age is protected by section 4(f)(2) 
because it predates the enactment of the ADEA'' (emphasis added)) and id. at 7888 (state-
ment of Rep. Waxman) (noting that under the conference report, "[p]lan provisions in effect 
prior to the date of enactment are not exempt under section 4(f)(2) by virtue of the fact that 
they antedate the act" (emphasis added)) with id. at 7887 (statement of Rep. Weiss) ("Under 
this amendment - contrary to the Supreme Court's rationale - a provision in a pension or 
seniority plan which would mandate early retirement would be unlawful regardless of whether 
the plan came into effect before or after the enactment of the ADEA or these amendments." 
(emphasis added)). 
The conference report itself is quite clear about not immunizing plan provisions in general 
because they predate the Act. But it is highly unlikely that Representatives Hawkins, Wax-
man, or Weiss were contemplating the kind of differential disability benefits system that 
arose 11 years later in Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989). 
Still, applying the conferees' understanding of what their legislation means to unanticipated 
circumstances should be no more troubling than applying the legislative language to those 
circumstances, provided that the conferees' understanding may reliably be imputed to 
Congress. 
395. The Betts Court's refusal to credit 1978 legislative history approving the "economic 
purpose" justification for age-based distinctions in employee benefits also was controversial 
and ultimately was overridden by Congress. See supra notes 52, 56. A discussion of that 
history, which involves primarily floor statements not specifically directed at prior judicial 
interpretations of the statute, is beyond the scope of this article. See S. REP. No. 263, lOlst 
Cong., 2d Sess. 9-13 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 664, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 11-15 (1990), reprinted 
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1514-18 (accompanying Older Workers Benefit Protection Act). 
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c. The 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Employee 
Spouses: Some Foresight and Some Political Contentiousness. In 
1978 Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
(PDA),396 amending Title VII to provide for a broadened definition 
of sex discrimination that included discrimination on the basis of 
pregnancy.397 The PDA was a direct response to the Supreme 
Court's decision in General Electric· Co. v. Gilbert, 398 in which the 
Court had held that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities 
· from a company's disability insurance plan was a decision based on 
a disabling condition rather than on gender.399 
A final chapter on the meaning of subterfuge remains to be written. In the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 12,101-12,213 (Supp. III 1991)), Congress prohibited disability-based discrimination in 
employment, transportation, and public accommodations. Section 501(c} specified that cer-
tain provisions regarding insurance classification and underwriting "shall not be used as a 
subterfuge to evade the purposes of" chapters I and III of the Act. ADA§ 501(c}, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1220l(c) (Supp. IV 1992). At the time the ADA was enacted in July 1990, the Betts deci-
sion had not yet been overridden. Congress was still more than two months away from en-
acting the OWBPA. 
There are differences in precise language between the ADA ("shall not be used as a 
subterfuge to evade ... ") and the ADEA as it was then in effect ("which is not a subterfuge 
to evade ... "). Moreover, there is ample legislative history to the ADA rejecting unequivo-
cally the subterfuge analysis from Betts. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. II 
(Education and Labor), at 136 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 419 (stating that 
§ 501(c) "may not be used to evade the [Act's] protections ... regardless of the date an 
insurance plan or employer benefit plan was adopted"}; id., pt. III (Judiciary}, at 71, reprinted 
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 494; S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1990}; see also 136 
CoNG. REc. S9697 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kennedy} (explaining that the 
term subterfuge does not require a purposeful intent to evade the ADA, does not shield an 
insurance plan based on its pre-ADA existence, and "should not be interpreted in the man-
ner in which the Supreme Court interpreted the term in [Betts)"); id. at H4623 (statement of 
Rep. Owens) ("It is not our intent that the restrictive reading of Betts, with which we do not 
agree, should be carried over to the ADA."); id. at H4626 (statement of Rep. Waxman). 
One might conclude from all this that the Court, after twice being rebuffed in its defini-
tional approach to subterfuge, should not seek to impose its definition a third time in the face 
of continuing signals of congressional hostility. On the other hand, the Court may revive its 
subterfuge analysis, on the theory that Congress had not yet expunged the term from the 
ADEA when that term was enacted into law in the ADA. Some commentators have ad-
vanced the argument that Congress in effect endorsed the Betts approach - even though it 
expressly condemned that approach in ADA legislative history and acted to override the 
Betts decision a short time later. See David A. Copus & Glen D. Nager, Benefit Plan Limita-
tions After the Americans With Disabilities Act, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 77 (1993). But cf. 
Ronald S. Cooper, EEOC Issues Guidance on Applying the ADA to Health Insurance Plans, 
2 EMPLOYMENT TESTING L. & PoLY. REP. 125, 128-29 (1993} (adopting a more cautious 
analysis). 
396. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k} (1988)). 
397. See the new § 701(k) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k} 
(1988). 
398. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). 
399. 429 U.S. at 133-40. The legislative history makes clear that Congress acted inten-
tionally to override Gilbert. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1977); H.R. 
REP. No. 948, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 2-4 (1978); 123 CoNG. REC. 7539-41 (1977) (statement of 
Sen. Williams upon introducing the Senate bill}; id. at 10,581 (statement of Rep. Hawkins 
upon introducing the House bill); 124 CoNG. REc. 36,817 (1978) (statement of Sen. Williams 
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Subsequently, disagreement flared over whether the PDA ap-
plied to pregnancy-related differentials in benefits provided for an 
employee's spouse. Typically, the controversy arose when an em-
ployer's health insurance plan offered medical coverage for em-
ployee spouses but limited coverage for the spouse's pregnancy. 
The result was that male employees with spouses had less generous 
medical packages than female employees with spouses.400 The con-
troversy stemmed from two facts: first, Gilbert had involved a plan 
excluding pregnant employees; and second, the text of the PDA was 
inconclusive on its face as to whether the new definition applied to 
employment-related pregnancy discrimination in general or, more 
narrowly, to pregnancy-related discrimination directed at female 
employees.401 The issue of whether Congress, in its legislative his-
tory to the PDA, disapproved only the holding in Gilbert or also the 
Court's reasoning was relevant in resolving the controversy over 
coverage. 
Both the House and Senate committee reports expressly re-
jected the reasoning as well as the holding of Gilbert.402 Each re-
port, after setting forth the Court's ruling, then paraphrased or 
quoted extensively from the Gilbert dissenters' contentions that any 
classification involving pregnancy is necessarily sex-related. They 
also embraced these dissenting views as "correctly express[ing] both 
during the debate on the conference report); id. at 38,573 (1978) (statement of Rep. Hawkins 
during the debate on the conference report). 
400. The lower courts were divided over whether this differential violated Title VII as 
amended by the PDA. Compare EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 680 F.2d 1243 
(9th Cir. 1982) (holding that the statute applies to pregnant employees only), vacated, 463 
U.S. 1202 (1983) and EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 706 F.2d 1469 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(same), vacated, 724 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1983) with Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock 
Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1982), affd., 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982) (en bane) 
(holding that the statute covers pregnancy-related spousal benefits), affd., 462 U.S. 669 
(1983). The Supreme Court resolved the conflict by deciding in favor of broader coverage. 
See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 {1983). 
401. The first sentence of new § 70l{k) consists of two clauses connected by a semicolon: 
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to, 
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and 
women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions shall be treated 
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe 
benefits programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability 
to work .... 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e{k) {1988). The first clause, standing alone, suggests that employment-
related pregnancy discrimination amounts to sex discrimination in all settings. The second 
clause, standing alone, suggests that "employment-related purposes" are only those affecting 
one's "ability or inability to work," and that coverage, therefore, is limited to pregnant em-
ployees. There was disagreement as to whether the meaning of the first clause was limited by 
the employee-specific language of the second clause. Compare Newport News Shipbuilding, 
667 F.2d at 451 with 661 F.2d at 451-52 (Hall, J., dissenting). See generally Newport News 
Shipbuilding, 462 U.S. at 678 n.14; 462 U.S. at 688 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
402. See S. REP. No. 331, supra note 399, at 2-3; H.R. REP. No. 948,-supra note 399, at 2. 
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the principle and the meaning of title VII."4°3 This understanding 
of Title VII was reaffirmed on both the Senate and House floors by 
leading supporters of the legislation.404 
At the same time, while rejecting the reasoning of Gilbert, each 
report also concentrated heavily on the application of this reason-
ing to working women.405 The plight of female employees who be-
come pregnant was overwhelmingly the focus of floor debate in 
both the House and the Senate.406 Moreover, the Senate commit-
tee report identified the issue of how the new statute would affect 
pregnancy-related discrimination in medical coverage among em-
ployee dependents but expressly declined to resolve the issue.401 
The employee dependents issue also surfaced during Senate floor 
debate, with members seemingly in disagreement as to whether the 
PDA covered pregnancy-related benefits discrimination.4os 
403. S. REP. No. 331, supra note 399, at 2; see also H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 399, at 2 
("It is the committee's view that the dissenting Justices correctly interpreted the Act."). 
404. See, e.g., 124 CoNG. REc. 21,435 (1978) (statement of Rep. Hawkins) (stating that in 
rejecting Gilbert, the bill "clarif[ies] congressional intent that sex discrimination includes dis-
crimination based on pregnancy"); id. at 21,437 (statement of Rep. Green) (explaining that 
the bill overturns Gilbert "to prohibit sex discrimination in employment on the basis of preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions"); see also 123 CoNo. REc. 29,387 (1977) 
(statement of Sen. Javits) (quoting Stevens's dissent); id. at 29,641 (statement of Sen. Bayh) 
(quoting Stevens's dissent). 
405. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 331, supra note 399, at 3 (stating that the bill was introduced to 
change the definition of sex discrimination and "to insure that working women are protected 
against all forms of employment discrimination based on sex"); id. at 4 ("The bill would 
simply require that pregnant women be treated the same as other employees on the basis of 
their ability or inability to work."); H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 399, at 6 ("This bill would 
require employers who provide medical benefits for their employees to cover the medical 
and hospital costs of pregnancy ... under the same terms and conditions of coverage for 
other medical conditions."); id. ("In addition to the impact of this bill on fringe benefit pro-
grams, other employment policies which adversely affect pregnant workers are also 
covered."). 
406. See, e.g., 124 CoNG. REc. 21,435 (1978) (statement of Rep. Hawkins); id. at 21,436 
(statement of Rep. Sarasin); id. at 21,438 (statement of Rep. Weiss); id. at 21,439 (statements 
of Reps. Akaka & Corrada}; 123 CoNG. REc. 29,385 (1977) (statement of Sen. Williams); id. 
at 29,387 (statement of Sen. Javits); id. at 29,388 (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
407. 
Questions were raised in the committee's deliberations regarding how this bill would 
affect medical coverage for dependents of employees .... 
. . . This bill would not mandate that women dependents be compared with women 
employees .... 
On the other hand, the question of whether an employer who does cover dependents 
... may exclude conditions related to pregnancy from that coverage is a different mat· 
ter .... It is certainly not this committee's desire to encourage the institution of such 
plans. If such plans should be instituted in the future, the question would remain 
whether, under title VII, the affected employees were discriminated against on the basis 
of their sex as regards the extent of coverage for their dependents. 
S. REP. No. 331, supra note 399, at 5-6. The House report includes no discussion at all of the 
employee dependents issue. 
408. Compare 123 CoNG. REc. 29,642 (1977) (statement of Sen. Bayh} (expressing a be-
lief that "if companies choose to provide full coverage to the dependents of their female 
October 1994) Congressional Commentary 103 
This presents a close question under the proposed approach, but 
on balance the committee report disapproval of the reasoning in 
Gilbert is too politically contentious to be deemed reliable legisla-
tive history with respect fo employee spouses. The report language 
is elaborate and well-reasoned, and accordingly the critique of Gil-
bert's analysis about pregnancy-related exclusions' not being gen-
der-based would be accessible to a reasonably thoughtful member. 
If the committee report and floor debates· had been silent on the 
issue of coverage for employee dependents, then the fact that cov-
erage for dependents was not specifically mentioned in text might 
well be understandable.409 But the discussion in the Senate was 
hardly silent in this regard. The committee deliberated yet ac-
knowledged its failure to resolve the issue.410 The decision to in-
clude report commentary leaving open the extent of coverage .for 
employee dependents is unusual and suggests at least the possibility 
of controversy. That possibility became a reality on the Senate 
floor, where debate disclosed disagreement on the employee de-
pendent issue among the bill's supporters, including several sena-
tors who were members of the committee.411 
employees, then they must provide such complete coverage to the dependents of their male 
employees") and id. at 29,663 (statement of Sen. Cranston) (stating that although the "com-
mittee did not directly answer the question ... my own view [is] that such a plan [covering 
spouses of women employees but not spouses of male employees with respect to pregnancy] 
would indeed be discriminatory" under Title VII) with id. at 29,643-44 (colloquy between 
Sens. Williams and Hatch) (limiting Act to female employees who are or may become 
pregnant). 
409. Congress did override the Court's decision, and its discussion of that override in 
history is predictably focused on pregnant employees. Discrimination against pregnant em-
ployees was the issue presented in Gilbert, and it is obviously the most visible and dominant 
setting for pregnancy-related discrimination in the workplace. Given the report language 
asserting that any pregnancy-related differentials in the workplace were now discriminatory, 
there is no reason to infer that failure to address the distinctly subsidiary and derivative 
matter of employee dependents is anything but inadvertent. Cf. supra text accompanying 
notes 391-94 (discussing ADEA and subterfuge). 
The decision to bring up the bill on the suspension calendar further supports this hypothe-
sis. See 124 CoNG. REc. 21,434 (1978). The bill was sufficiently noncontroversial in the 
House to warrant its expedited ratification on the floor. See id. at 21,450 (approval by 376-
43). The one controversial feature, added as a compromise in committee, was an amendment 
specifying that "pregnancy" and "related medical conditions" do not include abortions ex-
cept when the life of the mother is endangered. This language was not in the Senate-passed 
version, and therefore a conference was almost unavoidable. The House leadership may also 
have pressed for prompt floor action to ensure enough time for conference before the end of 
Congress; ultimately, conference report approvals came on October 13 and 14, 1978, and 
Congress adjourned on October 14. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1786, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4765 (accompanying Civil Rights Act of 1964 - Pregnancy 
Discrimination). 
410. See supra text accompanying note 407. 
411. See supra text accompanying note 408. Senators Williams, Cranston, Bayh, and 
Hatch each voted for the bill on final passage. 123 CONG. REc. 29,664 (1977). All but Sena-
tor Bayh were members of the Committee on Human Resources, which reported the bill. S. 
REP. No. 331, supra note 399, at 12. 
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Under these circumstances, there is ample reason to doubt that 
reasonable senators, exposed to the committee report and the floor 
debate, would understand this history to reflect an intent either to 
cover or not to cover employee dependents. Accordingly, a review-
ing court should regard the committee report's disapproval of Gil-
bert as inconclusive with regard to the scope of coverage and should 
rely instead on other contextual sources in order to resolve the em-
ployee dependent controversy.412 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, I have argued that courts should take legislative 
history seriously as a contextual source of meaning when they inter-
pret statutes. Today more than ever, Congress uses this history to 
enhance its statutory work product by avoiding both an unnaturally 
confining quest for linguistic precision and an unduly burdensome 
pressure on the legislative calendar. To the extent that courts sys-
tematically ignore or devalue such history, they undermine Con-
gress's reasonable efforts to manage its agenda in a complex and 
controversial world. They also impose substantial costs on the leg-
Classifying Senator Hatch as a true supporter is somewhat troubling, inasmuch as he did 
not vote favorably in committee and proposed a number of weakening or hostile amend-
ments on the floor, always joined by an opponent of the legislation. See S. REP. No. 331, 
supra note 399, at 12 (Hatch not recorded as voting on motion to report bill favorably); 123 
CONG. REc. 29,644-60 {1977) (recording the offering of various amendments by Hatch, each 
supported by Helms and opposed by Williams, each withdrawn, modified, or defeated). But 
the statement that the PDA was not intended to cover spouses of male employees is not a 
statement from Senator Hatch alone, which might be suspect; rather it is contained in a collo-
quy between Senator Hatch and the bill's author and principal supporter, Senator Williams. 
See id. at 29,643-44. 
412. There are several alternative contextual reference points available. First is reasoning 
by analogy from the language of the PDA to the surrounding body of law other than the law 
in Gilbert The Court has elsewhere read text seemingly limited to protecting blacks as sim-
ply "emphasizing 'the racial character of the rights being protected' " and not restricting the 
statute's protection to nonwhites. See McDonald v. Sante Fe nail 'Iransp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 
287 (1976) (quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 {1966)) (applying § 1981). Simi-
larly, the text of the PDA referring to "ability or inability to work" could be read as empha-
sizing the functional basis of the pregnancy-related conditions to be covered, without 
restricting the statute's protection to pregnancy among female employees. Second is the 
meaning of pre-PDA Title VII law, and in particular the extent to which medical insurance is 
covered by "terms and conditions of employment" under§ 703(a). See Newport News Ship-
building & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682-83 {1983); see also Wambheim v. J.C. 
Penney Co., 642 F.2d 362, 365 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a head-of-household qualification 
for dependent medical benefits constitutes a prima facie violation of the Title VII ban on sex 
discrimination because only 37% of women employees would receive dependent coverage, 
compared with 95% of men). A pregnancy limitation for dependent medical benefits has 
similar, predictably disparate effects, this time on male employees. Third is deference to 
agency interpretation. Unlike the agency guidelines criticized in Gilbert, EEOC interpretive 
guidelines on the PDA (covering employee spouses) did not conflict with positions previously 
announced by the Commission. 
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islative process, which are likely to result in diminished and diluted 
legislative products. 
The refusal by some jurists and scholars to take these materials 
seriously is striking when contrasted with the courts' stance regard- · 
ing contextual materials produced by the other tWo branches of 
government. Courts often look to concurring judicial opinions in 
an effort to understand and apply the meaning of the majority deci-
sion.413 The concurring opinion is not the law, but it may well offer 
guidance as to how the law should be applied in new or unexpected 
circumstances. Similarly, courts regularly refer to administrative 
agency interpretations and opinions that are not expressed as legis-
lative rules or formal adjudications.414 They do so recognizing that, 
"while not controlling ... by reason of their authority, [these state-
ments] constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to 
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. "415 At 
least some less formal materials produced as part of the legislative 
enterprise constitute a comparable "body of experience and in-
formed judgment." Yet these materials will not be appropriately 
credited if generalized suspicion and criticism of the legislative pro-
cess results in an unwillingness or inability to understand that 
process. 
Critics of legislative history are surely right to point to its short-
comings. As such history has proliferated in recent years, concerns 
about lack of reliability have grown more persistent. Even defend-
ers of history as an interpretive aid have rightly called for 
a more consistent or uniform approach to statutory construction in 
an effort to control misuses.416 
The considerations proposed and applied here are a preliminary 
effort to respond to this challenge. Although the applications dis-
cussed have been limited to one specific type of history, the analysis 
could be extended to other areas. Obviously an "objective" ap-
proach runs the risk of becoming overly mechanistic and not suffi-
ciently sensitive to the nuances of each statutory setting. But that 
risk is outweighed by the benefits for reviewing courts and also for 
Congress. By adopting a more objective means of determining reli-
ability, this approach should make it less likely that judicial resort 
413. See, e.g., First Natl. Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676-77 (1981) (rely-
ing on Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 
203, 223 (1964)). 
414. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944). 
415. 323 U.S. at 140. 
416. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 3, at 214. 
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to legislative history will simply be a way of "looking over a crowd 
and picking out your friends."417 At the same time, by articulating 
explicit standards, the approach encourages legislators and their 
staffs to ensure that history they deem important is expressed in 
sufficiently reasoned and prominent terms. One important result 
could be to improve the quality of legislative history in general. 
That, presumably, should please critics as well as proponents of its 
use. 
417. Id. (quoting an observation made by Judge Harold Leventhal). 
